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CHAPI'ER I 
I NTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Di s serta t i on 
The problem of this dissertation is to make a pre-
liminary psychological assessment of rebellion against 
authority in relat i on to individual growth toward religioUS' 
maturity. How does rebellion influence the processes of 
relig i ous growth? Is there a clear correlation, -positive 
or negative, between certain patterns of rebellion and evi-
dences of religious maturation? To wha t extent is rebellion 
a symptom rather than a precipitating factor at certain 
critical stages of personal development? These are three 
of the questions which press for consideration. 
This study f i nds its motivation part i ally in the growing 
volume of psychological literature dealing with rebellion 
against authority and its implications for personality de-
velopment. The abundance of the s e resources offers oppor-
tu....VJ. i ty to study psychologically a subject that long has been 
of central importance to Christian theology. 
One initial assumption is that psychology is qualified 
to de s cribe the outward manifestations of rebellion and some 
of the varying interpersonal concH tions and psychic activities 
which accompany it. None of these functions violate the 
1 
pr9vince of theology, a lthough the r e a re numerous points of 
mutua l interest a nd concern. In a genuine sense , the two 
disci plines ma y be said to compl ement each other , especially 
where they focus on man in the tota lity of his expe ri ences, 
aspirations , needs , and relationships . Whe r e rebellion is 
concerned , it seems reas onable to expect tha t psychology 
can off e r clinica l da t a , observations , and ins i ghts tha t 
ma y ser·ve to s timulHte a re-examina ti on of traditional theo-
2 
l ogica l doctrines. The considerable degree to which psychology 
has already pr ovided this stimulus gives life to this ex -
l 
pectation. 
The purpose of the present study is not to valida te or 
refute the theological doctrine that e qua tes sin with re-
bellion against God . Rather, the concern is to cla rify 
terminology, colla te psychological data , a nd offer a pre -
limina ry eva lua tion of wha t a ppea r to be two divergent theo-
ries . This divergency is dramati zed by an inte resting con-
temporary phenomenon : a t a time when the doctrine of sin as 
rebellion i s finding renewed expression and emphasis in 
l. This obs e rvation is not intended to disc ount the growing 
influence of theology in many qua rters of psychology. 
Ka ren Horney , Erich Fromm, and Rollo McJ.Y a r e three writers 
whose work reflects the ir keen awareness of theolog ical 
issues. 
3 
2 theology, a number of psychological studies are suggesting 
the positive role that rebellion against authority plays in 
the life of the individual.3 
An exhaustive approach to the questions listed above 
is well beyond the scope of a single study. However, this 
paper is designed to be a contribution to the psychology of 
rebellion and more indirectly to the theology of rebellion 
or the Christian doctrine of s i n . 
2. Definition of Relevant Terms 
i. Rebellion 
For purposes of this study, a psychological definition 
of rebellion is of cardinal importance. The nontechnical 
definition of resistance to or defiance of authority is im-
plicit in the literature of psychology where rebellion and 
conformity are usually treated as antonyms. 
2. One student of theology, Mary Frances Thelen, Man As Sin-
ner (Morningside Heights, New York: King's Crovm Press, 
1946), traces the revival of theological intere s t in man 
as sinner to the year 1932 and to a group of men whom she 
designates as "contemporary, American, realistic" theo-
logians. Most notable among these are: Reinhold Niebuhr, 
Walter Marshall Horton, Robert Lowry Calhoun, John Coleman 
Bennett, and H. Richard Niebuhr. 
3. These studies will be referred to in detail throughout the 
dissertation. Illustrative is the work of Adorno et al., 
The Authoritarian Personalit (New York: Harper an~Broth­
ers, 1950 • In their findings, the authors show that 
patterns of rebellion against authority during childhood 
and youth are related to freedom from ethnocentrism in 
the adult years. 
In one sense , r ebe llion ma y be r ega rded a s one dimen-
s ion of a broader c a t ego ry such a s a ggres s ion, hostility , or 
s en timent . For example , it may be e qua ted with a ggr e ssion 
directed against persons in positions superior t o one ' s own. 
Or , it ma y be de s i gna ted as one type of negative s entiment. 
On the othe r hand, r ebellion shows i t s pr otean , e lus ive 
cha r acter when one a ttempts to rela t e it to pe rsona lity va ri-
bles such a s those we find in H. A. Murrs y ' s t enta tive l ist 
4 
of twenty human need s . Of the twent y , el e ven needs show a 
close r e l at i onshi p to the dynami c s of r e bellion a s defined 
nontechnica lly : a chievement , a ggre ss i on , a ut onomy , c ount e r -
act i on , defendance, dominance , e xh i biti on , ha rm a vo ida nc e , 
i n f a voidanc e , ord er, and r e j ection. t-Jhen and if any of 
the s e need s find t he ir object in a pe rs on or group of pe r-
s ons in posi t i ons o f authority , the t e rm r ebe l l ion ma y be 
appropri a.tely a pp l i ed, if d e fi s.nce a nd resistance a r e con-
s idered to be the key manifes t a ti on s . The poss i bi l ity of 
s uch broa d and va ried a ppl ica tions may be one r eas on why the 
t e rm rebellion ha s made only infre quen t appea r ances in the 
ba sic voca bul a r y of psychology . 
Al ong wi th the likelihood of mul t i ple dete r minant s 
st c:.nd the nume r ou s mod e s by which r ebe l l i on ma y express it-
self. In h i s ana lys i s of pre judice, Gordon Al l port list s 
4. H. A. Murray , Explora tions in Pe r sona lity (New Yo r k : 
Oxf ord Press , 1938 ), pp . 152-226 . 
5 
five degre es or stages of negat i ve act i on: antilocution, 
avoidance, discriminatlon ("detrimental dist i nctions of an 
active sort"), physical attack, and extermi nation.5 While 
not exhaustive, this listing does reflect the wide range of 
actlvi t ies which may stem fr om negat ive attitudes such as 
rebellion. The complexities increase with the r ecognition 
that, since authority is usually synonymous with powers of 
reward and punishment, rebellion i s subject to r epression 
and a ll manner of covert and indirect expression. 
If we attempt to define rebellion i n terms of possible 
emotional components, the task continues to be diffi cult 
and elusive. Anger, hatred, hostil i ty, and resent ment must 
be included i n the range of possibilities and each of these 
poses problems of def i nition and usage. At the same time, 
if their rela tionshi p to rebellion is not clarified, then the 
latter is les s meaningful as a psychological concept. 
Recognizing the complexity of rebellion and the cor-
r espondi ng temptati on to oversimpli fy its definition i n the 
name of parsimony, we conclude that the aim and the object 
(or target) of rebellion are the critical f a ctors which dis-
tingui sh it from aggression in general, and provide a helpful 
perspective from wh i ch to study its origins, modes, and emo-
tlonal components. 
5. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejud i ce (Cambridge, Ma~ 
sachusetts: Addison-W:csley Publishing Co., Inc., 1954), 
pp. 14-15. 
6 
Rebellion , as conc ei ved in thi s diss e rta tion , describes 
any defi a_nt or resi s tive behavi o r by which a n individual seeks 
to gain to t s.l or pe: rt i a l freedom from the cla ims and control 
of one or more forms o f authority . The freedo m s o ught ma y be 
temporary or transiti onal and the a uthority ma y be huma n or 
divine . I n any c a se , the go~l of rebelli on is a l ways freedom 
or independence a nd the ob.ject is a h Ja.ys some f o rm o f a uthority , 
p e rceiv ed a s s t a nding in o p p osi t ion to the desire d fr eedom . 
Desp it e eviden t simila rities , rebellion i s not the 
psycholog ica l e qu iva lent o f aggr ession . Re b e llion is l e ss 
diffuse , more f o c a li zed tha n a ggres s i on , eve n tho ugh authority 
offers a wide r a n ge of t a r gets . Furthe rmore , r ebe lli on does 
n o t necessari l y i nvol v e a~gression i n the sense o f a tta cking 
o r o vercoming forcefull y . Rebe llion often i ntroduces a pas -
s ive dimen s ion which is not sug g ested in the n o rmal inter-
pret a t i ons o f a gg r ession . 
I n a simila r vein , r ebe lli on is not s ynonym ous with 
Mu rra y ' s "au t on omy n eed ," 6 a lthough the at t a inment of freedom 
i s the g oa l o f t he l a tter . Auton omy i s one o f tho se ne e ds 
which i"'urra y de s i gn Gtes as proacti v e , tha t i s , it o ri gina t e s 
wi t hin the pe r s on . Re bel l i on often i s r e a c t ive , r esponding to 
s timuli in the pe r son ' s environment . Thus , it mi ght be re-
l s.ted to the needs o f defend c:m ce , h .... r me voidence , and 
6 . Murra y , 1_oc. cit . 
7 
infa voidance ( the avoida.nce o f humili a tion , embarrassment , 
o~ belitt l ement ). 
These obse rv2tions a re made in order to j u s t i f y the us e 
o f rebellio~ as e.n independ ent concept , d espit e i ts close re -
l s.t ionsh i p to o~her , more - widely- used te r ms . 
At th i s po i nt in our task o f offering r elevant de f-
initions , the pu r poses of clarity may be served if we re turn 
bri e f l y to the probl em o f segregat i ng emot i on l components 
tha t may accompany rebe llious behavi or . Fir s t , l et us h ypothe -
s i z e t wo bas i c t ypes o f r ebellion . We may employ Murray ' s 
" p roa c t ive 11 and " rea ctive " c a t ec;or es o r a dapt Erich Fromm ' s 
disti nc tion betwee~ " cha r acter-condit i oned " and " r eactive " 
7 hate . Essenti a lly , thes e bifu rca tions hs ve the same meaning . 
Re ct ive rebellion wil l be the sub j ect o f Chapt e r s V and 
VI o f the dis ser t a ti on . Here we wi ll s i mply note t h a t ange r 
a ppear s to be the mos t likely a ccompani ment o f this t ype o f r e -
volt , since aneer is a h i gh l y react i ve emot i on : a tra nsitory 
emoti onal state , exper i enced personal ly o r e mpa.th i c a l ly and 
d ' f t th t . . t d . 8 arouse oy a s en se o un j us Tt-Ja r 1ng o r unme r1 e p.:nn . 
--------
7. Erich Fromm , Man f o r Hi mself : An I nou i ry into the Ps ycho logy 
o f Ethics ( NevJ Yo rk : Rineha rt a nd Company , I nc . , 1947) , 
pp . 214- 215 . 
8 . I n h i s Rhetoric ( Book I I ) , Ari s totle d e fines ange r as "an 
i mpul s e , accompanied by pain , to a c ons p icuous re v enge for 
a c ons p i cuous sl i ght direc t e d without just ification towa rd 
wha t conc erns onesel f o r t oward s wha t con c erns one ' s 
fri ends ." I n t e r estingl y , Ar i stotle , in a n a l yz i ng a n ger , 
anticipates the theory of r epres s i on by observing the in-
compa ti b ili t y o f f ec:T and a n ge r with re f e r ence to the same 
person . Mode r n psychoanalyt i c i nsi ght p o i n t s to a similar 
incompa ti b ility be t ween f e a r a nd r ebell i on . 
One r easonabl e p rediction is tha t in company with a n g er , 
reb e lli on i s likely to be directe d aga inst individua ls 
r a ther tha n g roups . Sinc e r evenge is the goa l o f a n g er a nd 
freedom the a im o f r ebell ion, we ma y c onc e ive o f a fusion 
i n which rev enge is a chieved by the as s e r ti on of on e ' s i n -
dependence . 
I n p roac t ive o r cha r a cter-condi t i oned rebellion , h a tred 
a ppea r s to r epl a ce a n ge r a s the d aminant emotion . Ha t r ed is 
a ne ga tive s en t iment , d e ep- sea t e d i n t he ma t ri x of pe r son-
al i ty and enduring i n its i n t en sity . I ts power may f a ll upon 
groups a s wel l a s ind ividua l s a nd d oe s not re quire previous 
of f ense a t the h a nd s o f its victim . Aristotle obs e rves tha t 
h a t r e d ma y be ba sed on d istorted p e r cep tions o f a nothe r ' s 
cha r a c ter . Its chief goa l is not s o much the inflicting of 
pain as the e x tinction o f i t s object . In f u r the r contra st to 
a n ger , h a tred is i ncompa tible with l ov e a nd p ity . 
By d esi gnating these t wo basic types of r ebell ion, we 
hypothes i ze t ha t rebe l l i on ma y be a capa ci t y a nd/o r a s ent i-
ment . As a cap a c ity, r e b e llion is the abili ty or potential 
to defy a nd resi st s.u tho ri ty i n the name o f fr e edom . As a 
s ent i ment, r ebe llion is more tha n a potential , it is a con-
tinuous rea di ne s s to defy and resist. Pa r aph rasing From!n, 
cha r a cter- conditi oned reb e llion o f ten i s '' g r a tuitous," us i n g 
eve r y o ppo r tuni t y to expre s s itself a nd to rationa li ze i ts 
exis t en ce i n terms of rea ctive rebe llion . 9 
9 . Fromm, ££· c it., p . 215 . 
8 
Gordon Al lpo r t ' s def inition of sent i ment a.l so furthe r s 
t he attempt t o of fer a workabl e de finition of proactive re -
bell i on . A sentiment , i n Allport ' s view, i s a r elative l y 
sta ble un i t of pe r sonality , r ough ly e quiva lent to i nterest , 
ou tlook or sys t em of beli e f s . For Al l po r t , sent i ments , l ike 
habits and t r e its are va r iabl e express i ons o f " the p r i ma ry 
un i t of menta l life ": "or gan i zed mo t ive , " or "mot ivat ed 
o r gan i zation ." This pr ims.ry unit i s "a system of readine ss , 
a ma i nspring of conduct , prepari ng the per son f or adaptive 
beha vi or whenever the appr op ri a te st i mulus o r a ssoc i ations 
10 
a re p r esent ." 
As a de fini t i on of sentiment , Allport of f e r s t he f ol -
l owi ng : "an o r gan i zat i on of fe e l ing and t hough t directed 
toward s ome d e fi nable ob j ec t of va l ue . .. 11 Sentiment 
is le s s specif ic , l ess i ngr a ined t han habi t . I t is di s tin-
gui shed from t ra it by t he lat t e r ' s "broade r style of ada pt -
ing wi t hout r e f e r ence to speci f ic stimulus .. . Wh i l e 
sent i men t r e qu i res a specifi c ob j e c t of va l ue , the ob j ect 
ma y be abs tract or conc r e t e . Sentiment may have nega t i ve 
mani fest a ti ons , of which r ebellion is one . 
For our pur poses , proactive r ebe l lion i s de fi ant or 
r es istive beha vior which is o r i ent ed p rima rily a r ound an 
10 . Go rdon Allpo r t , The I ndividua l and Hi s Rel i gi on (New 
Yo r k : The Macmi l l an Company , 1930 ) , p . 55 . . . 
l l . I bid . 
12 . Ibid . 
9 
lQ 
inner orga.nization of negat iv e fe eling and thought , and 
dire cted toward one o r mo re f orms of authori ty f or the sake 
of ach i e ving t otal or part i al fr eedom fr om the claims and 
con trol of tha t a utho r ity. 
Allport further contribut es to o u r think i ng with his 
def i n i tion o f the mature r el i g ious sentiment : " a dis pos i t i on 
built up throug h experi en ce, to r espond f a v o r ably , and in 
ce rta in ha b i tua l way s , to conc eptual object s a nd p rinci p les 
t ha.t the individu a l r e ga rd s a s of ultima te importance i n h i s 
own life , a nd a s having to do with wh s. t h e regard s a s pe r-
1.3 
manent or cent r a l in the na ture of thi ngs ." 
!\.gain , in an effort to a dapt Al lport to the purposes 
o f this study , we may define pro activ e , r eligious r e bellion 
as : a dispos i tion b u_ilt up t h r ough ne g a.t i ve exp e ri en ce , to 
respond unf a vora b ly , and in certain f.l ab i t ua.l way s , to con-
c e p tual objects and princ i pl e s ths.t the individual rega r d s 
a s posing an u l tima te thr e a t t o his e xistenc e , since he 
rega rds them as p e rm anent or centra. l in the nature o f th ings. 
Used in this sense , reli g i ous rebe lli on bec omes a p sycho-
log ical synonym for rebellion agains t God . The modes o f 
defi ance a nd re s i stence a re seen as habitue l , a nd the element 
of threa t is introduced a s an etiolog ical f a c tor . Freed om 
from the cla i ms and c ontrol o f ultima te a uthority, while no t 
de si gnated s p ecific a l l y , is held to be t he c entra l a i m o f 
r ebel li on i n this, a s in p r e vious d e f i n itions . 
l J . I bid ., p . 56 . 
ll 
ii. Authority 
Turning now to the concept of authority, we find the 
related psychological literature to be very extensive, but 
often vague or inconsi s tent in its definitions. Functionally, 
the social psychologist usually equates authority wi th in-
fluence. In an analysis by Adams and Romney, for example, 
authority is described as the ability to gain a desired or 
reinforcing response from another person, whether by request, 
fiat, or a simple expre s sion of need or desire. 14 It is in-
teresting that the a pplication of this definition to the 
family places the young child in a positi on of great poten-
tial authority, thus modifying the traditional picture of 
overwhelming parental control. 
Another study suggests the wisdom of differentiating 
authority from power. Authority is defined as "the poten-
tiality to influence (ability to reward and punish based on 
a position"--the "legitimized right to means-ends control."l5 
Power, on the other hand, is seen as the "actual ability of 
14. J. Stacy Adams and A. Kimball Romney, "A Functional 
Analysis of Authority," Psychological Review, LXVI 
(1959), 234-251. The authors write: "We define author-
ity as follows: Person A has authority over Person B, 
in a given situation , when a response of A, under the 
control of deprivation or aversive stimulation and spec-
ifying its own reinforcement, is reinforce d by B." p. 234. 
15. W. G. Bennis, N. Berkowitz, M. Affinito, and M. Malone, 
"Authority, Power and the Ability to Influence," Human 
Relations, XI (1958), 144. 
12 
16 influence ," " the actua l cont rol of means - end s . " According 
to th i s theory , powe r i s authority which has gained the 
actual a ccep t anc e of a pe r son in a subordinate po s i t ion . 
The concept of a uthori t y as po t enti a l influence is 
ge r mane t o the concept o f p re ss , a s deve l oped by H. A. 
Murra y . Murray uses press t o r epresent si gnificant envi -
r onmenta l determinants of behavi or . "The 2!:_~ss of an ob j e c t 
is wha t it can do to the sub jec t or f o r the sub ject-- the 
power that i t has to a f fect the well - be ing of the subject 
in one way or anothe r . 17 Recognizing t he i mportanc e of pe r -
c e ption , Murra y goe s on to dis t inguish between the s i gnifi -
cance o f envi r onmental objects a s the individua l pe rc ei ves 
and inte r pr ets them ( " beta press " ) , and the at tributes of 
those ob j ects a s ob jec t ive inquiry di sc l oses them ("alpha 
pres s " ) . 
I n Mur r ay ' s t hinking , the i mport ant quest i on of wh e ther 
the pre ss of an obj ect becomes a ctua lized , involves the add i -
ti onal conc epts of ca t hex i s and s entiment . Cathexis refers 
to the capac i ty of an envirolli~ ental ob j ect to a t t r a c t or 
r epe l an i ndi vidua l . Sentiment , which Murray define s much 
a s Allport doe s , r epr e sents a t endency wi thin the individua l 
to be a ttracted o r r epelled by certa i n ob j ectE in the 
16 . I bi d . 
17 . Murr ay , .2..12. · ci t ., p . 121. 
environment. Both terms have a positive and a negative 
dimension, as does press. 
Still another development in psychology which has rel-
evance here is the c onsiderable attention which has been di-
rected to authoritarian factors in personality and interper-
sonal relationships. These studies have tended to describe, 
study, and evaluate authority in terms of three pairs of 
antinomies: 
(1) Democratic-authoritarian 
When the governing source of an individual's values is 
authoritarian, it e s tablishes a relationship of inequality, 
by virtue of its own power. Such authority is preoccupied 
with its own status, to the exclusion of intere s t in or con-
cern for its subject. Excluded from this relationship are 
love, freedom, justice, and the dignity of human personality. 
As a rule, authoritarian types rely on coercion and fear to 
elicit a response of unquestioning obedience which is equated 
with ultimate virtue. 
Democratic authority describes a relationship of basic 
equality wherein differentials in knowledge, skill, or ex-
perience invite a critical, discriminating acceptance or 
rejection of another's values or principles. In such a re-
lationship, elements of love, freedom, justice, and human 
dignity predominate. 
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(2) Rational-irrational 
18 To borrow a phrase from Harold Kelman, rational 
authority is not logical in character but rather "in ratio 
with the actualities": the actualities of the authority it-
self, its subject, and the particular circumstances under 
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which the two are brought together in the authority relation-
ship. 
Irrational authority is governance claimed or accorded 
beyond the dictates of reason and the standards of compe-
tence. It defies rational, discerning evaluation by the 
subject or by others around him. The performance of such 
authority discredits its validity except for those whose re-
liance upon it is motivated by unconsci ous factors. 
(3) Heteronomous-autonomous 
The term heteronomous describe s authority which is 
external to the self. Autonomy, on the other hand refers to 
an authority that emanates from the self as the integrated, 
valuing center of personality. Depth psychology has demon-
strated that heteronomous authority can be internalized as 
superego without becoming fully integrated with the ego. 
Although experienced subjectively as "one's own," conscience 
in this form is actually an internal echo of external voices. 
18. Harold Kelman, "Rational and Irrational Authority: A 
Holistic Viewpoint," American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
XI I ( 19 52 ) , 50 • 
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Theoretically , authori ty -c a n be rat ional in its clai ms 
b ut authorita r i an in i ts meth od s . Or , it c a n be external in 
i ts locus , but committed to fr e edom o f thought and a c tion on 
the part of its subje c t . Vi a this line o f rea soning , authori -
t a ri a.ni sm , irra ti onality , and heteronomy appea.r to be inde-
pendent va riabl es . Howe v e r , in the ir study o f The Authori -
t ari an Pe r sonality , l9 Adorno , Frenkel - Bruns;.r i c k , Levinson , and 
Sa.nford off e r signi fic ant data to show the t end ency o f the s e 
va riable s to a ppea r toge the r as an authoritari a n syndrome . 
The f o re6oing summa r y of psychology ' s use o f the term 
authori ty reveals a tend enc y to equa te authori ty with i nflu-
ence , us ing both to convey the idea of " powe r o ver ." Th is 
powe r may be po tenti a l or a ctua l, a nd it ma y or may not be 
besed on posi t i on or on a c a pab i l i ty to reward or punish . 
I t ma y be temporary or long r a n g e , af f ect i ng a s i ngl e a c t , 
or a way o f life -- i n f l u enc ing a t t i tude s and va lues , o r s imply 
an indi vidual ' s e fforts to reac h a g iven g oa l. 
"Power ov er " i s a n important a.spect o f authority , but 
the re i s a second di mens i on whi ch ca~not b e i gno r e d , esp eci a lly 
I 11 20 It II i n a study o f rebellion . I t is 'powe r to . Power ove r 
19 . New York : Harpe r and Brothers , 1950. 
20 . The wri ter is indebted to Erich Fromm for these terms , 
212. · .s:_i ~·, r::·P · 87 - 88 . Howev e r , Fromm uses " p ower o ve r" 
neg tive ly to deno te domina t i on , wh e r eas we ~refer a 
broa der d e f i nition which include s mor al p e rsuasion as 
well as the negat ive aspec t whi ch Fromm is emphasiz i ng . 
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i s the i nte r pe r s on a.l di men s ion of au thori t y ; "powe r to " is 
t h e pe r son a l d i men sion . Al t h ou gh the pe r s onal asp ec t may 
be cons trued as gene r a l c apacity or po tency , a partic ul a r 
empha si s on powe r to make free a nd responsibl e cho ices is 
i n t end ed here . Be c a u se o f this emphas i s , t he r e e me r g e s a 
clea r r e l ationshi p betwe e n a utho rity and aut onomy . This re -
l at i on ship wi ll be d e v e loped more f u l ly i n Chapter II . 
Due to t he e qual i mportance o f the t wo fo c i , ·we shall 
r e t a in both th r oughout this d is se r tati on by the u se of " in-
t e r pe rs ona l " a nd '' personal authority ." Interpe r son a l a utho rity 
may be defi ned as " n owe r ov e r " or t h e a bi lity t o i nf luenc e 
21 
o t hers in t e rm s o f me ans- ends contro l . Li ke Murray ' s 
"pre ss ," inte r persona l 2.u thori t y is a product o f c a t h e x is 
and sent i ment or the i n t era c tion o f c e rtc: i n chc:Tacteri s tics 
i n t wo or mor e pe r sons . Unlike "press , 11 i n t e r pe r son a l a u t hor-
i ty is n ot s t r i ct l y dete rmi ned by i ts capaci t y t o a ff e c t t h e 
wel l-be ing o f a noth e r , a lth o ugh thi s c apac i ty is fre qu ently 
an impor t ant a dj unct o f autho rity. 
Pe r son .l a uthori t y i s " power to " o r the a bi l i t y to make 
free and respons i b l e d e ci s i ons conc e r n ing one ' s va.lues and 
ways the se values s r e to b e tta i ned . In t hi s di sser t a t i on , 
pers ona l a utho rity and a utonomy wil l be used i nte r c ha.nga bly . 
21. Whi le the ad j e ctive "in t erpe r sons.l " c annot be aptly a ppl i ed 
to t ~e autho ri t y ves t e d i n soc i 8 l a n d r e li g ious i nst itu -
tions and sanctions , it i s a thesis o f th i s di sse r t a t i on 
tha t the essent i al i ngredi ent s i n both s uthority and r e -
b el li on a re hi t hly pe r son a l and n e ver i m,personal . 
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). Limitations 
This study essenti ally is an at tempt to rela te the 
psychology of rebellion to the psychology of pe rs onal re-
li gious development . Both areas are broad , having received 
contributions from ne Prly every branch of dynami c psychology. 
In the chapters tha t follo w, we sha ll limit our sources 
l a r gely to the theori es and findings o f three schools of 
dynamic psychology : 
l) The psychoana lytic school 1.-'Ji th its inte res t in the 
uncon scious dimensions of persona.li ty a.s critica l deter-
minants of behavior in general, and reli gious phenomena in 
pa rticula r. Si gm und Fre ud, a s the founder and mo s t eminent 
representative of this perspective, receives speci a l emphasis. 
2) The socio-interpersonal school with its interest 
in the relationa l , environmenta l f actors tha t ch ':: r acterize 
a nd sha pe person&,li ty . Close a ttention to the soci a l dim en-
sions of personality pervades the wo r k of such n eo -Freudians 
a s Sullivan , Horney , and Fromm whose theori es receive con-
siderable attention in this s tudy. 
J) The school of individua l-ego psychology. Under 
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this ca tego ry, we include Allport, Carl Rogers, and others 
who give empha sis to con scious motivation and the interna l 
22 . This link i ng of Allport and Rogers ha s a functional purpose 
and is not intended to dismiss c ert a in b9.sic differences 
between the t wo . Support f o r our p r esent empha sis on the 
simila rities of these two men ma y be found in Hall and 
Lindzey , Theories of Persona lity (Ne v.J York: John itJ iley and 
Sons , I nc., 1957) , pp. ·257-295, 467-502 . 
frame of reference. A second comm on element among the s e 
psychologi s t s is the i mportance they attach t o a qualitativ e 
study of the individual. Thirdly, there is a prominen t us e 
made of 11 ego 11 or 11 self 11 concepts in de s cribing pers onality. 
In its focus on the individual as a creature more of t he 
present t han the past, t hi s scho ol, along with the socio-
interpersonal school, counterbalance s t he strong orientation 
to the past, evident in much of psychoanalytic thought. 
Of equal significance for thi s study i s t he psychology 
of religion with its particular i n teres t in personal re-
ligious development. This psychology scarcely can be i denti-
fied with a single school s i nce its history and its c ontent 
has been enriched by many, varied sources. In general, the 
eclectic character of the psychology of rel igi on will be 
a pparent. 
A further limitati on of t his s tudy i s tha t rebellion 
a gainst authority is c ons idered primarily a s it rela te s to 
four specific, criti cal stages of the growth proce s s: 
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l) The Oedipal complex in infancy (as described by Freud). 
2) The formati on of cons cience in childho od (as de-
scribed by Freud, Gordon Allport, and others). 
3) The identity crisis of youth (as described by Erik 
Erikson). 
4) The problem of Ultimate Authority in adulthood (as 
described by Gordon All port, Erich Fr omm , Rol l o May , and 
others). 
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Finally, the di s sertation adopt s a phenomenolog ical 
a pproach to the problem of rebellion, and thi s approach b e-
comes a limiting factor. Specifically, we s hall be concern ed 
primarily with authority a s it is experienced a n d perceived by 
the individual, as over a gains t authority a s objective re ality. 
The i mportance of the latter perspective is n o t den ied; rather, 
it is reluctan tly set aside for later s t u dy in t h e interes t of 
doing justice to perceptual factor s too significant to be dis-
counted in the search for a unifying theory. Throughout the 
chapters tha t follow, there will be an apparen t a n d inten tional 
emphas is upon the prin ciple that, bey ond a knowledg e of stimuli 
themselves, it is important to understand how the stimuli are 
perceived by t he pers on under study. Only then do many anomalous 
patterns of rebellion bec ome meaningful. 
Thus, t h e pre s e n t study is limited both in terms of its 
psycholog ical perspectives and the stages of persona lity de-
velopment on which the s e perspectives will f ocus. Th e s e limi-
tations are desi gned to bring t h e problem wi t hin the sc ope of a 
s ingle study without sacrificing the prin ci ple s of academic 
integrity. 
4. Previous Research in the Field 
Rebellion a ga i nst authority has long been a mutual 
concern of psychology and theolo gy. Historically, theologi-
cal interest in the subject claims a definite seniority. 
The myths of Adam's rebel l ion a gain s t God in t h e Garden of 
Eden and the contumacy of Prometheus a gains t the divin e 
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monopoly of fire demonstrate the a lmost timeless ingredient 
whi c h r e li gious students o f human na ture ha ve discerned in 
man ' s disturbed r elat ionship with his God or gods . 
Ps ychology ' s ea rliest interest in the subject of re-
bellion can be tra ced largely to the observa tions and theo ries 
of Sigmund Freud . It was Freud who , more than any other, 
saw in childhood rebell i on against pa r enta l authority a 
dynamic p rocess , universal in its manifesta t ion a nd life-
long i n i ts c onsequenc es f o r lndividua l cha r acter . When 
Freud linked the Oedipal conf l ic t of the chi ld with the re-
li gi ous a tti tudes of the adult , he opened to psychology a 
sub ject whi ch heretofo re had been res e rved l r gely f or theo -
logical s tudy and insight : rebellion against God . 
Chal lenges a gai nst Freud ' s pronouncements conce rning 
the val idity of r eli gious beli e f and pr a c t ice ha ve been 
sus t a ined and vociferous . Our concern at this point is 
n e ither to defend nor criticize Freud ' s att acks on r el i gion . 
We only wish to suggest tha t his hypothesis of t h e Oedi pal 
conflict and. its relationship to the r eli g ious sentiment has 
been a goad of grea t import ance in the psychology of r e -
ligi on . I n te r ms of its heuristic va lue , this Freudi an 
theory merit s a place bes ide the William J ame s clas sic , 
2'"' The Var ietie s of Rel igious Expe ri ence . J 
In a word , it may be s a id tha t the theology of re -
bellion against authority- a disci pline of l ongstanding-
23. New York : Longmans , Gr een· and Co . , 1902 . 
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has f ound i n the present century its counterpart in the d evelop-
ment of the psychology of rebellion . 
Using the phrase " the psycholog y of rebellion" ma y be 
mi s l eading beca use it sug ges ts a hi ghly organi zed , clearly 
a r t iculated , and comprehens i ve structure in which va rious 
schools of thought a re c a re f ull y def ined and related . In 
a ctuality , the psychology of rebellion is loosely organized 
and ill - defined . A number o f its hypo theses and definitions 
a re in conflict and its conclusions are oft en elus ive . 
The conflict is perhaps most apparent when one com -
pares the study of rebellion wi thin th e ps ychology of reli -
g ion with studies o f soc i al or d epth psychology . Some of 
the ma j or component s of such a compa rison may be s ummar i zed 
a s follows : 
l ) There is agreement that rebe l l ion is one im portant 
aspect of an ubi QUitous human problem : c omin g to terms with 
a uthority. There is disag r eement as to the nature and c a use 
o f the rebe llious r esponse and its ef fec ts upon personali ty 
growth . 
2) There is agreement that rebe llion a a i nst p r elim-
i n ary au thority ( pa rents , tea chers , ministers , other repre -
s ent e tives o f s oci a l and mora l law) is intima tely re l ated to 
24 
rebelli on aga inst ult ima t e a utho ri ty , i n so f a r a s the latte r 
24. "Pre l imina ry authori ty " and " ul tims. te authority " are terms 
b o rrowed f r om Pa ul Till i ch ' s The New Bein g (Ne w York : 
Charles Scribne r ' s Sons , 1955 ), pp . 79- 91 . Here , Tillich 
includes unde r " p reliminary a uthority" : pa r ents ; wisdom 
a nd knov·J ledge ; comm uni ty , state , nation , and society ; a nd 
the c hur ch . 
is subject to psychologi ca l observation and analysis . There 
is d i sagr eement as t o the nature and extent of th i s rela -
ti onship . 
A survey of psychologi c a l lite r a ture shows the con-
cept of rebellion i s not basic to contempor a ry psychologies 
25 
o f rel i g ion excep t in the "confli c t ual psychology " of Freud , 
who r e l a tes it to the Oedipal complex of childhood and l a ter 
r elig i ous t endencie s in the adult . 
I n gene r al , psychology has vi ewed rebel lion a s an 
evidence of inner conflict rather than an indicati on of 
g row t h . These conflicts are moat critica l in the turbulent 
yea r s of adole sc enc e , henc e the expectati on tha t reb ellion 
will be an inevita ble phase of thi s period of development . 
Otherwise , rebellion is g iven n e urotic connota tions , 
26 
s o tha t the "rebel without a ca use " becomes a prototype , 
not only of the psychopa thic personality bu t of a l l va lue-
less r ebelli on , which br eeds destructi on and personal deteri -
oration . 
Tha t rebel l i on is not more widely regarded a s a sig-
nificant f actor in personality development ma y be rela t ed to 
s evera l f a.ctors . One is the modificat i on of the Freudian 
25 . A descriptive term borrowed from Pa ul E. Johnson , 
Ps ychologL_£f Reli gi on (Nashville : Abingdon Press , 
1959 ), pp . J2 - J7 . 
26 . The title of a hypnoanalyt i c study by Robert M. Lindne r . 
(New York : Grune a nd St r atton , 1944) . 
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view of the early child-parent relationship. No longer is 
blinding rebellion against the parent of the opposite sex 
seen as a normal and universal phenomenon. Rather, the 
feel i ng is tha t while Freud has done a genuine servi ce in 
fre eing childhood of its utopian trappings, he has probably 
overstated the degree of the frustrations and the intensity 
of the conflict in the growth of the normal child. It seems 
more appropriate to see in Freud's description a fairly 
accurate statement of the dynamics that characterize neurotic 
r e lationships, to wh i ch Freud's remarkable analytical powers 
would have had the greatest exposure. 
This is only another way of restating a previous ob-
servation: except for its frequent occurrence as a manifes-
tation of the ad~lescent's identity crisis, rebel l ion against 
authority is generally regarded as one possible product of 
neurotic conflict rather than a vital dimension of human 
personality. 
One notable exception to this general statement is the 
position of Robert Lindner, who has attempted to reviv i fy the 
concept of rebellion by making it central rather than periph-
eral in his psychology. We shall de a l with Lindner's contri-
buti.ons in detail in later chapters. Here, ~Je nay observe 
that, wh i le his "'prescription for re be llion1t '2 7 has stirred 
much discussion, it has gained little acceptance in psycho-
logical circles. 
27. A book by this title carries the burden of Lindner's 
central hypothesis. (New York: Rinehart and Company, 
1952. ) 
Returning to Freud , his p r o te s t ag2. i n s t r eli gi ous 
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a utho rity ( 2, form of r ebell i on , it m2.y be sa i d ) ha s sur-
v i ved rec ent deca de s with littl e more success than his theo ry 
of the uni ve rsa l i ty of the oed ipa l compl ex . I t is wi dely 
agreed toda y tha t in both descri pt ions of auth ority r e l a t ion-
ships (ch i l d- pa r ent , man- God) one may find more neur osis 
than no rma lity . In both i nstances , Freud ' s observati on s a r e 
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v lid . His e rror l ~ in his ov er - genera li zi ng these obse rva-
tion s i nto unive r sal principles . 
Proof that Freud ' s ant i pa thy t o r eligious a utho rity i s 
no t exti nct i s to be f ound in the cont empora ry wri t i ngs of 
1~rich Fromm , a n eo- Freudi an . To di sm is s the f or ce fu l and 
lucid a r guments of a brill i an t mind with a few sen t ences 
would be f a t uo us , t o say the lea st . Much of this study wil l 
be an at t empt to re spond , somet i mes critj_ca lly but a l ways 
ap 9rec i a t ively , t o Fromm ' s indictments of r el i t_, i on and his 
al terna t i ves . 
He r e , it is s uf f i ci ent to not e tha t Fromm' s pol emic is 
aga ins t "a uth orit a r i an religi on" a s oppo s ed t o wha t he ca l ls 
"humani s tic r eli gi on . "29 Unl ike Freud , he s ee s in rel i gion 
forc es which are f a r mo r e r e voluti ona ry t ha n i llusory . 
28 . The clea rest s t a tement of this protest is in The Future 
of an I llusion , trans . W. D. Robs on- Sco tt (Ga rden City , 
New York : Doubleda y and Co ., I nc ., 1957). 
29 . Er ich Fromm , f.§_ychoana lysis and Rel i gion (New Ha ven : 
Yal e Un i ve rsi ty Pre ss , 1950) , pp . J4- 55 . 
Essenti a lly , however , he and Freud are both fi ghting an 
externa l f o r m of tyranny (authorita ri anism) whi ch robs man 
of his greatest potential by fost e ring a r egressive depend-
ency and a stultify i ng subservience . Both men make a pene-
trating ana lysis of neurotic reli g i on and evoke a response 
tha t clarifies the nature of mature reli gion. It is t o 
Fromm's credit tha t his r ebellion aga inst r eli gious a uthor-
ita rianism shows a dis crimina tion which is not evident in 
the e a rlier writings of Freud. 
Both Freud and Fromm a dvoca te a response to authori -
t a ri anism , to which the name r ebellion c an be applied only 
with mis g iving . The way of rebe llion ma y be impl ied, but 
it is seldom sta ted . If rebe l lion is impli ed , it is a lways 
against externa l authority in the name of autonomy. The 
rebellion is clea rly rationa l and va lue- ori ent ed . 
Fromm regard s achievement of autonomy a s the fi na l 
solution to the proolem of authority. Howe ver, we will 
l a ter c onside r the po ssibili t y 30 tha t autonomy is not the 
ultima te s olution to the problem of a uthority and tha t in a 
mil itant mode , it m y signify re belli on against ul t im2te 
a uthority. The fi rst pa rt of this hy po th es is find s support 
i n the thinking o f J ohn H. Schaa r , who ha s ana lyzed the 
pe r spective of Erich Fromm under the p rovoca tive title, 
Escaoe From Authority . Jl 
J O. Chapter II. 
Jl . New York : Basic ~ooks , I nc ., 1961 . 
Authoritarianism a s a soci a l phenomenon ha s attra cted 
considerabl e psychologica l study since th e resurgence of 
f a scism in Europe and the subse quent eruption of ~'Jorld Ha r 
I I. Of pa rti cula r signi fic ance is a s eri es of studi es spon-
sored by The American Jewish Commi ttee in an ef fort to seek 
sol utions to the r e l a ted problem s of f a scism and pr e judice 
through sci entific methods of r e sea rch . 
One of t hese studies , a s summarized in The Autho r i -
J2 
tari an Pe r sona lity, shows the crucia l role tha t att i t ud es 
tovmrd a utho ri ty pl ay i n the dynamics of pre j udice . A con-
e l usion of particular import for the pr esent study sta tes 
tha t ethnoc entrism ha s a hi gh correla tion wi th submission to 
and dependence upon pa r ental authorit y and pa r enta l r el i gion . 
A simila r high corre lation linked ethnocen trism to the follow-
ing s cale it em : "Every person should ha ve a de ep f a ith in 
some supe rna tura l f orce hi gher t han h imself to which he 
g i ves tota l a llegi ance a.nd whose deci sions he does no t ques-
JJ 
tion." 
Conve rs ely , this study finds a no t able abs ence of pre j-
udice where the subject ' s r el i gion ha d been interna li zed 
"independently of o r in revol t against the main ca r r i e r of 
J 4 
r eli gious influenc e in the f amily. " 
J 2. Adorno , Frenl{el - Brunswik , Levinson , and Sanford , The 
Authori t a.ri an Personality (New York : Ha r pe r and Brothe r s , 
195 0) . 
JJ . I bid ., p . 218 . 
J4 . Ibid., p . 215 . 
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De spite the i mplied rebellion in the writings of Freud 
and Fromm and the constructive values of reb el l ion sugges ted 
by r ecent studi es of pre judi ce , the f ac t rema ins tha t rebel -
lion is not a basic concept in contempo r a ry psychology . 
Wha t applies to psychology in general i s a ls o true of 
the psychology o f reli gi on . This is somewha t eni gmatic in 
view o f the recent reviva l o f interest (noted earlie r) in 
"man as sinner ," and a corresponding empha sis on rebellion as 
the essence of sin , in keeping with the theology of Reformed 
Protests.ntism . 
Where re f erence to r ebellion ag ins t God is made , the 
diagnosis i s clearly nega tive , whether the focus be on the 
individua l pe r sonality or on the divi ne- human r e l a tionship . 
The effec ts of r ebell ion on personality ha ve been described 
by Ka rl Stolz : 
Deviation from the a uthorita tive mandates of God is 
sin . Psychologically , sin is , then , the disturb2nce 
o f the e quilibrium of per sonality by an a ttitude or a ct 
inconsistent with the accepted standa rd . The disruption 
of the ideal and conduct a r e incompatible35 Shame , anx-iety , and guilt a ccompany th i s condition. 
Stolz a l so links r ebellion with one type of autonomy , by 
defining "Godlessness " a s an absence of respons i bility to 
anythi ng beyond human personality. 
Writing wi thin the framewo r k of a "dynamic i nt e rpe rson-
a l ism," Paul E. Johnson describes r ebellion against God a s 
35. Karl R. Stolz , The Ps ychology of Reli gious Living 
(Nashville : Abingdon- Cokesbury Press , 1937 ), p . 192 . 
a sundering of the I - Thou relationshi p , with l repre senting 
the ego or sel f and Thou the ul tima te au thori ty . Seen in 
this dimension , r ebe l l ion is an a buse of freedom , "a tragic 
d eni al o f the bes t I know , a betra ya l of my ultima te poten-
ti a lity turning into self - defeat ."J6 
Rebellion aga ins t prel i minary author i ty does not nee -
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ess a rily r ecei ve the same interpre t a tion , howe ver . One f inds 
tha t the psychology of reli gion is not critica l of s uch re -
hellion when it i s va l ue - orient ed . The p rophetic not e of the 
Judaeo - Christian r eli gi on is often one of rebell i on aga inst 
soci a l tradi tions and authori ty in the name of a h i ghe r author-
ity . This i s possible only when the pe r sone lity ha s been in-
tegrated a round va lues tha t t ake the individua l beyond the 
pleasure princ i ple , vJhi ch is the psycholog i ce.l c ounterpart 
of hedonism . 
Aside from orief e quations of rebellion with sin , it 
is diffi cult to find rebellion against authority trea ted in 
deta il either in th e psychology of r el i g i ous g r ow th or in 
the psychology of unbe li ef . 
Edwa r d Scribne r Ame s , f o r example , off ers o.n ana lysis 
of "Nonr eli gious Pe rsons " which is de void o f r e f e r ences to 
r ebell ion . 11 Nonre ligious pe rsons are . . . those who f e il 
to enter vita lly into a wo rld of soci a l a ctiv i ties a nd feel -
ings . They a r e l a cking in the s en se of idea l va lues wh i ch 
J 6 . Paul E. Johns on , Persona lity and Reli gion (Na shville : 
Abingdon Press , 195 7), p . 256 . 
c ons titutes the social c onscience."37 
It is possible that Professor Ames sees in rebellious-
ness a special kind of religious or antireligious manifesta-
tion, hence it s absence from t h e nonreligi ous category. On 
the other hand, one would expect rebellion in s ome form to 
be a discernible pattern among personal itie s whose religious 
values are either outmoded , anomalou s, h i ghl y specialized , 
or nonexistent. 38 
We may observe that in none of the s e re fe rences i s the 
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motivation for rebellion against ultimate authority clarified. 
One explanation may be the traditional boundary which has 
separated the psychology of religion from theology. Because 
sin is the sundering of an obedient relationsh ip to God , 
whose obj ective r eality is beyond the pro of or the province 
of psychology, the analysis of sin ha s been left largely to 
the theologian. On the other hand, theologian a n d psycholo-
gis t have assumed join t respon sibility for analyzing the 
effects of sin u pon human personality. In recent years , a 
common vocabulary and a n i ncreasing dialogue have mad e possible 
a pooling of insight s between the two disciplines. 
These observations are me~nt to suggest that the future 
may alter t h e present status of rebelli on as a meaningful 
concept to the degree that psychology is influenced by phil-
osophical and theological analyses of rebellion' s motivations, 
modes of expres sion , and consequences upon personality and 
37. 
38. In the latter categ ory, Ame s include s the mentally re-
tarded, the ego-impoverished, the irresponsibly impulsive, 
and the criminal classes. 
inte rpers onal relati onshi p s. For t he present, we note t hat 
its s i gnificance i s limited l a r gely to reforme d t h eology , 
nihili s tic philosophy , and Freudian psycho logy . 
5. Methodology 
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This dissertation will rely, in its methodology , u p on 
historical re s e arch and u pon psycholo gical and logical analysis. 
The s e a ppe a r to be a ppropri ate methods for explicating principles 
and building a conceptual framework suitable to the probl em 
under consideration . 
By historical re search i s mean t a chron ol ogical survey 
and orderly synthesis of existing theorie s and clinical data 
which speak t o t he probl em. This method derives its validity 
from the remarkable absence of a clearly defined body of litera-
ture or even a s ingle psych ological stu dy devoted exclusively 
or primarily to the psychology of rebellion. Before asses s ing 
t h e role of rebelli on in religious maturation , it becomes neces-
sary, therefore, to draw to gether the relevant psychological re-
sources in a way that renders them r eadily acces s ible to the 
purp ose s of the dissert ation. 
Beyond the survey and organizing of relevant material s , there 
is need for a critical appraisal both of t hese re s ou rce s and of 
their rela ti onsh i p to the c entral pr ob l em. I n e stablish i ng mean-
ingful criteria a nd in applying these criteria to psychological 
theory and human behavior, we employ t h e r e lated methods of 
log ical and psychologi cal analysis. 
Logical analysis a pplie s to extant t he ories ,th e pr inci ples 
of coherenc e and consist ency. Chief a mong t he c ons i d erations in 
t h is approach are quest i ons pertaining to self-c ons i s tency , con-
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sistency wi th known facts of experience , and c onsis t enc y wi th 
other a ccepted propos itions . Does t he theory al so explain and 
interpre t in a reasonable way empirical relationships between 
various aspects of experience? Where theoretical c ontra-
dictions , i n cons is t e n ci e s, a n d non sequiturs are evident, 
logical analysis becomes a partial basis for rejecting or modi-
fying a psychol ogical point of view. 
Psycholog ical analy s is is t h e metho d of i nte r preting one 
or more as p ect s of human behavior in t h e li ght of reliable, 
clini cal da ta a n d p s ycholog ical theorie s , previously accepted 
on the basis of log ical examination a n d empirical eviden ce. 
The present expl orati on will attempt to analy ze rebellious as-
pects of behavior from the standpoint of mo tivat ion as well 
as mode, and long itudinal a s well a s short-term implicat i on s 
fo r personality d evelopment. 
Our methodology inten tionally exclu de s a s eek ing after 
f u rther empirical and experimental facts. Th is doe s n ot imply 
a judgment that experimentation should be d i s p ens ed with. 
Rather, the judgment is that theoretical analy s i s a nd con-
ceptual cla rificati on may n ow be neces s ary before further 
experimentation can be effe ctive. Thus, whil e t h i s s t u dy 
d oe s not incor porat e t he experimen tal meth od , it is to be 
hoped tha t it will serve a heuristic functi on where fu tur e 
experimentation i s c oncerned. 
CH APTER II 
REL I GIOUS MATURAT ION IN RELATI ON TO AUTHOR ITY 
In order to make a psychologica l a ssessment o f r ebellion 
again s t a uthority i n relation to r e li g ious m tura tion , some 
attention n eeds to b e g iven to the concept of r e l i g ious matu-
r ity and the d e v e l opment of criteria by which to e va lua te r e -
bellion . The me a ning o f r elig ious maturity has received 
r ath e r extensi ve trea tment in the psychology o f reli gion , 
and va lua ble listings o f criteria are by n o means lacking . 
A ma j o r rea son for the present chapter is tha t previous 
d i scuss ions of r e lig ious maturity ha v e not focused on the 
problem of autho r i ty to the deg r ee tha t our present interest 
seems to warrant . At least , this is true o f individual ana l y -
s e s . ·Ta ken coll e cti vely , some me aningful pat terns begin to 
eme r ge , cl a rifying what ma turi t y means i n relat i on t o the 
ha ndl i ng of or c o ·ni n g to terms with a uthority . 
Our im~edi ate o uroose is to e xolore the relevant liter-4 L _ 
ature i n psycholog y in order to give spec i fici ty to the 
phra se " coming to terms with a uth orit y . " As one ma ture s r e -
li g i ously , what change s occur in h is con c e p ts a nd perceptions 
of auth ori ty , i n hi s response to the a uthority o f others , and 
in his own sense of pe r sonal authority ? To wh a t extent a re 
r el i g iou s a ttitude s infl uenc e d by gene ra l i zed attitudes 
J2 
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tmv-ard p r e limina ry a utho ri ty f igur es ? I s a ut onomy t he fi nal 
so l ut ion to the problem o f authority? To these and other 
_•el a ted ques ti ons , we now direct our a ttention . 
The framewo rk f or our analysis of r eligi ous ma turity 
is prov ided by a tr i pa rtit e theory , which a ppa r ently origi -
nated with Julius Mulle r , a prominent nine teenth century theo -
logi an . In hi s book The Christian Doctrine of Sin t 1 Mulle r 
vi ews religious g rowth as a progre ssi on from hete r onomy 
through a utonomy to theonomy . Heteronomy is de fined as the 
i mpos i t i on of a l aw upon man from out s ide himself . Autonomy 
is the rul e of self by the sel f . Somewha t pa r a do x idal ly , 
Muller trea ts theonomy both as the supe r i or l aw which is 
r ooted i n God and the innermost law o f mB.n himsel f. Theonomy 
predicates a bas ic ha r mony between God ' s l aw and the essen-
tial natu r e of man . Obedience , then , is to be car r i ed out 
ne i the r in the spir i t of f ear nor self- r enunc i a tion but in 
the sp i r i t of self- fulf illment . 
Of Muller ' s three conc ep t s , the fir s t two ha ve enjoyed 
wide usa ge in psychology . In lieu of the third , we f i nd , 
though with much le ss frequency than heteronomy and autonomy , 
2 
the concept of homonomy . 
/ I n Andra s P. ngya l , there is the f irst clea r a tt empt 
to develop p sychol ogi cal equive l ents f or Muller ' s three s t a ges 
l . Bresl au : Jo se f Mar and Company , 1844 . 
/ 
2. Deri ved f rom the Greek words f or " same " (homos) and "lm'l " 
{noma's ) . 
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of reli6ious groivth. 3 Discussing t-vm Gif the hLunan organ ism t s 
very general tendencies, Angyal speaks of autonomy as a trend 
toward mastering oneself and one•s environment. This move-
ment is mvay from heteronomy w·herein the sou.rces of change 
reside in the environment rather than the self. A second 
tendency, noted by Angyal, is the trend touard homonomy--a 
trend to harmonize oneself with superindividual units, with 
external forces which impinge upon t he individual. Both 
trends exist as something more than personal wish forces, be-
cause people generally tend to lift these tendencies up as 
uorthy universal goals. Each trend may become the center of 
a "tvhole system of values. 
While homonomy is not a specifically religious concept, 
it clearly incorporat e s t he idea of theonomy and, to a de;.:. 
gree, enriches the latter with psychological meanings t hat 
are lacking in Muller's treatment. Because t his dissertation 
is concerned vli t h the religious aspects of personality de-
velopment, we shall use the term theonomy as a more precise 
criterion of rna turi ty than homonomy v-rhich has social and 
artistic as ivell as religious ramifications. HOi"-"ever, our 
indebtedness to Angyal for helping to bridge the chasm vThich 
often separates general psychology from t he psychology of 
religion, will be apparent in what follm·;s. 
J. Andr's Angyal, Foundations for a Science of Personality 
(New York: Commonv-real th Fu.nd, 1941). 
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In the deve lopment tha t follows , the re i s t he unde r ly ing 
a ssumpt ion tha t reli gious ma tura t ion in r e l a tion to authority 
can best be d e scribed &s prog ression from heteronomy through 
autonomy to a type o f homono my which is more specif ic a lly re-
li gi ous than Angya l ' s concep t and mo r e clee r l y ori ented to 
t he province o f psychology than Muller ' s theonomy . 
l . Heteronomy 
In psychology as in other d i sci plines , heteronomy is 
used to de scri be a uthori ty which is ex t e rna l to t he self , o r 
the i~pos i tion of a l aw upon a person fr om out side him self. 
Psychology a l so t end s to ma ke hete r onomy th e antithesis of 
a utonomy , thereby surrounding the f or me r with e xt remely 
negat ive com1ot2ti ons . Kurt Lewin , for example , has de -
ve loped a topologica l psychology in vh ich hete ronomou s 
even t s , s l t h .::: ugh l ess crucia l ths n tho se which emanat e fro ::n 
4 
within , appea r l a r sely a s external ob s tructions t a ction. 
Eri ch Fromm ma ke s heteronomy synonymous with autho ri t a rianism 
and e stabli sh es a r adica l dichotomy be t ween '1powe r t o '' ( the 
e ssence of a ut onomy) and "power over" ( the e s s ence of 
5 
heteronomy) . 
Due t o an unde r s t andable des ire t o expo s e and comba t 
cr i ppling f orms of exte r na l dominat i on , many psychologi s t s 
4 . Kur t Lewin , Principles of Topologica l Psycho logy ( New 
York : Mc Gr aw- Hill Company , 1936). 
5. Eri ch Fromm , Ms n for Himsel f: 
of Ethics ( Ne-w~Y~o-r~k~:~R~i-n-e~h-a-- r-t~--~~._--~--~----~~~r---~~ 
pp . 87- 88 . 
h a ve f a ile d t o em ~ ha si z. e t he hi-ghly _pos i t i v e , e ven cruc i a l , 
rol e t h a t he t e r onomy p l a ys in t he e a r ly o r c hildhood y ears . 
Wh t these psycholo g i s t s op po se i s t h e p e r sis t enc e o f h e t e r -
onomo u s r elat i onshi ps i nto a d o l esc ence and a dul thood . In 
th e ir ve hemence , t h e y o ft en f a il to ma ke a v e r y i mportant 
a c kn owl edgement : hete ronomy in r e l a t i on to childhood i s a 
hi ghl y pos i t ive c oncept . It i s no t necessa r il y t he enemy 
o f a utonomy . Rath e r , it i s de v e l opmental l y speaki ng , the 
p r e r equis i t e o f a.ut onomy 2.nd h omon omy . 
This st a temen t ca n b e d e f end ed by ci t i n g the prolonged 
d ependenc y wh i ch i s a n ina li e nabl e p ro pe rty o f chi l dhood . A 
second ob servat i on i s t he. t " p ower ov e r , " c ontra r y t o Fromm' s 
imp l i cat i on , c a n h a ve p o s i t ive s i gn i fic enc e , especi a lly in 
r e l at ion t o t h i s e a rl y p eriod o f dep e n d ency . 
Powe r i mpli es t he poss i b ility o f c a us i ng e v ents t ha t 
&r e benefic i a l to 2 ( re f e r ence pe r s o n ) , and p r e ven ti ng 
e vents t hat a re ha r mf u l t o 2 · Al so , strong peopl e wi t h 
whom we a r e un i t e d wi ll d o us no ha r m; t h e y wil l bene fit 
us . Powe r , the r e f o r e , i s a g ood att ribute ; i t i s p os i -
tive i n i t sel f. One a rra!l[es on e ' s s entiment s i n s uch g 
way tha t t he y co i nc ide with t h e s t ructu r e o f c gusa ti on . 
]6 
Suc h a n interpretati on find s only i n frequ ent exp r e s s i on i n t he 
pages of p s y c holo gica l lite r a ture . 
Sup? Or t f or th i s p o s itive i nterp r e t a tion a n d emph2 si s 
ma y b e f Jund i n a bri e f a n c.-o lysi s o f t wo aspec t s o f h e t e r on omy's 
func t i on i n r e l a ti on t o childhood . 3o th f unct i ons have 
6 . Fri t z He i:i e r , The Psychology o f I nt e r p e r sonal Be l s t i on s 
( Jew York : John Wile y a nd Son s , I nc ., 195 8) , p . 240 . 
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religious sign i ficance, but only the s econd has received much 
psychological i nteres t.? 
i. Sa t isfact i on and sustenance 
One of Freud's serious errors was h i s fa i lure to recog-
nize the highly construct i ve role authority may play in the 
life of the child. So intent was Freud in stress ing society's 
denial of the chilcJ.I s wishes that he failed "to clarify what 
it (the social organi zat i on) nay first grant to the infant, 
as it keeps him al i ve and as , in administering to his needs 
i n a specific way, it seduces him to its particular life 
style. 11 8 
Assuming genuine attitudes of love and acceptance on 
the part of the parents, the infant's first contacts with 
authority are neither de manding nor frustrating, but satis-
fying and fulfilling. Paul E. Johnson obs e rves that di-
mensions of this initial encounter derive from the child's 
innate sense of need--a need not only for physical satis-
fiers but, starting with experiences of his mother's tender-
nes s , a lifel ong need for "inte rpersonal r e lation s in which 
?. Undoubtedly, apparent oversights regarding the parental 
funct ion of sustaini ng the child and sati s fying his needs 
stem in large measure from psychology's admitted preoccu ... 
pat ion with the patholog i cal or abnormal ele ments in 
human experience. 
8. Erlk H. Erikson, "Identity and the Life Cycle," Psycho-
logical Is sues, Vol. I, No. 1 (1 959 ), pp. 2 0-21. In 
this pa per and elsewhere, Eri:V..son offers a psychoanalytic 
correct i ve to Freud's undue negativity. 
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he is valued, respected, and loved. 11 9 Without t his need for 
spiritual f ulfillment, religious growt h would not be p os sible. 
Even t he se earliest strivings, t hen, constitute reli-
gious behavior in t he s ense t hat t hey are "a seeking out of 
values. uJ.O In his urgent dependency upon a response 111from 
beyond himself," 1 the child experiences an ultimate concern 
t hat i$ the embryo of vital religion. 
A furt he r religious dimension derives from t he p arental 
patterns of r esponding to the child•s expr e ssed needs. In 
t hese resp onse s are important det er minants of whether trust 
or distrus t will be t he child•s characteristic r esponse to 
ultimate aut hority in lat er years. 
Erik H. Erikson observes in t he infant's willingness to 
let hi s mothe r out of his sight without undue p rot est, evi-
dence that the mothe r has become for t he child 
• • • an i nner certainty as well as an outer predict-
ability. Such consist ency, continuity, and sameness of 
experience provide a r udiment ary sense of ego identity 
which depends ••• on the recognition t hat there is an 
inner population of remembered and anticipated sensations 
and i mage s which are firmly correlated 1vi t h the outer 
population of familiar and predictable t hings and people. 
Smiling crowns t his achievement.ll 
9. Paul E. Johnson, Psychology of Religion (Nashville: Abing-
don Press , 1959), p. 84. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York : W. W. 
Norton and Co., 1950), P• 219. 
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'rhi s bas ic t.cust , this i nne r ce rta int y t h 2. t the o ut e r 
populat i on o f things a nd peopl e is essenti a l ly reli a ble, 
Er i k son fi nds t o be a p roduct p rima ri ly o f t h e mother - c hi ld 
r e l a t ion shi p duri ng the o r a l pe riod. 
Moth e r s , I t hink , c r eat e a sens e o f trus t i n thei r c hil-
dren by tha t ki n d of adm i n i s tra ti on , whi c h i n it s qua li t y 
combi nes sens i t i ve c a re of t h e baby ' s i nd ivid ua l need s 
a n d a fi rm s ense of pe r s ona l t ru s tworth i ness wi t hln the 
t r us t e d framewo r k o f t he ir cultur es ' s life style . 2 
In a d d iti on to smil i n g , the evid enc e o f t r us t i n the 
g r ow i ng inf a n t i s a quality of r e l a xat i on i n i ts f e e d ing , 
s l eeping , a nd bowe l functi oning . 
'ro summa ri ze , t h e fir s t function o f au tho r i ty is to 
keep the chi l d a l ive by admini s t e ring t o hi s bas ic need s . 
The complete d e p end enc y o f the i n f ant g ives t o pa.r ent a.l 
auth ori t y i ts u l t i m2te d imens i ons . Thi s va s t inequality 
b e t ween child a nd parent is the so i l f o r l a ter experi ences 
of awe . Dur i ng the o ral p e riod , i ts i de a l s olut i on l i es in 
a r elati on shi p o f bas i c trust , which means t ha t the infant ' s 
disc omforts a r e c on s t a n t l y b a l anc ed by comf o r t and s e n s it ive 
c a r e 2. t the h a nds o f the mothe ri ng on e . 
It i s no exagge r a tion t o state t h a t t h e expe ri enc o f 
materna l a uth ori ty &s s a tisfa ction a n d sus t enance is a bas ic 
aspec t o f r e l i g i o u s g r owth . Fo r th i s expe r ience is the ex-
peri enti a l f ound at i on o f the mature pe r son ' s f a i th t hat 
Ul t ima t e Au t hori ty , 0 :1. whom one f eels d ependent f o r life a nd 
12 . Ibi d ., p . 221. 
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the va lue s t ha t g iv e life meaning , i s "Jorthy o f tru s t , e ven 
when t h a t a ut h ority i s " ou t o f si ght " and e ve n wh e n there is 
discomfor t in the form of anx i ety , phy s ica l pain , gr i ef , guilt , 
a nd the like . Witho u t this hi ghly po s itive e xperi ence of a 
p ro v i d ing , s us t a i n i ng , tru s t wo rthy r ela ti on shi p with a uthority , 
it is i n e vita b le t h a t one ' s pe rc ep t i on o f a ll auth ority , i n -
cluding the r e l i g i o us , s h ould b e n ega ti ve ly - ori ent ed a nd tha t 
r el i g ious ms tura tion s hould be impo ss i ble to a ch i e ve . 
i i . De m9nd a nd f rustra t i on 
The first fun c t ion o f pc_ r e ntal po ~.~.; -:; r is to p r o vide 
se cur i t y for the chi l d v-; h o in turn i s a bl e to deve l op ba sic 
tru s t . Rea li s tic dif f ere nces be t we e n c h ild and pa r en t a re 
int en s ified o y the i n f ant ' s de s ire to ha ve his p 2, r ent s omnis -
cient and omni poten t . The s e a ttri but e s , when properl y ut ilized , 
&r e s tron defenses c:. ga.i n st undue anx i ety in t he g r ow in g child . 
Even ~hen powe r is exe r c is e d on the c h ild ' s b e ha lf in 
a c ontext of pa r ent a l l ove and a ccep t a nce , there comes the 
t i me wh en s oci e ty a nd t h e p r ocess o f a c c ulturat i on r equire 
the pa ren t to e l i c i t ce r t a i n mod ifi c a ti on s o f beh a vi o r which 
co::1flict wi t h t he d ominant theme o f t h e ch i ld ' s life : t h e 
p l eas ure p rinci pl e . Concurrent with the d e ve l opment of 
S) hi n ct e r - urt:th r a l c ontrol , a nd the me t u r a ti on o f the a nal 
muac u l a ture , t o ilet t r a ini n g r equi r e s the surrend e r o f i m-
med i a t e bowe l a nd blad d er g r a t i fic a ti on f o r t he sake o f c on-
f ormity to a cc ept ed soc i a l p ~ tt e rn s . 
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From a psychoanalytic point of view, no amount of love 
on the part of the parent can eliminat e entirely the element 
of conflict in toilet training. The clash of the plea sure 
principle i'ri th the r eality principle minimally ioJill exert 
long-range influences on personality patterns especially as 
these relate to the development of moral chara cter. Thus, 
t he second year of life, or more sp ecifically the anal period, 
assumes large psychological significance . In t erms of our 
study, t his period symbolizes t h e child 1 s first experience 
with t he demands of authority. Privileges of receiving are 
now mixed with requirements for giving . 
The religious dimensions of parental and social demands 
expressed thro ugh toilet training are once again evident inThen 
t he child 1 s subjective equation of parents vJith God is recalled. 
At t his age , the equation is certain to be emotional and ex-
periential rather than intellectual or concept ual. Sub-
j ectively , t he fact remains t hat ultimate alJ.thority on iolh ich 
the child is compl et ely dependent for love , protection, sat-
isfaction, and sustenance is nov-r i mp osing a neH standard of 
behavior. Symbolically, at leas t , obedience and rebellion 
against ultimat e aut hority become options for t he first time. 
Ideally, the loving approbation of t he parents will 
compen s a te for the physical discomfort imposed by the nevr 
discipline . In r eality, ther e is t he probability of occa-
sional revolt t hr otJ.gh anal retention or lJ.ndisc ip lined 
42 
expul s i on , as a means o f test i ng one ' s fr eedom if not r e j ec t -
i n P" wh a t e ppear t o be i rrational and imposs i ble dem c: nds . 
The het e r onomous nature of a ll a uthority f o r th e t wo -
ye 9 r - old child means th2, t th e d emands o f t he pa r ent s a r e no t 
onl y ult i ma te but a lso r epresent a tive o f a n exte rnal or 
f o r e i gn moral i ty . Th e y a r e mora l abso l ute s wh i ch l a ck a ny 
counterpa r t in the i rr:1e r l if e o f th e c hild . Hi s d e fi c i en cy 
i n v e rba l and commun i cati on skill s , means the dem a.nds a lso 
ma y be experi enced a s irra ti ona l be c a use so ci a l matur i ty i s 
a g oa l with lit tle me a n i ng apart fro m i ts e mbod i ment i n the 
pa r e nt s . 
At l east one wr i te r con t end s that d emf:md a nd fru s tr -
ti on c a n be mad e me a n i ngf u l to the c h ild and th .t i t is the 
absenc e of this me a n i ng r a the r the n frus t r tion or d emand ne r 
se wh i c h the c h ild finds intol erable . Erik Erikson de s cribes 
societ2 l mee_ i ng in t e r ms of '' t he e v e r - renewed expe rience of 
g rea t e r e mene ss and s tronger c ::Fltinui ty o f d e v e lop ment , 
towar d a fi n l integ r a ti on o f t he ind i vidual life cyc le wi t h 
some mec:mi ngf ul wide r b e long ingness . ., lJ 
Moti vat ion tow a rd obedienc e ma y be pr ima r i ly p os i t i ve 
o r negat ive . Po s i t i ve mot ivati on i s a de s ire to please t he 
s ourc e o f love a n d sus tena nce , a.nd 8 de s ire to be mo r e l ike 
t h e pe r son who provid e s these essenti a l s . Negat ive mot i va -
tion towa rd obedi ence is the f e a r ths t any o th e r r esponse 
will mean a loss of l ove o r t he inflicting o f puni s hment . 
l J. I bid ., p . 222 . 
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If trust describes the ideal resyonse to authority in 
the oral phase of development, love-oriented obedience or 
cooperat ion is the healthy response growing out of the anal 
p eriod. In both cases , we are dealing with r elative rather 
than absolute terms. For the two-year-old, love "ivill never 
be Lmmixed v.rith fear, and obedience will be only partial, due 
to a lack of adequate controls and corre sp onding impt1lsive 
behavior. Futhermore, the parents• humani ty insures that 
t hey v.ril l balance only imp erfectly their demands and the 
child's abilities. It is also inevitable t hat the parental 
claims v.rill not always be in ratio to the off ers of love and 
the need-satisfaction \vhich are t he child • s rightful legacy 
from the moment of birth. 
It is evident that at l east tvJ'O factors are essential 
if the child 1 s cooperation with parental demand s in toilet 
training is to be motivated by p ositive val ues . One is a 
sense of basic trust, the child's heritage from the satis-
factions of t h e oral p eriod . On a non-verbal level, the 
child t s exp erienc e s 1rJ'i th parental aLJ.t hori ty assure him that 
he will never be required to end ure discomfort beyond his 
capacity and t hat satis factions will al uays balanc e or out-
weigh experiences of displeasure. 
A second factor is t he degree to whi ch parent s can 
give meaning to the d emands "ivh ich they lay up on the child. 
Although , in t he second year, t h is meaning canno t be con-
ceptualized by t he child, we do hold that, in Erikson's 
;.vo rds , 11 s ome meani n .ful wi d e r b.e longingness " c n 'oe com -
muni cated to the ch i l d , i n ways tha t do not vi 8l a t e the 
samenes s and cont inu i t y of hi s development . 
To t he degr ee t he t pa r ent s c om~uni c 8 te th is meaning 
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to the sa cr i f ices t hey i mpo se , t hey cast the ir demands i n an 
authorit a t i ve r s the r than an a uthoritar i en mould . The ir de -
m8nds are r ? t i onal -- i n rc:t i o ~.; i t h s oc i a l rea l i ty and the 
c h i l d ' s capa bi l i t i es --a nd they s.r e mot iv a t ed prima.r i l y by 
a con c e r n tha t t he hild f ul fi l l hi s highest potential i t i e s 
a s an ef f ect i ve membe r of human s oc i e ty . 
I n r e l i g ious te r ms , t he child ' s coming t o te r ms wi th 
author i ty a s demand r e quire s a c onfid ence t ha t t he d eman d s 
he ve :nean i ng e ven when th i s mean i ng c .s.nn·.Jt be f ully c ompre -
h end ed by the child . In a very primiti ve way , the child 
come s to f eel t ha t t he pa r ents , a s hi s ulti m~te a u t hority , 
ha ve i n vi ei·l! end s wh ich a r e beyond h i s pe rc e 9t i on but wh ich 
he bel i e ves to be consistent wi th hi s h i ghes t good . P2 r enta l 
pa t i ence wi th his rebell i ousness and hi s f a i l ure to me e t 
demands , a nd pa r ent a l 2.pp rova l o f hi s progr ess i ons , how-
e ve r smal l , to1•1a rd soc i a l matu r i ty he l p insure th2 t hope 
lAJ i l l triumph ove r despa ir i n t he long and d if f i cult p rocess 
o f e:;row i n8 up . 
This c apacity t o trus t and c oope r a t e beyond t he l i mits 
o f one ' s und e r s t an_d i ng bea r s a. g r aph i c rese!Tibl ance t o the 
Ne w 'Testament d e fi n i t i on of f a i th as " th ·e Bssur ance of 
4.5 
t hings hoped for, t he conviction of t hing s not seen.nl4 
In a very r eal sense, t his fa i th is not only the mark of 
Chr istian maturity , but an important r equisit e of early 
authority-relationships in 1vhich begins the slow· r econcilia-
tion of wishes and d uties. 
If toil et-training symbolizes t he child 1 s first exp er-
ience with t he demands of aut hority, t he oedipal conflict 
symbolizes his fir s t e~~erience of frustration a t the hands 
of ultimat e aut hor i t y . Weaning is not to be overlooked as 
an earli er eA~ erience of deprivation but it l a cks t he dep th 
of r eligious significance which res ides i n t he Oedipus 
struggle. 
Fre ud's clas sical description begins vJ" i t h t his bas i c 
hypothesis: 
"It may be t ha t "toJe were all dest i ned to direct oo.r 
first sex ual imp ulses toward our mothers, a nd our first im-
pulses of hatred and r esistance tovra r d our fat hers; o o.r 
dreams convince LlS t hat 1..re v.rere. nl5 
According t o Fre ud, the ch ild i s abl e to move only 
gr adually from its i nitial love of s elf to t he love of 
"obj ect," a s an entity distinct fr om self. Wi th the 
14. Hebrews 11:1, The Holy Bible, Revis ed St andard Version 
(New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 19.52). 
15. Sigm und Fre ud, 11 The Int erpr etation of Dr eams, 11 t190Ql 
The Basic i'lritin s of Si und F reud, ed. A. A. Brill 
New- York : The Hod.ern Library, Random Ho use, Inc., 1938), 
p. 308. 
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abandonment of auto-erotic satisfactions, the child moves 
naturally and inevitably into an erotic attachment to the 
one who has gratified his n e eds from birth--his mother. She 
is the first object of hi s l ove. 
Assuming that this erotic attachment of the child to 
his mother is exclusive and jealous of any rival, Freud 
s e es in the drama of childhood the patterns of the Oedipus 
myth, wherein Oedipus' murder of his father and subsequent 
marriage to his mother fulfills a universal wish: the elimina-
tion of the father and the possession of the mothe r by the 
son. 
The child's mother becomes his "object choice" very 
early in life. This attachment to the mother is accompanied 
by subtle identifications with the father, whose ego is t he 
model for the son's character. It is not until the father 
is perceived as an obstacle in relation to t he child's wishe s 
regarding the mother and a threat to the chi ld' s safety, that 
the Oedipus complex blossoms in f ull power. Then , the son's 
earlier relati onship to the father , essentially positive in 
natu re, becomes mixed with hosti l ity and fear. 
That ambivalence comes to characterize the chil d ' s re-
lationship with both parent s , Freud was able to r ecognize in 
his theory of bisexuality. 16 To the de gr e e that masculine and 
16. Perhaps the most c oncise statement of t his theory is con-
tained in "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex;·" 
[)905] The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, pp . 612-614. 
feminine characteristics inhabit his per s onality, the child 
forms affectionate relationsh ips to both father and mother 
and to a corresponding degree manifests hosti lity and jeal-
ousy toward each. 
Basically, ho wever, the boy's erotic attachments are 
with the mother and his identification is with the father. 
By identify ing with the father, the son achieves the be s t 
possible s oluti on to his dilemma. For h e enters into his 
father's world of s trength, he shares vicariously hi s 
father's favored po sition with the mother, he finds ex-
pression for his positive feelings toward the father, a n d 
he achieves the incipient facultie s of self-guidance and 
self-criticism, which are precursors of autonomy. 
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These ~atter faculties are the function of the super-
ego which i s born in the process of identification. The 
super-ego is the child' s psychic c ompensation for his loss 
of his intense emoti onal attachment s to his parents. Their 
reinstatement within the e g o i s r ou ghly analagous to oral 
incorporation of a desired object. 
Under ideal conditions, the process of identification 
is not without its hazards. Initially , the character of the 
super-ego will be infantile, reflecting the gro s s inequ ality 
that exist s between parent and child. Gradually, t he child's 
growing s k ills, rati onality , and h is experience s wi t h authority 
figures outside the home remove the irrational, auth oritarian 
components of the super-ego. To disting Qish between the 
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infantile and t he mature super-ego, some scholars designate 
t he latter as ego-ideal or conscience. This is an important 
distinction vJhich Freud, apparently i"i'as able to make only to 
a limited degree. In general, he seems to lJ.se the t i-ro terms 
int erchangeably. 
Th e importance of the Oedipus complex for religious 
t hought, belief, anc1 behavior in l ater life has been enun-
elated in a negative manner by Freud in several ivell-known 
1vorks .17 Space does not allow a discussion of his phy-
logenetic-historical development of the Oedipus complex as 
t he primitive source of all religions. It is sufficient to 
observe that t h is aspect of Freud 1 s theory has tended to 
confound even his most faithful adherents. 
Apropos of individual development and the problem of 
coming to terms with authority, t he oedipal conflict does 
dramatize two responses to authority t hat have imp ortant 
religious connotations . The first is ambivalence, a mixture 
of love, fear, and rebellion directed simultaneously tovrard 
the father. Experientially, t his ambivalence to-vmrd an all-
powerful fi gure who a t the same moment is seen as a cent er 
of one•s dep endency a nd a threat to one 1 s safety (i.e. the 
castration compl ex ), may be the ground of religious awe, 
v'Th ich charact erizes the mat ure Christian 1 s r el ationship to 
God. 
17. Totem and Taboo, Hoses and Honot heism, and The Future of 
an Illusion contain the essence of hi s p olemic. 
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A second re sponse to auth ority is identificat ion , 
representing for Freud the ideal solution to the Oedipus 
comp l ex . Religiously , a process not un l ike i dentification 
s e ems to be a prerequisite of maturity. This process may 
follovl a period of conflict in v-rhi ch the i ndividual se eks 
eit her to flee from UltiElat e Auth ority or t o be equal to it, 
to ab olish it or compete 1-tith it. Essentially , the co nflict 
marks the climax to a period of external moralit y , in vvhich 
t he claims and frustrations i mp osed by Ultimate Auth ority 
s eem to stand over against the wishes and needs of the indi-
vidual. 
Wit h identifi cation , based at l east partially on the 
realization that God can neit her be dest royed nor dethroned, 
there emerges a new dimension of personality , or a new center .lB 
In p l a ce of the fo r mer confl i cts, there now exists an es sen-
tial unanimit y bet1-reen t he claims of Ult imate Auth ority and 
t he value s anc1 goals of the i nclividual . Liv ing under the 
dictates of an inner morality , t he individual finds t l~ t he 
is no longer under the Law ( i . e . ext ernal constraints), but 
is the p ossessor of a new fr ee dom and integrity be cause an 
es sential contradiction in his nature has be en overcome . 
18. Will iam James speaks of 11 t he habitual center of personal 
energy II as li the hot p l a ce i n a man 1 s consciotJ.sness . II 
For James , t he movement of relig ious i deas and concerns 
from t he periphery t o the center of conscio usne ss is t he 
essence of co nversion. The Varieties of Religious Ex-
perience [1902] (NeH York : Th e Modern Library, 1929 ), p. 193. 
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To sugge st an uncterlying relations hip betvveen io.entifi-
cation s wi t h parental a nd Ultimat e Auth ority is not t o endorse 
t he tencLe ncy of t he Fre udian school vJ'hi ch restricts adult re-
ligion to the infantile patterns 1·1h ich ar e its antecedents. 
J. C. Fl ugel, f or example , cites the fund&~e ntal contribu-
tions of p sych oanalys is to an unders tanding of religi on as 
fo l lov,rs : 
••• the a t t itude of man to his gods i s determined t o 
a l a r ge extent by displacement of hi s attitude tmvards 
h is parents, either in t heir original f orQ as dominating 
external figures or as incorporated in t he sup er-ego, 
in which lat ter case t here is a proj ection of the in-
ternal super-ego on to the ext ernal fi gure of God , as 
in t he not i on of t he "all-seeing eye of God .nl9 
Such a statement rings with a finality that s carcely 
do es justice to the fac ulty of critical discriminati on 1vh ich 
t he mature p erson bri ngs to his religious loyalties . Nor 
does it r efl ect the increasing attention b e i ng g iven by p sy-
cholog ists to t he infl uences of extra-familial authority 
fig L1 r es ana_ of peer gro :.1p s up on personal i t y i n chil dh ood_ 
and yout h . In s eeki ng to place u.p on a single me chanism the 
·v;eight of endless varieties of religio us interests, t h is 
v iew falls into t he error of over-simpl ification, as nu~er-
ous critics have p ointed out. One wholesome a l ternative to 
t his position is Allp ort Is t heory of functiona l :.::.utonomy vrhich 
11 regards ad ult motives as infinitely vari ed , a nd a s self-
sustaining, cont emp orary systems, growing out of antecedent 
19. J. C. Flugel, Man, Norals and Society (NelJ' York : Inter-
national Universiti es Press, 1945), p. 271. 
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sy s tems , but functi onally independ ent . o f them ." 
Here , our purpose is only to su~ze st tha t t he son ' s 
identificat ion with h is f a t her pri or t.J end duri ng the 
Oedi pus c ~nfli c t does ha ve profound re li~iou s o verton es , a s 
Fre ud observed , but not in th e re str·i c ted , mechanical sense 
o f the Fre udi a n inte r p retat ion . Rathe r , we would sue:cges t 
t h2 t the c a.pa.c i ty t o internali ze va l ues a nd t hu s to identify 
with th e source o f those values is a cru~ial on e , involving 
a process tha t mu s t be expe ri enced not onc e but pe rh a ps 
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se ve r a l t i mes , a t i ncreasingly matu r e l e v els o f comprehension 
a nd val ue - ass i mi l ~t i on . 
The Freud i a n view, as s tated by Fl ugel , beB t describe s 
wha t mi ght be c a lle d a rre s t e d rel i g i o u s dev e l of na nt . Such a 
condi t i on is more pa tholog ica l tha n no rm2 l , f o r it f a lls 
short o f the spira l i n g se quence of id ent ifi c a t ions tha t mo ves 
the growi ng p e r s on eve r c l ose r to a theo~on ous r e l at i onship 
wi t h t he ul tima t e source o f a ll values . 
In s ummar y , the po s it i v e si gn ificance o f pc-. rent a l 
a utho ri t y re:n::~ ins e v e n when i t s function is to make demands 
and i mpos e frustra tions upon the child . Soci s lly and psycho -
l ogica lly , th i s function is ess ential to the child ' s matur a -
t i on . First , it can nouri sh in the child a growing frustra-
ti on- tolers n ce , so necessa r y to a ut onomy and homonom y in 
l a ter ye8 r s . \.,J rites Saul Ro senzwe i g , "It is con s i s tent with 
20 . Gordon Allport , Pe rsona l i t E A Ps y_chol o gical Interpreta-
tion ( Ne:.v York : Henry Holt and Compa ny , l9J~p . l S4. 
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available information to suppose that insufficient frustra-
tion 1 spoils 1 the individual so that h e is lat er unable to 
withstand frustration adequat e ly.n21 
Secondly, demand and frustration can be effective 
instruments by llhich parents fulfill t heir role as ch ief 
agents in t he socializing of the child. H. A. Murray rec-
ogn izes t ha t socia lization is not lJ'it hou.t its ne gative qual-
itie s . Houever , he finds t ha t this p roc ess involves more 
often the instigation of time-place-mode-ob ject formulae 
t han t he t ot al s uy9 ression of basic ne eds . Furthe r more, 
Murray finds that whil e conformity may destroy creative 
spontaneity and vigor, it has a vital r elationsh ip t o the 
general need t o b elong to and participat e in a functioning 
group-- the need for roleship . 22 Thus , the frustration of 
so me ne eds are the i nevitable result of sa t isfying other needs 
which emerge as t he child s eeks a more meaningf ul and wider 
s ense of belongingness . 23 
21. Saul Rosenz1v-e ig, 11An Outline of Fru.stration Theory ," 
Per~onality and t he Behavior Disorders , e .d. J. 1,fcV. 
Hunt (New York : Ronald Pre ss , 19~4), I, 387. In t h is 
connection, RosenzvTeig is not arguing for excessive 
frustration, but a realistic compromis e bet"·J' een the t-vm 
extremes of too much versus too little. 
22. H. A. Murray, EA.'""f)lorations in Personality (Nelv York : 
Oxford Press, 1938), pp. 152-226 . 
23. This search antic i pates t he concept of the onomy 1vhich 
we re gard a s the ultima te sol ution to the problem of 
a uthority. 
Reli g iously , the pos i t ive _signific an c e of d e mand and 
frust r c: .tion a t the hand s o f ext e rna l authority is manifested 
in the chi ld ' s g r owing c a pac ity to trust and coopera te be -
yond t he limi ts o f his i mmedi a t e unde r standing . Secondly , 
these function s o f parent a l autho r i t y help to n ou r i s h i n 
the child an iden t ificat i on by which sense o f c l o senes s 
a n d unity r e m9 i ns e ven when the r e is phy sica l sepa r at ion of 
pa r ent f rom chi ld . I de a lly , this ident ificat i on is in spired 
by love r a the r tha n f ea r . I n e ithe r c as e , it ap ears t o be 
a n i mport a n t prep0 r at ion for the l ater establ i s hment o f a 
homonomo u s or theonomous relst i onship . 
F inal ly , without i ncrea sing d emand and frustrat i on a t 
the h ands o f p c- rent a l suthori ty , the re is se rio us que st ion 
whethe r the chi ld would deve lop the g r owing i ndepend ence 
which l eads to aut onomy . At its be st , p a r ent a l a uthori ty 
place s increas ing re s tr i ctions upon it s OJA'n " power over " the 
child . At the same time , it gently but fi rmly cut s the t i es 
of dependency tha t ha ve bound the child to his parent s , so 
tha t his "powe r to " think a nd ac t f o r himsel f is free to 
g row. 
2 . Autonomy 
Although heteronomy ma y fulfill a h i ghly constructive 
role a nd ma y be r egarded a s a p r e r e qui s i te to a utonomy , it s 
va lues a r e lim i t e d l a rgely to i n f ancy and childhood and its 
powe r n e c essaril y decreases as a utonomy increases . This l as t 
-5J 
statement suggests the antithes is between heteronomy and 
autonomy, of wh ich psychology has been so keenly aware. 
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However, the antithetical relationship is genuine only if 
the focus is on adolescence and the adult years, or if an 
authoritarian form of heteronomy is assumed to be ope rative 
in childhood. 
As indicated earlier, we u s e autonomy or personal 
autho rity to mean 11 power to" in the sens e of ability to 
make free and responsible decisions conc e r n ing one' s values 
and modes of achieving them. Autonomy denotes t h e develop-
ment within personality of an internal locus of evaluation, 
responsibility, and decision. 24 It i mplies the a ssuming of 
priillary responsibility for one's feeling s , t h oughts, and 
actions, and for evaluating and affirming t h e principles by 
which one patterns his life. 
Wri~ing from the perspective of a holistic ps ychology, 
Andr's Angyal finds in human pers onality a progre s sive, 
self-transcending character. 25 One process-aspect of this 
character is autonomy, which mak e s every living organ ism a 
self-governing entity. Unlike inanimate objects of natu re, 
the organi s m can place self-determination (autonomy) in 
dynamic opposition to external determination (heteronomy.) 
Angyal expresses the interaction of autonomy and heteronomy 
24. This achievement i s not to be equated strictly with the 
formation of cons cience in later childhoo d , bec au s e the 
incipient cons cience is really the internalized i nage 
of external authority. 
25. Andr~s Angyal, QE· cit., pp . 20 -55. 
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in t e r ms of an 11 a: h ratio." With reference to t hi s ratio, 
he discovers 11 a definite trend in the organismic total 
process toward an increase of the relative value of ~ in 
this ratio, that is, a trend tm·mrd an increase of autonomy .rr26 
Alt hough the goal of this trend is ah.rays progressive, 
heteronomous environmental influences may cause the organ-
ism 1 s regression to a stage of dimini shed autonomy . Autonomy 
and heteronomy thus bring into focus the int eraction, some-
times prohibitive for the individual, between t he organism 
and its environment. For Angyal, these concepts represent 
the 11 t1m indispensable poles of t he l ife pl~oc ess . 11 27 H01:-
eve r , he ~a~es it cl ear that autonomy is not an entity but 
a pattern of the life process , not an expl.s.natory princ iple 
but lla descr iptive generalization. n-28 
Be cause it is frequently s een a s a cardinal asp ect of 
emotional maturity , autonomy has received extensive treat-
ment in psychological IT.citings. Kelman chooses to equate 
autonomy with per sonal a ut h ority by wh ich he means 11 a f eel-
ing a p erson derives from his evaluations of his f ee lings , 
20 Th is 1o1ri ter t houghts and ac tions and t h ose of others." -/ 
distinguishes t his "fe eling of authority" from "functional 
26. Ibid., p. 41. 
27 . Ibid., p . 51 . 
28. Ibid., p. 52 . 
29. Harold Kelman , "Rational ancl_ Irrational ALJ.t hority: A 
Holistic Viewp oint , u American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
XII (1952), 50 . 
J.uthority " which rns y de r ive f ~o:n here•.-city , a vested pos · tion 
in 2 grou;::> or organizat i on , ac ~u i red informD tion or wealth , 
o r spec i al c ompetence . For Kelm n , autonomy is synonymous 
wi h respons i bi Li ty . I t is t he reco~nit i on by the indi vi dual 
th ~, t he is " the s.u hor , the prime mover , the e fficient cause 
of h i s f eeling s , thoughts and act i ons , no m tter how ove r -
~helming the e~ t e rnal s timul i may be and ~o matter h ow much 
30 he ma y ex t e rna li ze . " 
At fir st gl_nce , autonomy appea r s to oinci de with 
Ri es rna. ' s concep t o f the " i nner- di r e t ed " person . Hmveve r , 
on close r ins pe ction , the nne r - direc t ed pe r son i s actuD.lly 
one who a dh e r e s to th e int e rnal i zed d ic t2tes o f p2rent0 l 
a uthori ty . Althou~h experienced ~ s i n t e rna l , hi s va l ues 
ems.ne t e uncorJsc i ou.sly f r o:n a source beyond hi msel f . To use 
:3.i es ;nan ' s apt .)hr ::.se , the inner- di r ected person i s gover-ned 
by a "p.s ;yc:'1olo -::, ica l ,3roscope . "3l It opera tes with a qua si -
ind ependence of tradi t i on , parents and othe r a uthority , but 
because they hs ve s e t it s course orieina lly , the pe r s ona l ity 
can en j oy only a limited and del i cate f lex ibility . 
If a utonomy i s not interna lized he t e r onomy , what is i ts 
source ? If it is not imposed from without , how does i t evolve 
f r om wi th i n ? Di s cussing wha t i t means to become a p e r son , 
Ca.rl Roge r s spea ks , almos t m, st i ca.l ly , of a £TOw i ng t rust i n 
30. I b i d . , p . 55 . 
31. Riesman , Glaze r and Denney , The Lonely CroNd (Ne;,,; Hsven : 
a le Univers i ty Press , 1953 ) , pp . Jl - J 2 . 
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the innate wisdom of one 1 s total organismic eA.-pe rience. 
I can trust my experience •••• I have l earned t hat 
my total organismic s ensing of a situation is more 
trustworthy than my int ellect •••• As I gr adually 
come to trust my total r eact ions more deep l y , I fi nd 
that I can us e t hem to guide my t hinki ng . I have c ome 
to have more r e sp ect for those vag ue t houghts which 
occur i n me from time to time, ~vhich feel as thoo.gh they 
were significant •••• I think of it as trusting t he 
totality of my experience.J2 
To resp onsibility, then, must be added s elf-confidence 
in the deep er sen se of trusting the totali t y of one 1 s exper-
i en ce a s a valid basis for evaluating alternatives and making 
decisions . Rollo Kay r eflects t h is i nsight in hi s definition 
of t he creative conscience a s 11 one 1 8 cap ac ity t o tap one 's 
ovm cleeper l evels of insight, e thical sensitivity and aware-
ne ss in uhich tradition and i mmeo.iate eA.'}) erience are not 
opp osed to each othe r bo.t int errelated. n3J 
In contrast uith heteronomy, the c oncept of c..utonomy 
ha s been surro unded by h i ghly positive connotations . Since 
a basic function of s cience is to gain understanding and 
control over ext er nal forces which are often host ile to man, 
it is na tural that psychology , i n its eagerness to be di-
vor ceo. from the humanities, should regard autonomy as a defi-
nite value, along with t he r e l a ted concep ts of independence 
and r e sp onsibility. 
32. Carl Rogers, On Becomi ng a Person (Boston : Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1961), PP• 22-23. 
JJ. Rollo May, Man 1 s Search for Himself (New York : W. W. 
Norton and Co., 195J), p. 215. 
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What many psychologists have fail ed to stress is that, 
potentially at l east, autonomy has a ne gat ive side. This can 
best be demonstra t ed by relating autonomy to homonomy. 
Autonomy is a prereq uisite of homonomy, because the lat-
t er development pres1.1pp oses the pm;er fo r fr e e choice and the 
capacity for sustained loyalty to a cause , force, or unit 
which supersedes t he individual. Only an a utonomous p erson 
p osse sse s these cap acities . Yet, an autonomous person may 
r efuse to unit e with others as a cooperat ive and equal part 
of a Sl)_perincl_i vid ua l -v:hole. Free dom to chao se one 1 s values 
i ncludes the fr ee dom to r e fuse t he val L~e s inherent i n t he concept 
of homonomy. 
This is only to say both heteronomy and autonomy have 
p ositive a nd nega tive values which are best discerned in r e-
lation to t he development a l st age t hat immediately succe eds 
them. To the degree t hat heteronomy promotes autonomy, it 
is posit ive . To the degr e e t hat autonomy thv,rarts homonomy, 
it is negative. 
Whether or not autonomy l eads to homonomy is dependent 
upon at least three variables, all of 1.vhich trace t he ir 
principal orig i ns to the adolescent year s.34 Thes e i'V e now 
34. In t he se discussions, the relativity of the autonomy con-
cept is r ecognized. Ev en t he child is not wit hout some 
de gree of autonomy, and the mat ure ad ult nev er achieves 
absol ute a utonomy. Alt hough definite movement toi·J"ard 
autonomy may be said to begin i n the second year of life 
with the struggle to «stand on one's own feet," the 
struggle toward aut onomy appears to be most crucial dur-
ing t he adol escent years . 
c:L i s8uss b ri e f l y be f o re di s c u s sing r e l i g i ous me. turi ty in t e r ms 
o f h omonorny . 
i . The c a pa c i ty fo r c ritica l di s c rimina t i on 
Aut on omy a s th e a b i lity t o ma ke r e spons i b le deci s ions 
p r ed ica t es a c r i t i cal f a c ulty t h a t a lows t he i n d i v i dua l t o 
e v 8 lua t e v Plues , p ri n c i p l e s , and th e au thor i ties wh ich p ro mot e 
t h em . A!l unc ri t i c s l a p :;;r oa c h to aut ho rit y a.nd V8 lues usua lly 
is evidence o f a uthorita ri a n i sm a n d r e l i g i o u s im~atur i ty . 
Ob se rves Go r d on Allpo rt : 
No vJ e vidence show s t h a t the ve r y s ub ·e cts vvho a ccept 
r el i g i on unr eflec t ive ly and uncri t ic8l ly t end to r eact 
i n an equa l l y unr e fl ective way t o t he ir par ent s , t o 
po li t i c .l i ss ues , to s o c i a l i nst i t u t i ons . Their sen-
t i men t s s eem uni formly i mwature .. .. Close r a n a ly s is 
ind ica. tes t hat t he r e l i g ious s e!ltirnent i n t hese c ases 
i s bl i n d ly ins t i tut i op.q,l , e xclusioni st , a!ld r e l a t e d to 
s elf-cent e r ed v 2 lues . ;J 
How t h e C8pa c ity f o r critic a l di s cr im inat i on d e v e lops 
ma y be d e a lt w:th b r iefly h e r e a s on e di men s i oTI of g r owth a wa y 
f r om h eteron omy towa r d a u t on omy and homonomy . 
Am ong s tud ent s o f r el i b i on the r e i s genera l az ree~ent 
that , d u r i n g th e fi rst fi ve y e a r s o f l if e , the ch i ld ' s c on-
cept of God i s so c ompletely color ed by hi s image o f h i s 
f the r t ha.t the t wo c a n scar c e l y be d i s t i n £ui s h e d . This 
s i mila ri t y be t we en t h e God - conc e p t .nd t he f a ther- i mage ap -
p a r ently prevail s e v en i n h om e s wh er pa r 2nt s h a b i tu2 ll y 
3.5. Go r d on Al Jpo rt , The Ind i v i d u a l and Hi s Rel i 0 i on ( _ew 
York : The Ms c '11 illE:m Comp an y , 1950 ), ~· · 59 . 
r e f er their thou gh ts a n d a ct i ons to a religious authorit y 
~ 6 
hi ghe r than t hemselve s . ) 
Wi th t he form a t i on o f consci ence &t the age o f six or 
s even y ears , the chi l d h a s ent e r ed a l arger soc i a l wo r ld 
whe r e schoo ling in the basi c a c a demic sk i lls and s ust a ined 
ex,o ure to autho rity fi gur es o ther t han the pa r en t s , com-
bine to sever the c h i ld ' s n a ive uni on o f pa r s~ta l a nd ulti -
mate a uth orit y . Ps hi s powe rs of critica l different i at ion 
d evelop , the child bec omes increasingly disenchanted with 
the i deali zed i mage h e has nur t u r ed o f h i s pa r ents . 
At the emoti on a l l e vel , h owever , the ch ild ' s n eed fo r 
an auth ority , unblemished by par enta l def e c ts , ontinues . 
Thi s dep endency need finds f ulf i llmen t in a God- concept 
whic h bec omes i nc r easingly idea li zed and therefo re d i st in~t 
from the ch i ld ' s i mage o f his f ath e r . 
<,'7 
Li Y'..n a nd .:.~c h;,r::. rzA employ a Fre udia n f r amework t o 
trace r el i g i o u s de v elopm ent in childhood . Howe v e r , they 
demonst r a te the transito r y natu r e o f the mechani sm b y which 
the ch i ld pro j e cts h i s f ears o f pa r enta l r e tri bution onto 
God as an all - seeing , all - k!lowi n g super- pc: r ent fr orr, 1\rhom no 
s ecrets &r e hid . Al t ho ugh hi s God- concep t r e t a ins the omni -
)o tent ~uali t i es formerly i n ves t ed in the f 8 the r , the child 
J6. Ho':,:ever , the writer knows o f no studies wh i ch tes t the 
e ffec ts o f va ri ous t ypes o f r el igi ous cli~ate in the 
home upon the ch i ld ' s r e lig i ous c o~c e ts . 
J[. Linn and Schwar z , 
( New York : RAndom 
e ri ence 
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is ab l e , gradually , to idealize thi s concept in spite of the 
limitations of the parents with whom God originally was 
equated. In additi on to the i nfluence of parent- surrogates 
up on t he child (e . g . t eacher s , mi nisters , and publ i c heroes), 
t hese writers al so note a diminishing of c onflic ts due to 
the sublimation of unacceptabl e i mpulses and the acquisition 
of new skills and knowl edge . 
~Vi th the r educ tion of inner conflict, the child ex.;:oer-
iences a diminishing of gui lt, anxiety, and fear of retri-
bution . I ncr easingl y , God assu...rnes more benign qua l i ti e s 
and t he child' s r esponse change s fro m feexful subservience 
to unquestioning l ove . 
His differentiation of God and parents i ntroduces t he 
child to the fundamental realization that all aut hority is 
not ultimate. This insight comes slowly , b ecause many chil-
dren find diffi c ul ty in br eaki ng early patterns of idealizing 
certain t yp es of authority. One by one the erec ted idols 
fall. These experiences of di sapp ointment at the r evealed 
fallibili t y of reveren ced a ut hority are al ways painful if 
not traumatic. As Erikson observes: 
One of t he deepest conflicts i n life is the hate 
for a parent who serves a s the model and the exe cutor 
of the s uperego, b u.t who (in some form ) -vras fo u.nd try-
i ng to ge t a-v:ay ·Hi t h the very transgress;i.gns uhi ch t he 
cnild can no longer tolerate in himself. ) 
Apparently , t he child 1 s developing concept of God is 
at least p artially a compensation f or the hard r eality that 
]8. Erik H. Erikson, op. cit., Childhood and Socie t y , 
pp. 22.5-226 . 
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huma n a uthority i s n t 2l~ays r e li able . If s o , the child ' s 
need n e ithe r ~o ves nor disprov es the ob j ect i ve r eal i ty of 
the Ultim~te '.~thori ty f or which he lonss . Hi s predicament 
"" ')es underl i ne th e psyc~'10 log ical v2 1 ue s ) f r e l i :-::_ i ous t each-
ing wh ic h corlstcmtly illuJl ina.te the e lationship bet-,reen God 
a s Ulti m~ te Au~hority a nd the pr e limi nary cu h rit i es through 
1...rhom, des:pit e their l i mi t oti ons and f E, iJ_ure , 'J or_ seeks t o 
r evec l h i :-ns elf . 
A second phase of critica l discriminat i on ~h i ch de -
velops duri ng the l a t ency per i od is a God- se l f d i ff e r en t i ot i on 
on t he pa r t o f the c~ i ld . Ju s t as t he God - concept assumes 
th e omnipotence once pe rc e ived ~s bel onc i ng t o the f a th e r , 
so th i s concept a l so a ssumes , g r adual l y , t he magica l omni po -
t ence with wh i ch the ch ild h .s endt:red h i msel f th r ough the 
fi rst f i ve o r s i x yea rs of his life . In a g r owi n g cla rifica -
ti on of c s.us .li ty t hc. t is u suall r com- le ted by age t en , the 
chi ld outgr ows th e i n f ant i le mis concept i on wh i ch sees al l 
caus a li ty in relat i on t o c; r and i ose est i ms t es of one ' s own 
powe r s . Now , God becomes the c ause ) f e vents , 1,r hethe r mo r s l 
o r physica l i n their i~plica t i ons . 
De s c ribi ng t h is i mpor t ant tr&Ds i t i on f r om f c.nt e sy to 
r ea l ity , Lin0 and Schwarz wri te : 
Thus inf an tile idea s o f mae;i c s l om.:1i po t ence g i ve wa y 
to the God - concept 0f ca usa li ty . In t hi s concept , mora l 
cons ide r a t i ons mi ngle di r ectly wi th ph rs ica l , indeed a re 
hardly s epa r a ted . It i s t he ea r l i est notion o f ca usa l i t y 
a nd the on e t h8 t surv ives longest . As meDta l development 
proceed , i ncreas incly the sepo r &t i on bet~'ieen mora.l and 
phy sical c ons ide r a t i ons occurs , and theology i s mo r e and 
more e xc luie d from th e explana t i pn o f natura l phenom ena . 
I n t i ~ e s o f great cr~~ is the ee rli ar no tion o f c c us2 li t y 
t ends t o be r e vived . / 
The a bili ty to discern the limita t i ons of t he sel f a.nd 
of pre liminqry s u th r i ty deepens as t.e l i f e cycl e progre sses 
through the yec r s of youth nd i nt o adultho ~d . It s deve lop-
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~ent r epre s ents one o f the sur est sa f egu3rds s ga in s t c doc i le , 
unquest i oni nG ubs e rvi enc e on wh ich ~ u thor it a ri s nism th ri ves . 
I n i ts ~atu e form , this capac i ty f or e va l u2 t i ne E th Jrity 
o r as s ess i ng i ts r2ti o with t he actua l i t i es manifests itsel f 
i n i nde pendence of j ud<?;ment , c ri tice l thought and spiri tus ! 
disc ernment . 
Some ~ha t ironic8lly , the qua lity of critica l d iffer-
ent i ~ tion m8 y e rve or de fe a t the en s of re l i ~iou s comm i t -
rn en t . As ~ e shal l ~bs e rv e i n l o t a r ch8pt e rs , the f aculty 
f or h i ehly c ri t ic8 l eva luation o f a l l authority inc l uding 
t he d i v i ne ma y beco11e fused wi t h r ebe l li on and mi s trus so 
a s to rende r inacce s s i ble a ma ture r e l 8 tion2h :i.p 1;-; i t h ult i ma te 
a uth :::> ri ty , i n :.;hich critica l di c r i mina t i on end t ru s t plcW 
compl ementa r y , m utu~ l ly suppo r t i ve r ol es . 
Ado l e sc ence i s a critica l pe r i od i n the struggl e t owa rd 
ma turity bec c use , i n add i t i on to a sha rpeninz of pe rc ep t i ons 
of p r el i mi na ry EJ utho r i ty , i t br i ngs the crit i cal capac i t i es 
o f the pe r s on s l i ty fully to bea r upon God as Ul t im~ te Au t hority . 
13 . Li nn and Schw·::-- r z , OD . 
_..... 
cit ., p . J9 . 
From one 90 i nt o f vi el , adoles c ence r e pea ts the pat t e r ns 
o f the ea rl y l a t e ncy pe r i od , but on a hizher level . I dec-:l i sm 
i nvested f irs t in t he parent s a n d then in the d ivine inevi t ~bly 
c lashes wi th the r ealit i es o f the g r owi ng pers on ' s experience 
as he enc ounters l 2 rge r a n d l ess - fi l t e red aspects o f l ife . 
A matur e r eligi on re Quires a p a i nful r eshspin:?; o f the u!lreal -
is t ic i 1ages o f chi l dhood , where b8th p r e li mina ry and ult i ma t e 
::=mthori t y c_re c onc e r ned . Fo r s ome vo un2· ne r sons the f o rm e r 
u ~ ~ ' 
conc epts of God prove so untens ble th8t a f l ight i nt0 r a d i c a l 
dJubt seems the onl y a l ternat ive . Fo r others , the tran ition 
to a meture God - concept produc e s less confl i ct and l e ss re -
bell i on . 
The i mpo rtance of the cri t i c a l faculty i n relat ion to 
authority can sca rcely be exagge r a t ed . I n ch i l dhood , it is 
the means o f diffe r entiat i ng prel i mi n s.r y a nd. ultimete author-
i ty a.nd achi ev i ng a mo!:'e realist i c und e r s t :=mdin of c ::o-usa li ty . 
In ado l e scence , it become s a n instrument for that testing o f 
v a r i ous a uthor i t i es , caus es , and va lues wh ich i s the prelud e 
to mrture c ~mm itment t o a purpose beyond onesel f. 
i i . Capa c ity f r rea li stic defendency 
A second aspect o f a utonomy i s th e c c-paci t f or r e e l -
istic de~endency . Rea l i stic dependenc y n eed s to be dist in -
gu i shed fr om t wo widesor e a d d e vi at i ons -- sy~biot i c a ttachment 
and unrealistic independence.4° 
The first may be defined as a r e l a tionshi u to auth or-
i ty in vJ"h ich security is achieved at the expe ns e of one t s 
integrity or personal authority. Frequently, symbiosis is 
found in t h e char a ct er structure of t he authoritarian per-
sonality. It spring s from a number of sources--among them, 
weakness, fe ar, guilt . Erich Fromm describes t h e victim of 
a uthoritarian submis sion in the follov-ring uay : 
He has found inner security by becoming, symbiotically, 
part of an authority felt t o be greater and more pm1erful 
mhan himself. As long as he is part of that authority--
at the expense of hi s o-vm int egr ity--he fe els t hat he is 
participating in the authority's strength . Hip feeling 
of certainty depends on t his symbiosis •••• ~1 
Unr ealistic i nd ependence may be defined, psychologically, 
as the denial of any ultimat e aut hority beyond oneself and 
t he tendency to see all depenc1e ncy :r·e l a tionships a s a t hreat 
to one•s autonomy. 
That realistic dependency is a more valid i ndex of 
maturity than t his t ype of i ndepende nce is disput ed by a 
number of psychoana l ysts , incl uding Fre ud and Fromm. A 
40. In hi s study , The _Psychology of Af fili a tion (Stanford , 
California: Stanford University Press , 1959), Stanley 
Scha ch t er defines dep endence as "the extent to "tnThich the 
individual tJ.s e s or relie s on other p ersons as sources of 
approval, StJ.pport, hel p , ancl reference." p . 82. Schachter 
fi nds convincing evidence that t her e is a dependency dif-
fer ential among siblings, which can be coordinated with 
the ordinal position of each Ohild. 11 For both b oys 
and girls, only children have higher dep endency scor e s 
than first-born childr en a nd first-born childr en have 
higher scores t han later born children. " p. 84. 
41. Fromm, ~· ci t ., p . 146 . 
66 
care ful cr i tic of th e lat t ~r , how ever , has f~und that the 
i n vas i on of irret i ons l u tho ri ~y i s not t he m2 l a i se o f mode rn 
t i mes . REt':!er , the bc..sic p ro t l em i s " the flit;ht of r a ti one l 
LJ,-; 
2uthori ty . " .. ~ Rel uct .?nce to ackno··l edze the c l B.i ms e ven of 
rBt i ~na l authori ty , c s evidenc ed i n t h i s f l i ght , epi tomizes 
the c oncept o f unrec-l i s tic in<iepend ence . 
~e may sc-y t hz t a dol escence and e 2 rJy Bdulthood i s a 
time f o r defining re Elist i cally the l i mi t s of one ' s powe rs 
end one ' s inie~endsnce . Gordon . ll port c it es e vi d ence to 
the e ff ect the t an undue confid ence i n one ' s own powe r s 
._ tt ::: i ns unt i l into the thi rti es . Onl ,y then :io 8 mB jori t y 
of pe r sons begi n to r ecogni ze that th e ya~ninc cap be t ween 
the ir a spira tions end the i r .chievemen ts i s likely to re -
, l:f3 
ma i n unconque r ea . 
'dheteve r the dync:•m i cs and the chronolo_::,y of the ir 
achi evement , r e s.l i s t i c d e::_)ende:ocy end l oya l ty ::< r e influenced 
cri t ica l ly by t he dolescent yea r s . Th e ir d evelopment is 
o f fe cted , of c~urse , by the her i ta e of tru2t , obed i ence , 
and i dentif i cet i on from chi ldhood . ToLe ther Gl l ~f these 
cepac i t i es fo r m the 15r Jund o f autonomy a nd t he adult ' s b::-s ic 
pat t e rns of e uthority rel ~ tionsh i s . 
42 · John H. Schaer , ~scafe From Authority ( Ne~ Yo rk : Bes ic 
Books , I nc ., 1961 ) , p . 288 . 
Lf). ;' llport , em . cit ., 'T'he Ind i vi du8 l End Hif ~el igi on , 
p . J? . 
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iii. Cap acity for fidelity 
A third asp ect of autono~y j oi ns with t he critical 
faculty and the capacity for r s alistic dependency to s e t 
the st age for Angyal 1 s trend toward homonomy to become 
actualized . It may be called the capacity for loyalty . 
Born of incomp lete identity in the life of adolescent p erson-
ali ty, this capacity grovrs with the mvareness of 'V'lho one is. 
Fidelity, when fully matured, is the strength of 
disciplined devotion •••• (It) compri s es a ne1·l s et 
of identifica tion processes, both with significant per-
sons and vJi th ideological forces, which give importance 
to individual life by relating it to a living commu-
nity and to ongoing history , and by count erpointing 
the ne1ifly -vvon incli vidual identity ·Hi th some communal 
solidarity. 
In yout h , tUEn, the life history int ers ects with 
history: • • • 
In religion, the capacity for 11disciplined devotion n 
is an essential virt ue . It is the goa l of the adols scent 1 s 
act of commitme nt to the Christian life. Fa ilure in its 
evol ution may lead to deviant commitme nt s to the s elf, to 
blind de struction , or to aut horitarianism in one or more of 
its mode s. 
Th us f ar, we have st udied the p ositive s ignificance 
of both het eronomy and autonomy a s stages in t he deve lopment 
of personality. While negative or a ut horitarian forms of 
ext ernal ao.thori ty rr.ay thwart the person 1 s trend to~trard 
autonomy , benevolent a ut hority fos ters a basic trust in 
44. Erik H. Erikson, "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity ," in 
Daeclalus--Jourl]._al of the American Academy of _Arts ana_ 
Sciences, (\'lint er , 1962), p. 23 . 
and sn iden t i fic a ti on v>T i th tho se -who per sonify t he au t onomy 
and the homonomy tow~rd wh i ch the child i s grow i ng . 
Th l imit a t i ons o f heteronomy a r·e de,nonst r Bted by 
aut onomy . Hete r onom y ceases to be a good when i t b loc ks 
the dev e lopment o f pe r son a l authority-- t he poi'Jer o f an i n -
d i v i dua l to ori~inP te free a nd r e s pons i b l e dec i s i ons and 
9.c ti ons . Thi s pm11e r o r a utho rity i nvolves a. brosdeni ng of 
Eri kson ' s " b .s i c trust " so that it encompasses the tote l ity 
o f one ' s ttuugh ts , f eel i ngs , and experiences as e r e l i c ble 
basis f o r evaluation and deci s i on . The broa d ening o f bas ic 
t rus t i s ac~ompani ed by the d eve l opmen t o f a cr i tical fac -
ulty which enab l es the pe r son to eva l uc:=;te the :J.utho ri ty of 
othe r s as wel l as hi s own . In the somet i mes painful i nte r -
e.c tion of trust and uest i oni ng , the perso~ ul t i ms. tel y 
r ecogni zes he lim i tati ons o hi s e r sona l fre e dom a nd 
:::.utho ri ty and h i s ne ed f o r a c a use o r pu r pose beyond hi m-
self. 
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This r e co c;nition and a burgeoning C C• acity for fid e li t y 
a r e the so i l in which homo~o~y t a kes roo t . Just as a utonomy 
re vea l s the limit2t i ons of heteronomy , so homo~omy emon-
s tretes the limit a tions o f a utonomy . To the d eiree tha t 
autonomy contri butes t o t he trend to wa rd homonomy it i s a 
pos i t i ve va l ue , fo r it means t h a t one ' s l oy? l t i es end i dent i -
f i c et i ons wil l be guided by a c ritical we i £hiL ~ o f ~ Ite r­
nat ives i n the li gh t o f conscio u s ly a ffi rmed v alues . Pt 
thi s po int , it sh ould be evid ent t het no inherent conf lic t 
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ex i st be t wee n the t wo t r end s . 
Auto nomy c eases to be a p o s i tive vs lue if and wh en i t 
c ount e r Pc t s o r thwarts the t r end t owa r d h omono;ny . r~ nc, rc hy 
i s a. :;oss i ble conse~uenc e of the f Pi l ure to r ecogn i ze tha t 
one ' s fr eedom a n d ~u tho ri ty must b e limi t ed i f the f r eed om 
and a u t hori t y of othe r s a r e no t to oe v io l a ted . Er i c h Froi!lm 
f 4 ,5 
r ecogni zes t h is i n h i s 2ne lysi s o f 2uth o ri ty ~ nd _reed o:n . 
Al though Fromm i s a c h2mp i on o f ind i v i dua l f r eed om and c h oos e s 
t o r ega rd God 8 S a symoo l o f mEm ' s powe r s , he n e ve r the l e s s 
recogni z~ s tha t man need s a fram ewo rk of refe r ence and d e votion 
wh i c h l i es out s i de o f him s e l f . Th is ins i ght l eads Fromm t o 
of fe r hi s own con cep t o f h omonomy : a process i n which the 
c utonomo u s p erson r eunites h i msel f ' i th msnk i nd in the sp i r i t 
o f lo ve and prod~ct i v i ty . 
. man the more he ga i ns f reedoT i n t h e s ense o f eme r g -
in~ from the 8ri _::, i nal oneness with man e nd n a ture a nd the 
mo r e h e oecomes an " i nd ividual , 11 hss no cho i ce tJut to 
unit e him self with t he wo r l d in t he spont ~ne i ty of l ove 
and roduct i ve worl{ o r e l se t o se e k s kind of securi t y 
by such t i es with t he orld PS destroy chis f r eed om a nd 
the i n t e g ri ty o f h is i ndi vi duel sel f . 4 0 
Fromll does n o t sey thc t mank i nd h o l ds "uthori t'r ove r t he i n -
d ividua l , but h i s humani s t i c e thic is a s mu~h a r emedy f o r 
the a n a rchy or e3ocent r i c i ty t h e t ma y eme r ge f rom mi s3u ' d e d 
a utonomy , es i t i s f or a u th8rl t a r i an submi ss i on . 
4S. Er i c h Fro~m , Escape From Freed o m ( New York : Ei nehs rt a n d 
Compa n y , 1941). 
46. Fro:nm , 912. · c i t ., pp . 22- 2J . 
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For the mature person, heteronomy i n chi l dhood h as 
provided the soil in which autonomy and homonomy c a n flourish 
without c onflict of interes t. Homonomy i s autonomy 's pro-
tection agains t anarchy a nd autonomy is homonomy' s shield 
agains t autocracy or au thoritari ani s m. Wna t t h i s conclus ion 
means s pecifically f or religious matur ation can best be s e en 
by a closer consideration of the concept of theonomy. 
3. Theonomy 
In a second theoretical development already referred 
to, And~s Angyal goes beyond a purely individualistic 
view and considers "the problem of the integrati on of the 
individual into superindividual units." What emerge s from 
the s e consideration s is a convicti on that t h i s integrati on 
i s a s essential t o pers onality organizati on and deve l opment 
as the phy si ological functions . For t h e organism's dynami c 
movement toward integration into a l a rger whole, An gyal 
proposes the term "trend -coward homonomy ." By t h is he 
means "a trend to be in harmony with su perindividual units, 
the social grou p, n ature, God, ethical world order, or what-
ever the pers on's formulati on of it ma y be." 47 
Whether the individual's center of devoti on or integra-
tion is founded u p on r eality or illusion is immaterial to 
the psychologist, argue s Angyal. Much more important is 
47. Angyal, Q£· cit., p . 1 68 . 
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the danger that the trend to1-rard h omonomy may be obscured 
and distorted , vri th cri~1pling effe cts up on persona lity 
grmvth. For Angyal regards this trend as a psychic force 
too p oHerful to be s l i ghted . He describes it as "a so urce 
of profound mot ivation for human behavior. n1-l-8 
In contrasting autonomy ana. homonomy , Angyal finds the 
l atter to be direct ed not toward the environment but meaning-
ful wholes of which t he person fe e ls or wishes to feel him-
self a part . Homono~y is oriented to the non- rational rather 
than the rational, and it ha s a pe a ceful , permane~t quality 
in comparison to the restlessness in the trend to~rrard autono-
my. Finally , Angyal suggests that the trend toward homonomy 
proceeds by impressions and exp eriences rat her than aggress-
iv e res1) onses to environmental s ituations , Fhere the desire 
is to mould and conquer. Inst ead, the mood of hornonomy is 
one of esthetic enjoyment and creativity . 
At t his p oint , Angya l introduc es the concept of reson-
ance: 
It is the experience of harmony or of the corr espondence 
of one 's person 11 i th tho.t 't"lhich impresse s on e . • • • 
Thro u.gh t he corre spondences bet-vreen that 1 hich is OLltside 
and t hat which is inside , one ' s indiv idual problem is, so 
to say , extended into the realm of t he sup erindividua l and 
in t h is -vmy a c ertain kind of unity ••• is exper i enced .49 
Alt hough reluctant to make spe cifically r eligious appli-
cations , Angyal her e approache s the heart of the theonomous 
rela tionship. The goals he postulat es for homonomy apply 
48. Ibid., P• 178. 
49 • ~. ' p • 17 6. 
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significantly to religious experience--sharing , participa-
tion, and a f eeling of t.mion. Theonomy cent ers around all 
three of those elements . Psychologically , it f ocuses on 
one 1 s capacity for self- giving, one 1 s ability to re l a te or 
harmo nize one 1 s l ife wit h Ultimate Aut hority , in search or 
for t he sake of a basic sense of union or on enes s with God. 
This development does not negate the trend to\vard a uto nomy , 
be cause self-fulf illment , not self- destruction , is the o ut-
come . T~eonomy represents a broadening of p ers onality be-
yond pure l y individuali s tic l imits . 
Julius Muller ' s conc ept of t heonomy , described earlier, 
act ually combines a utonomy and homonomy in a singl e t he ory or 
declaration. It p os tulat es that in relating oneself harmo-
niou.sly u i th t he purp oses of Ultimate Aut hority one b e comes 
truly autonomous--free t o make resp onsible de cisions . Con-
versely , it may be i n terpreted t o mean that the val ues which 
emerge oLJ.t of t he totality of one Is experience as an a uton-
omo us person , 't·lill be consistent "t·Tith the pll..rp ose s of Go cl. 
In Muller 1 s c oncept , any apparent opp os ition be t ..,reen autonomy 
and religion breaks clm.-m . God 1 s aut .hori ty c..s 11~Jouer over 11 
t he lives of persons i s he l d t o be t he source of p ersonal 
au.t .\l..)ri ty or 11p ow3r to. II Appar ent l y , there is no reason "t".rhy 
the onomy may no t precede autonomy or wh~r the tvw may not be 
experienced simul taneo u.sly. 
A classic p syc hological des cription of theonony is 
'Vl iiliam James 1 analysis of "Saintliness , II his col lective name 
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f or the char acteristi cs of mat ure r eligion . "The saintly 
charact er is the char act er f or i·J'hi ch spiritual er.:wtions 
are the habitual centre of the pers onal energy ".5 0 . . . 
Saintl iness may be a ssoc i ated with c ertai~ universal feature s 
which Jame s ident ifies as foll ows : 
1. A f ee ling of bei~g in a wider life than that of 
t his world ' s selfish int ere s ts ; and a c onviction , 
not merely intellectual but as it we re sensible , 
of the exi s tence of an I c1eal Pmver . I n Chris t ian 
saintlinesf this p o1-rer is always p ersonifi ed as 
Goo. • • • .5 
2 . A sense of the fri endly continuit y of the ideal 
pouer vli th o ll.r ovm l ife , a nd a ;;-Jilling self- s urren-
der to its control • .52 
3 . An i mmen se elation and fre edom, as t33 OLJ. tlines 
of the confining selfhooc1 melt dmm . 
4. A shifting of t he emotio~al centre touards loving 
and harmonious affections , tml]"ards 1yes , yes, t and 
avray from .5' ijO , 1 1>Jherc the claims of the non-ego are 
conc erned . 
~vhile al l of t hese descriptive comr:1ents by Angyal a nd 
J ame s shol: a r emarl:ab l e unity and have re l evance to the con-
cept of r eligious mat uration , the mos t significant aspect of 
t heonomy fo:.." t he preser..t stud.y is t he cap a city fo r self-
surrender cit ed by bot h writ ers . Self- surrender i ncludes the 
.50 . J ames , 2I2..• "+ ~., p . 271 . 
51 . I bio_ ., P• 272 . 
52 . Ibid . , p . 273 . 
53 . ill_£. 
54 . I b id . 
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harmonization principle of Angyal and appears to be the pre-
condition for the fir s t, third, and fou rth of James' factors 
in saintliness. It emerges, in fact, a s t he c ritical r espons e 
by which man enters a nd experience s t h e ri c h benefit s of the 
theonomous relationship. Reli giou sly, it repre s ent s the ulti-
ma te s tep in coming to terms with authority. 
Within the frame work of contemporary p sychology of 
reli g ion, Walter H. Clark offers a definition of religion 
which focuses on behavioral as well a s attitudinal component s 
and incorporate s Angyal's concept of harmonization • 
• • • religion can be most characteristically described 
as the inner experience of the individual when he senses 
a Beyond, e s pecially a s evidenced by the effect of t h is 
experience on h is behavior when he actively attempt s to 
harmonize his life with the Beyond.55 
What is lacking in this definition a n d the other con-
siderati ons which precede it is a cl ear recognition that all 
religious self-surrender is not deserv i ng of a p probation as 
a mature act of personality. All four of Jame s ' factors in 
saintliness cou ld be carried to pathological extremes. 
Indeed, James himself gives serious consideration to the 
insight tha t the fruit s of religion are always liable to 
corruption by excess. 56 In a similar vein, it may be said 
tha t the transcendency of an experience or a cause to wh ich 
one surrenders himself is not proof t hat the experience or 
55. Walter H. Clark, The Psychology of Religion (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1958), p. 22. 
56. William Jame s , 212.• cit., p. 339 . 
75 
cause is more divine than diabolical. Applied to Cl ar k ' s 
de liberate ly broad def inition , this means t ha t religion can 
b e a p rivate fo1~ of neurosis a s Freud cont ended . 
Psychologically , sel f - surrencler or self- giving appear s 
t o be a more app~opriate phrase than s elf-renunciation or 
s elf-s ubmergence. In addition to carry ing mor e positive con-
notations , self-surrender , i nterpret ed as s elf- giving , ·is 
compatib l e ivith the i mage of an autonomous self . On the other 
hand , self-renunciation may more aptly descr ibe t he t ransition 
by lJhi ch a psychotic or ne tJ.rotic p ersonality mel ts clown the 
o D.tlines of a conf i ning pathology . I n any event , v!e here 
adop t "s elf-surrender" as a h i ghly positive co ncept , and sym-
bolic of t he openness , sensitivity , r esp onsive ness , and 
yielding ivhich charac teriz e a genuine love-r elationship be ti'Jeen 
husband and wife . 
To r estate an earlier observation , n either the trend 
toward aut onomy nor t he trend t oward homonomy can stand 
alon e wit hout r efle cting a s erious psych ic i mbalance or dis-
turb&nce . An import ant t es t of the mat urity of one 's relig-
ious surrender is t he degree to which it p romot es or sustains 
t he trend toward a utonomy , a s described in the previo us 
sect ion of t h i s chapter . Pathological exc esses in r eligious 
surrender invariably undermine existing a utonomy or seriously 
impair p otential a utonomy . The t heonomo us r el a tionship is 
psychologically valid onl y i nsofar as it height ens critical 
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faculties, 57 deepens the sense of personal responsibility, 
fosters a creative independence, increases productivity, 
and creates a climate in which basic decisions can be freely 
and consciously made. 
When t hese corrective considerations are appended to 
the central factor of self-surrender or self-giving, the 
following definition takes shape: Mature religious behavior 
aonsists of those actions or endeavors by which a person 
attempts to harmonize his life with the values and purposes 
of Ultimate Authority, with a resulting increase in his 
powers and potentialities as an autonomous person. 
In ensuing chapters, rebellion against authority will 
be evaluated longitudinally in relation to this definition 
and the incorporated dual concepts of autonomy and theonomy. 
57. In a chapter entitled "The Religion of Maturity," 
Gordon Allport stresses the differentiated character of 
the mature religious sentiment. The Individual and His 
Religion, .2£• cit., pp. 57-63. "Differentiations," 
cover a multiplicity of interests, all of which may 
comprise the religious sentiment. Absence of the differ-
entiated sentiment often is betrayed by an "uncritical 
abandon," wherein there is "no reflective articulation 
of parts." The mature sentiment, on the other hand, is 
the product of "many successive discriminations and 
continuous reorganization." Based partially on critical 
tendencies, it creates a genuine sense of wholeness by 
bringing varying components and related attitudes into 
meaningful relationship. 
CHAPTER III 
ETI OLOGIC PL THEOR I ES OF REBELLION 
We have seen in Chap t e r I tha t rebe l lion aga i ns t 
authority i s not of cent r a l i mport a nce i n p s y c hology gen -
e r a l l y e xc ept a s it r epres ent s one p oss ible response by man 
to the negative influences o f his environment . In the psy-
cho l o gy of r e li c i on , r e b e lli on again s t God i s viewed as a 
wi llful act o f p r i de against God lead i ng to tragi c conditions 
o f est r a n g em ent a nd loneliness . Howe v e r , out of de f e r enc e to 
theolog y , the psycholo gy of reli g i on has not ex ~lica t ed the 
c a uses o f man ' s r e b e ll i on in any thorough or s yst ema tic 
f a sh i on . 
In the b e lief tha t no ph enomenon s uch as r e b e llion is 
simple in it s structur e , it s c a us a lity , o r i ts consequences , 
we turn in th i s p r esent chap t e r to a b roader c ons iderat ion 
t ha n wa s pos s ible in Chap t er I o f p s y cho log ice l theo r i es that 
shed add itional li ght on the complex ity of our subject. This 
seems justi fi ed by our hypothetica l sta tement in Chapter II 
o f the three critice l s t ages i n the e vol u tion of a uthori ty 
r e l at i onships . Since a uthority is e xper i enced in a number 
o f different modes , it se e ms reas ona ble to a s sume thE. t re -
b e llion ma y b e direct e d against a pa rticula r mode o f 
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authority, thus illustrating the danger of oversimplification 
in any analysis of rebellion. 
To eva lua te in an exhaustive wa y the ma jor theories 
relevant to this study is beyond the scope of a single chap-
ter. At the risk of undue selectivity, we here limit our 
investi gation to wha t may be ca lled four ba sic t heories. In 
one sense, all f our theories are attempts to isola te the root 
of neurosis or a bnorma l behavior. They focus on man's pa ra-
doxica l beha vior whereby he frequently if not habitua lly makes 
choices and embraces behavior pa tterns which contradict his 
highest good. In terms of authority rela tionships, the pa ra-
dox is man's rebellion against those persons and a gainst the 
God who offer love, guidance, and fulfilling rela tionships. 
Interestingly, the pa r ado x rema ins whether one is exploring 
rebellion as s ickness or rebel l ion as sin. In either case, 
man tends to deny the thing s he most needs and to a ffirm the 
thing s tha t contribute to his own unha ppiness, if not his 
destruction. 
The four theories to be considered a re the frustra tion-
aggres s ion hypothe sis, the conflictual theory of neurosis, 
instinctua l theories, and theories ba sed on the concept of 
threa t. 
1 •. Frustra tion- Aggression Hypothesis 
The ea rlie s t a ttempts to esta bli sh an et i ologica l 
theory of hostility and rebellion from a p sychologica l 
standpoint were ma d e b y _S i gmund Freud . Freud ' s studi es are 
ch:_t r a ct e riz ed by such a dynamic , evolutionary qua l i t y tha t 
it is poss ible t o discern two jistinct theo ri es emerging 
l 
f r om h i s life and thought . I n hi s e _ r l i er wr itings Freud 
links hostility with frustration . Thi s c ausal r ela tionship 
was to become the f o unda tion of the Frust r a tion- Agg r ession 
Hypothesis deve l oped by Dol l a rd , Mi ll er , ~ a1 . 2 
Freud theorized tha t man ' s fru s t r at i ons c anno t be 
understood apa rt from a theory o f i ns tincts . He _9o r tra yed 
tvvo types of s timuli , external a nd int e rna l , which ac t upon 
the individua l . To t he internal s timuli , Freud gave the 
name " i nstinct ," e. c:_ uan t i ty o f energy having a source o f 
excitation (within the body ) , a n a im (re lease from th2t exc i-
t a tion ) and a n object ( a n instrument by wh ich satis f a ction 
or release i s to be ach i eved). 
The d e mands o f the instincts are i ncessant a nd ines -
c apable . When i nstinctual ener g i es a re success fully dis -
ch2 r ged , one feels tha t a need has been satis fied . I n 
s ummari z i n g this proce ss , Freud reache d an i mport ant con-
e lus ion: the bas ic d rive o f the hum .n o r ganism is to gain 
l . Ernest Jone s , The Life a nd Work o f Si gmund Freud , Vol . I 
(New York : Ba sic Book s , I nc . , 1955 ) , x ii . Fre ud ' s second 
the o ry ma d e r ebe l lion a se condary , i nstinctual tendency. 
Thi3 conc e pt i s t r eated und e r a sepa r ate heading , later 
in th i s chapter . 
2 . Dolla r d and Mil.ler , Frust r at ion and Aggr ess ion (New Haven : 
Yale Unive r s ity Press , l 9 J 9 ) , pp . 21 - 22 . 
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pleasu~e and avoid pain. To this drive, Freud gave the name 
the "pleasure principle." 
Freud recognized tha t the instincts a re subject to 
numerous kinds of frustration. In the ba sic conflict be-
tween the pleasure-seeking of the individua l and the denials 
of society, Freud saw a second principle to be operative: 
the rea lity principle. By this term, Freud depicted a limit-
ing function of the ego in relation to the id which, initial-
ly, is regulated solely by pleasure-pain stimuli. The di-
chotomy which Freud draws between the two princ iples is not 
absolute, since the ego continues to seek the gratifica tion 
of the id. It does so, however, with due consideration to 
the conditions imposed by the outer world. Human personal-
ity is l a r gely a product of the characteristic ways, effec-
tive and ineffective, by which the individual seeks to resolve 
this conflict. 
Society and its representa tives-, the pa rents in parti-
cular, according to Freud, play a role in moulding personal-
ity, tha t is primarily suppressive in nature. To repea t an 
ea rlier interpretation, Freud tended to ca st all authority 
in an authorita rian mould. It was, therefore, inescapable 
that he should see all rela tionships with authority in terms 
of conflict and frustration. 
Among possible reactions to frustra tion Freud lists 
change of objects (displacement), a im inhibition (sublima-
tion) and repre s sion. In -addition to these reactions, he 
' .- . 
.... 
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describes the powerful surge of animosity toward the frus-
trating agent. In most cas es, the a gent is external to the 
personality; in some instances, it may lie within the person-
ality (ego or superego). 
Freud's case studies are replete with evidence s that 
frustration in interpersonal relationsh i ps whether sibling, 
oedipal, marital, or professional triggers the "primordial 
reaction" of a ggre s sion whi ch is directed against tho s e ob-
jects or persons perceived to be the frustrating age n ts. 
Usually, however, these studie s demonstrate the s u preme im-
portance Freud attached to the oedipal s ituation and the 
thwarting function of parental authority . In explainin g the 
neurosis of a five-year-old boy, 3 Freud traces the child's 
morbid anxiety to the repre s si on of a ggressive tendencies 
against the father a nd mother. Here a threat of punishment 
or a possible los s of love motivate s an inversion or a turn-
ing inward of the aggre ss ive impulses which are now exper-
ienced by the boy a s a phobia that on going ou t of doors he 
will be bitten by a horse. Thus the urg e to hurt is replaced 
in consci ousne s s by the fear of being hurt. The punisher 
becomes the punished; the subject of aggression become s its 
object. Here we see an illus tration of how the con cept of 
displacement enables Freud to rec on cile t he inc on gruities 
3. Freud, Col l ected Works (Lond on: Imago, 1 94 5) VII, p. 243. 
presented by the pleasure principle vis a vis masochistic 
tendencies. 4 
Although Freud was later to move beyond the pleasure-
principle and its primary emphasis on frustra tion as the 
source of aggression, his frustra tion theory has continued 
to intrigue students of human behavior. In the year of 
Freud' s dea th, Dolla rd, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sea rs col-
labor a ted with other social psychologists in publishing their 
5 formulation of the "Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis." 
Perhaps the greatest significance of this hypothesis lies in 
the heuristic function it has served. The psychoanalytic 
principle is restated in such fashion that it allows experi-
menta tion and eventual valida tion, modification, or rejection 
according to the disciplines and methods of clinica l and so-
cia l psychology. An effort is made to close the gap between 
psychoanalytic theory and observation and clinica l investiga-
tion. 
The frustration-aggression hypothesis ma y be simply 
sta ted. Basica lly it postulates: "Aggression is a lways a 
4. On this relationship between frustration, aggression, and 
masochism, Saul Rosenzweig built his "triadic hypo thesis" 
according to which frustration may evoke "extra-punitive," 
"intra-punitive," or "non-punitive" reactions depending 
on personality and situation factors. "An Outline of 
Frustration Theory," Personalit and the Behavior Dis-
orders, ed. J. MeV. Hunt New York: Ronald Press, 19 ), 
I, J79-J88. 
5. Dollard and Miller, 2£· cit. 
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consequence of frustra tion." Aggression is defined as "an 
act whose goa l-response is injury to an organism."? Dollard 
et. a l. obs e rve tha t, quantitatively, a ggression has a posi-
tive correlation with the amount of frustra tion but an in-
verse relationship with the amount of punishment anticipa ted 
8 
as a consequence to the a ggressive act. Frustration and 
inhibition are thus the two significant va ri ables, a lthough 
the latter serves not to elimina te aggres s ion but r a ther to 
alter its direction or its mode of expression. Despite the 
prospect of punishment, the basic c ause-effect rela tionship 
between frustra tion and a ggression remains. 
In addition to the stimulus to investi ga tion which 
this theory has provided, the frustra tion-aggres sion hy-
pothesis ha s given central importance to an etiologica l 
factor which Freud at first emphasized and then allowed to 
move to the periphery of his attention. Frustration is a 
factor in the etiology of hostility, pa in, ha tred, and re-
bellion, and recognition of its role serves a s a co r~ective 
to t endencies which would extirpa te nega tive sentiments by 
fi a t, disci pline, or puni s hment. 
The essenti a l validity of this theory ma y be seen in 
the fact tha t a lmost no one rejects it out of hand. 
6. Ibid., p. l. 
7. Ibid., p . ll. 
8. Ibid., p . JJ. 
Contra riwis e , a l mos t no one accepts it i n i ts simple s t, mos t 
unqua li fi ed t e rms . 
It s f a i lure to a llow for excep tions a n d devi ations , 
first o f a ll is ant ithetical to a widely - held psycho log ical 
max i m tha t " every psychic ph e nomenon is d et e rmined i n multi -
p l e ways ."9 Summa rizing clinica l studies by Rad ke , Less e r , 
Hi t tenborn , Sea rs , Holl enberg , and Sperry , Irv i n L. Child 
reports tha t the " va rious re sult s do not add up t o unifo rm 
c onfirma ti on o f a simple and direct re l a t ion ship between the 
amount of f rust r a ti on i n soci ali za.tion and t h e strength of 
10 the chr onic a ggress i ve tendency ." Thes e studi es d o not 
dis qua lify the th eory , but they d o d emons tra t e tha t over-
simplifi c at i on may be it s bas ic fl a w. 
On a mo r e theo retica l l e vel, and in supr)ort o f the 
instinctual t h eory o f aggr e s s ion , Ka rl Men n ing er l a bels as 
"n onsen s ica l'' the con ten t ion tha t frus tra tion a t the c u l -
tura l l e v e l is th e source of a ll a ggr e s s ion . He then notes 
the f a il u r e o f t he hypo the sis to a c count d yna mic a lly for the 
ori g i ns of h o stility wi th in the ene r g i es of p e r sonality . 
9 . Ka ren Ho r n e y, New Wa ys in Psychoana lysis ( New Yo r k : iJJ. 
W. No rton a nd Co ., 1939 ), p . 59 . A s i mila r v i ew is 
e spou sed by Go r don Al lport . 
1 0 . " Soci a li z a t i on ," Ha ndbook o f Soc ial P sycholo gy , ed . 
Lindze y (Ca mb r idge , JV!a ssa chuset t s : L; dd ison- Wes l ey Pub-
lishing Co . , Inc., 1954), II, 670. 
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Anyone who has had his toe stepped on, which is cer-
tainly not a frustration, knows how inadequate such a 
formula is. Furthermore, it completely ignores the 
question of where the aggressive energy comes from 
which is provoked by the frustration, ~~ this is what 
the instinct theory attempts to answer. 
Menninger would seem to be supported by the observation that 
the frustrated need does not supply the aggressive energy 
since, after hostile energy has been directed against the 
frustrating agent or a surrogate, the unfulfilled need tends 
to emerge unabated. 
Since Menninger's position will be considered more 
fully under instinctual theories, we will only note here 
that again it is the tendency of the frustration theory to 
substitute a monolithic explanation for multiple causation 
that is being criticized. Menninger is pointing out that the 
pleasure principle has two foci and that while the frustration 
theory may cover the seeking of pleasure it does not encompass 
the avoidance of pain as a psychic reality of equal magnitude. 
It is significant that most of the criticism mentioned 
thus far against the hypothesis would be eliminated by 
dropping the scientifically suspect adverb "always." Frus-
tration does not lead always to aggression and aggression is 
not always explainable simply in terms of frustration. 
Responding to the reasonableness of these objections, 
Neal Miller has offered the following rephrasing of his 
11. Karl Menninger, Love Against Hate (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Co., 1942), p. 295. 
.....__ 
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concept: "Frustration produces instigations to a number of 
different types of responses, one of which is an instigation 
to some form of aggression."l2 This apparent willingness to 
move from absolute finality to conditional probability would 
seem to strengthen the hypothesis rather than weaken it, be-
cause it would then grant recognition to those important ex-
ceptions and qualifications to which variou s scientific 
points of view give witness. 
When we restate the frustration-aggression hypothesis 
as pointing to an important though not all-inclusive re-
lationship, we have: aggression is frequently a consequence 
of frustration and contrariwise, the existence of frustra-
tion often leads to some form of aggression. While su ch a 
formulation presents certain problems it does lead away 
from the "reversed-panacea approach" and the "one-shot pre-
scriptions"13 which fail to do justice to the complexity of 
personality and the social or interpersonal determinants 
underlying hostility. 
The question remains: under what conditions is frustra-
tion most likely to result in rebellion or aggression against 
authority? With the accumulation of research data , Dollard, 
Miller, and colleagues have been able to reformulate their 
12. Neal Miller, "The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis," 
Psychological Review, XLVIII (1942), 337-342. 
13. Hebb and Thompson, "The Social Significance of Animal 
Studies," Handbook of Social Psychology, I, 548. 
(These terms appear in this chapter.) 
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hypothesis in a way that strengthens and s harpens it: "'Ehe 
more succe s sive re sponses of non-aggression are extinguished 
by continued frustration, the greater is the probability 
t hat the instigation to a ggression eventual ly will become 
dominant so that s ome response of aggression will occur." 14 
This restatement allows for resourcefulness, initia-
tive, and perseverance as primary, natural response s to 
initial frustration. It sugge s ts that a s the individual 
finds himself unable to cope with the s ource of frustrations 
on other grounds, he resorts to aggressive-rebellious re-
sponses. 
Another way of stating this progression is to say that 
in the presence of persistent frustration, a ggression be-
come s more and more likely as the individual experiences in-
creasing feelings of impotence and helplessne s s in relation 
to the source of frustration. In this emphas i s on accompany-
ing feelings of powerlessness and helplessness as correlates 
of aggre ss ion , we approach a condi tion which Karen Horney 
calls "basic anxiety," a concept we shall .deal with in a 
later section. 
Still another important element i n the above reformula-
tion is the re f erence to "continued frustration." Although 
they do not use t he same words, the au thors here seem to be 
approximating Gordon Allport who score s a "chronic thwarting 
14. Miller, ££• cit., p. 339 . 
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of ne eds" 15 as possibly the vital factor in causing aggressive 
behavior. 
Redl and Wineman give similar emphasis to the function 
of chronic frustration in their analysis of The Aggressive 
Child. 
The children who hate • • • are the children of 
neglect. They have been chronically traumatized 
through repetitive frustration of many of their basic 
needs. Indeed we might speculate that they suffer 
from a disease entity directly stemming from neglect 
itself, which for want of a better term, might be called 
a 'neglect edema.' Their frustration swells and festers, 
as it were, until even frustration which is minor and 
painless in terms of the 'normal' threshold for frustra-
tion tolerance becomes for them an intolerable chal-
lenge to control what they cannot meet. For each frustra-
tion, no matter how small the issue may be, is lumped to-
gether with the chain of frustrations out of the past.l6 
A second question which is spawned but no~ answered 
fully by the frustration theory is why the frustration-ag-
gression pattern varies from person to person and from sit-
uation to situation. English and Pearson, for example, who 
acknowledge the importance of frustration as a complicating 
factor in human development are unable to offer any clear 
evidence as to why different children respond to excessive 
frustration in different way.l7 These authors, like 
Rosenzweig, find it likely that "frustration tolerance" is 
15. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1954), p. 344. 
16. Redl and Wineman, The Aggressive Child (Glencoe, Illinois: 
The Free Press, 1957), p. 222 
17. English and Pearson, Emotional Problems of Living (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1955), pp. 29-42. 
pa rti a lly determin~d by constitutiona l f a ctors, (biologica l 
inheritance, physica l and intellectua l constitution) and 
pa rti ally determined by skills conditioned by experience. 
The warning is appended tha t "constitutiona l factors" is 
too often a cloak for the unresolved mysteries of motivation 
a nd tha t the empha sis on such factors va ries inversely with 
scientific understanding. 
ag; 
Horney gives added dimension to this question by rioting 
tha t frustration often is desirable if it insures the sa fety 
18 
of the organism. Still another aspect of the question is 
the power of frustra tion to serve a benevolent function by 
fostering gr owth and s purring new activities and the develop-
ment of new skills. All of these considera tions make it un-
likely that the frustra tion-aggression hypothesis will ever 
be able to stand apa rt from other supplementa ry theories. 
Alone, this theory, while highly suggestive , seems on scrutiny 
to be too superficia l to do justice to the complexities of 
human motiva tion. 
An example of the kind of supplementa ry theory needed 
is a theory of needs and their relationship to frustra tion-
a ggression pa tterns. Are there ba sic or prima ry n eeds whose 
thwa rting in compa rison to other needs is more likely to 
issue in aggression? There is considera ble evidence to this 
effect. Karen Horney19 speaks of the need for safety as 
18. Horney, 2£· cit., p. 76. 
19. Ibid. 
being more ba sic than the need for satisfaction. To sa tisfy 
the former, a pe r son will gladly accept and endure f'rustra-
tions of the l a tter. Ha rry Stack Sul livan gives grea t 
wei ght to the int e rpersonal need for tenderness. His "rna-
levol ent transfor ma tion" is the re sult of a f a ilure to sa t-
isfy this need which in turn ma y block the satisfaction of 
20 
other needs. 
As pa rt of a genera l theory of human motiva tion, A. H. 
Ma s low lists five ba sic needs: the physiolo gica l needs, the 
safety needs (a lso s tressed by Horney), the belongingness 
and love needs, the esteem needs (including the desire for 
self-respect and the esteem of othe r s ), a nd the need for 
21 
self-actualization (i.e. the desire for self-fulfillment). 
Seen a s ins tinctoid in na ture, these ba s ic needs a re listed 
in a hiera rchy of de scending priority and potency. In gen-
eral, a ccording to Maslow, the belongingne s s and love needs 
will emerge only a fter the physiologica l and sa fe ·t; y needs 
ha ve been gr a tified. 
The importance :>f this lis t ing to our study of r,:)-
bellion a s a product of frustration li es in the following 
postula te: 
20. Ha rry Sta ck Sullivan, The Inte rpe r sona l Theory of 
Psychiatry (New Yor-k: W. W. Norton and Co., 1953), 
p . 216. 
21. A. H. f~aslow , Motiva tion and Persona lity ( New York: 
Ha rper and Brothe rs, 1954), pp . S0-92. 
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The higher the need the less imperative it is for 
sheer survival, the longer gratification can be post-
poned, and the easier it is for the need to disappear 
permanently •••• Deprivation of higher needs does not 
produce so desperate a defense and em~~gency reaction 
as is produced by lower deprivations. 
Whether we accept Maslow's ranking en toto, there is 
wisdom in regarding certain needs or drives as more basic 
and therefore more potent than others. Once such a designa-
tion is made, it follows that reactions to frustration will 
vary, with "lower deprivations" producing a higher frequency 
and intensity of aggression and rebellion. Allowing for 
possible variations in the Maslow hierarchy,23 the principle 
remains that frustration is most likely to produce rebellion, 
when a basic need of the individual is involved. 
One important variable, then, is the need which is 
frustrated. Another variable may be the way the frustration 
is perceived by the individual. A danger in the frustration-
aggression hypothesis is its tendency to focus attention on 
external, to the neglect of internal, conditions. That a 
child is frustrated may not be nearly so important as the way 
frustration is imposed by his authority figures and perceived 
22. Ibid., p. 147. 
23. The neurotic personality, for example, may place greater 
importance on safety than on the satisfaction of 
physiological needs. Or, as Sullivan points out, the 
need for tenderness may so dominate the need for food 
that the anxiety-filled infant may persistently refuse 
nourishment when it is offered to him. 
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or interpreted by the child himself. 24 In their observations 
of aggressive children, for example, Redl and Wineman found 
strong persecutional attitudes toward all r u les and routines, 
even when these had been carefully shown to be rational, 
justifiable, and non-punitive in character. These children 
seemed unable to differentiate reality-conditioned limitations 
from personal attack. 2 5 
These considerations lead us to the followi ng con-
elusions: 
1) While rebellion and aggres s ion are not necessarily 
synonymous terms, there is a close relationship which justi-
fies the inclusion of the frustration-aggre s sion hypothesis 
in a study of rebellion against authority. 
2) For the purpose s of this study, we may say rebellion 
against authority, a s a sentiment, is a likely though not a 
necessary result of chronic or pers istent thwarting of one or 
more bas ic need s by au thority fi gures. 
3) Rebellion becomes a more likely response to author-
ity figures as the individual's initiative, perseverance, 
24. Horney, (.2.J2. cit., p. 76) expresses the fear that over-
emphasis on frustration will "divert attention from those 
factors in the parents' attitudes which are relevant in 
engendering hostility--briefly, the parents' own defi-
ciencies--and hence . • . to put emphas is on unessential 
factors s u ch as weaning, education in clean liness, birth 
of siblings. The emphasis should be n o t on the ' what' 
but on the 'how. ' " 
25. Redl and Wineman, .2.12• cit., p. 118. 
and resourcefulness -are rendered repea tedly i neffective, and 
he experiences increasing feelings of powerlessness and help-
lessness as a result of his relationships with authority. 
4) Rebellion is more likely when frustrations are not 
carefully balanced with satisfactions and a sense of meaning, 
which relates them in some comprehensible way to the require-
ments of reality rather than malevolent intent on the part of 
persons in authority. 
5) Once exposed to chronic, anxiety-producing frustra-
tion, the individual may rebel indiscrimina tely against many 
types of authority, in response to ma ny forms and degrees of 
frustration. Such patterns may be thought of as "character-
conditioned" rather than reactive rebellion. 
2. Instinctual Theories 
Like most g rea t thinkers, Sigmund Freud had the courage 
to be inconsistent. That is, his thinking had a dynamic, 
evolutionary qua lity that defies neat classification. In his 
pronouncements on aggression, there is an enigma which must 
be viewed against the background of a facile, relentlessly 
sea rching mind whose passion was new truth even a t the risk 
of ne gating former views, however dea rly bought. The enigma 
a rises from a development in Freud's thought known as the 
"death instinct" which emerges from his later yea rs and seems 
to refute much of the frustration-aggression hypothesis on 
which his ea rlier theory was grounded. 
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Ernest Jones, perhaps Freud's most eminent biog rapher, 
obs e rves tha t Freud's bela ted emphasis on "the importance of 
a biologica l tendency in the organism to restore ea rlier sta tes 
of being " belongs properly to the rea lm of me tapsychology where-
in ment a l processes a re de scribed from "a dynamic, topog r a -
phica l, and economic point of view. " 26 The wea kness of Freud's 
extreme a t a vism is its "avowedly specula tive nature ," its re-
l a tive deta chment from the solid ground of clinica l da t a . 
This boldness of speculation, uni que even for Freud, Jones 
27 
traces to "some personal and profound source" of grea ter 
direct benefit to the biographer than to the scientist since 
its motiva tions must be regarded as persona l rather than 
clinica l. 
Both Jones and Horney note Freud's obstina te dualism 
in discussing the menta l processes. At first, Freud con-
c e ived menta l c onf l ict a s the result of the r epro ductive 
in sti~ct on t he one hand ba ttling th e instinct of self-
preserva tion on the other (libido ve r s us ego drives). This 
dichotomy wa s a ltered by the concep t of na rcissism which 
made antagonists of t wo f o rms of the sexua l instinct: the 
na rcissi s tic and the allo-erotic impulses (ego libido versus 
ob ject libido), f or Freud a highly unsa t i s fying portra it, 
26. Ernes t Jones, The Life and Work of Si gmund Freud (New 
York: Ba sic Books, Inc., 1956), III, 263. 
27. Ibid., p. 266 . 
since it a ll but elimina ted the sexua l-non- s exua l dua lism 
to which his intuitive powers a ttes t ed. In 1915 , in an 
essa y entitled "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,"~reud 
found in ha te t he prima ry, non-li bidina l ego- c omponent for 
which he had been looking . Cons e quently he expounded the 
Eros-Thana tos conf l ict which ha s r ec e ived much a ttention but 
li t tle a llegi ance amoung the followers of Freud. 
The motiva tion for the Dea th Instinct l a y in the re-
petition-compulsion principle, but its chief support came 
from Freud's stability principle. Both concepts, Freud came 
to regard a s more fundamental and rudimenta ry t han the 
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plea sure -unpleasure princ iple which nouri shed his fru s tra tion-
aggression hypothesis. Repetition compulsion phenomena struck 
Freud a s notable exceptions to the pleasure-unplea sure prin-
ciple and pointed to an independent principle. The se ex-
c eptions (e. g . wa r dreams, self-injuring pa tt erns , pa inful 
compulsions of pa ti ents under ana lysis) seemed to Freud 
e xpl a ina ble in terms of bound energy (a.s opposed to free 
energy) endea voring to ma ster or "bind" unplea sant e xperi-
ences, or to transla te them from the "prima ry system 11 into 
the "secondary system." The neces s ity of binding the pri-
ma ry processe s carried Freud "beyond the pleasure principle" 
into the r ea lm of the ins tinctual and demonic where the 
28 . Si gmund Freud, Coll ected Pape rs (London: The Hogarth 
Pres s , Ltd. and the Institut e of Psy::;ho - JI..na l ys is, 19 24), 
N, 210-232. 
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"reality principle" and the "pleasure principle" often fail 
to operate. 
Scientifically valid principles became the springboard 
from which Freud made his speculative leap into unscientific 
waters. He equated the observable tendency to repetition 
with a tendency toward atavism, thus indulging in a striking 
non sequitur. Whereas, the repetition-compulsion principle 
suggests a rigid adherence to the mental status quo, a re-
sistance to movement in any direction, Freud inferred from 
it a regressive drive to a more primitive condition. Pur-
suing his illogical hypothesis, Freud concluded that the 
ultimate goal is the state of inorganic matter--death. 
This purpose Freud held to be operative not only in mental 
but in non-mental processes as well. 
Now the dualism of the mind could be defined as a con-
flict between two opposing forces of equal status and validity: 
the Life and Death Instincts. Freud recognized that the Life 
Instincts or Eros were doomed to eventual defeat but he en-
dowed them with the power of indefinite postponement and 
acknowledged for them a Pyhrric victory by means of their 
procreative function. 
Before this culmination in Freudian theory, he had re-
garded sadism as a primary instinct, with masochism as its 
secondary or inverted form. In light of the Death Instinct, 
however, masochism becomes a primary manifestation with the 
sadistic-aggressive drives as derivatives. The diversion 
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outwa rd of ma sochistic tendencies awa y from their ori ginal 
object, the self, represents the diversionary tactic by which 
Eros thwarts for a time the forces of self-destruction. 
Freud's satisfaction with this pha se of his metapsychology 
is pa rti a lly tha t of a man who, not for the first time, has 
discovered an important truth by honestly and coura.geously 
struggling with resistances within and opposition without. 
I can no longer understand how we could have overlooked 
the universality of non-erotic aggression and destruction, 
and could ha ve omitted to give it its due si gnificance 
in our interpretation of life. I can remember my own 
defensive attitude when the idea of an instinct of ie-
struction first made its appea r ance in psychoanalytical 
literature, and how long it took before I became acces-
sible to it.~9 
Re ga rdless of its illogical, met apsychologica l aspects , 
Freud 's Thana tos the ory does give recognition to the wide-
spread ha tred; destruction, and rebellion which a re univer-
sa lly manifest in human relations, often to a diabolica l 
degree . This theory points to a deep-sea ted origin within 
persona lity, in contrast to the somewha t superficia l view 
of the frustration-aggression hypothesis. 
Secondly, this theory of Freud's does attempt what 
other theories f a il to do, that is, to expla in tne origin of 
destructive energies. As noted earlier , a frustra ted drive 
is not the true source of a ggr e ssion since the release of 
a ggres s ion does not a ttenuate the ori g ina l drive which was 
29. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents , trans. 
Joan Riviere (London: The Ho ga rth Pre s s , Ltd., and the 
Institute of P sycho - Ana lysis~ London , 1939), p. 37. 
98 
thwa rted. The concept of an -independent instinct or force 
which expresses itself, partially in response to frustration, 
does attempt to fill a theoretic a l void. 
Thirdly , the instinctual theory finds some validation 
in certa in delineations of personality trsits and needs. 
H. A. r1urra y , for example, finds tha t aggression i s more 
the.n a capacity which can become actua.lized under the stress 
and frustra tions of expe rience. While not agreeing that a 
force so powerful a s the death instinct is opera tive, Murray 
does recognize a non-reactive, inhe:cent a ggressive component 
which constantly s truggles to find expression. 30 ~fuether 
one accepts Freud's radica l elabora tions or not , it is dif-
ficult to deny that a non-reactive aggressive component is 
operative in all personality and tha t this component supplies 
the energies which frustration or thwarting oft en evokes . 
Turning to the case a gainst Freud, we must question 
the notion th a t the extent and fre quency of des tructiveness 
substantia tes the instinctual th eory. Just as fru s tra tion 
tolerance reve a ls the limita tions of the fru stration hypoth-
esis , so the wide variations in aggressiveness and rebellion 
r a ise doubts about the univers a lity of the death instinct, in 
the sense tha t Freud defined it. 
One hs.s the feeling tha t here a s in his elaboration of 
the Oedipus complex, Freud ha s colored norma lity with neurosis 
JO. H. A. JVl urray, " Variables in Persona lity," Explora tions in 
Persona lity (New 1ork : Oxford Press, 1938), pp . 159-161. 
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to an exces s ive and unrealistic degree. This is difficult 
to document because Freud does allow for many va rieties of 
Eros-Tha na tos interaction. By implica tion, the neurotic 
person is less successful than others in using Eros to nega te 
t he destruc t ive force of Thana tos. He is less a ble to turn 
hi s destruc t ive energies into non-ha r mful or creative 
channels. 
It is not clea r whether aggression can ha ve positive 
a spects for Freud--whe ther it can be the child of Eros as 
well as the ch ild of Thanatos . Ka ren Horney che"r ges that 
Freud fails to distinguish hostile mo t iva tion s fro m hea lthy 
self-a ssertion.Jl This seems to be true. More important, 
the cha r ge revea ls a ba sic f a llacy in Freud, which many have 
noted: his tendency to reduce all f ee ling s , aggressive, re-
bellious and othe rs, to mere elementa l, inst i nctua l units. 
For Freud, according to this theory of instincts, the 
most sublime feeling s and a s pira tions a r e determined by 
libidina l or destructive drives. Such a philosophy errs 
badly on the s ide of oversimplifica tion and mechanical re-
ductiveness. Beyond that, it sha tters one ' s confidence in 
his own powe r to judge and a ssess his motives and fe e lings. 
The valid assumption tha t many motiv e s a re suspect and in 
need of hones t e"ppr a isa l gives way to the f alla cy tha t man 
is inca pable of rising above the level of his i ns tincts. 
Jl. Horney, ££· cit., p . 28. 
From this perspective, Freud's theory crea tes f a r more 
problems than it solves. 
One fac e t of th i s defi c iency is the f a i l ure of the 
inst inct ua l theo ry to a ccount for the good in the world . 
Harry Stack Sul livan find s in his studies of schizophrenia 
little evidence tha t man is essent i a l ly des tructive or 
sadistic.32 That the good or subl ime in man i s a lwa ys a 
r eaction f orma tion, or E~n aim-inhibited or sublima t ed ex-
pression of ba sic ins tincts which a re amora l and destruc-
tive--th is Sullivan finds grossly inade qua t e and unduly 
pess imi s tic. 
Equal ly serious challenge s to Freud's theory came 
from c l inical psychology and its studies of both animal and 
human behavior. A. H. Maslow observe s tha t the dea th in-
s tinct is not subs t anti a ted by anima l studies. Aggre ss ive 
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behavior is gene r a l l y found to be a seconda ry , derived a ction 
to va rious de t erm inants . The evidence f a vors a reactive, 
defensive interpr e t a tion r a t he r than an ins tinctive one . 33 
The ma jority report against Freud is summa rized in the 
conc l usion of Ashley Montagu, a "de voted but not uncritical 
admirer of Freud ." 
)2. Sul livan, .2.12.· cit. , "Introduction." 
JJ . Mas low, 2£· cit., pp . 168-178 . 
It became increa singly clea r to me tha t not only was 
ttere not t he slightes t evidence wha t ever for the 
existence of a "Dea th I ns tinct," but tha t all the 
r e levant evidence indica ted the contra ry, namely that 
al l natura l drives we re directed towa rd the ~ain­
tenance of l ife and the avoidance of death.J 
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Despite the we i ght of theoretica l and clinica l evidence 
a gainst it, the instinctua l theory of destructiveness and 
rebellion ha s f ound further expression in the writings of 
Robert Lindner , a Freudian, who speci a lized in the study of 
p s ychopa.thic pe r sona lity. Lir1dner is one of the few psychol-
ogist s who gi ve rebellion a centra l a s well a s an ins tinctual 
locus in persona lity . He define s r ebellion a s t te antithesis 
of conf o rmity and the vehicle of soci a l evolution. Rebellion 
is "the a ll-engulfing drive behind evolution, the instinct 
tha t, by pa rticipating in all activities of the organism, is 
the vehicle of evolution." 35 
Lindner clea rly sha res Freud's pe s sim i st ic evalua tion 
of society's influence upon the individua l, and he dec r ies 
the f a ls e equating of goodness with conformity. His "pre-
scription for rebellion" is offe red a s an antidote to the 
"campai gn a ga inst individua lity" waged by the authority of 
pa r ents and soci a l institutions. In this context , rebellion 
assumes pos itive, af firming , and r ectifying qualities. 
Whether rebellion is positive or negat ive must be determined 
,3 4. I an Suttle, Ori g ins of Love and Ha te, "Introduc tion," 
Ashley Montagu, p . i. 
J5. Robert Lindner, Prescription f or Rebellion (New York: 
Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1952), pp . 229-2JO. 
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by its purposes, its l a tent motivation, and its mode of ex-
pression. 
In his use of the term "instinct," Lindner is more 
vague and elusive than Freud and therefore, more difficult 
to eva luate. Whereas Freud thought of instinct as a quantity 
of energy having an internal source of excitation, an aim , 
and an object, Lindner hypothesizes a genera lized ca pacity 
for learning which may ha ve its sea t in the cerebra l cortex 
or the neopallium. Lea rning ability does not supplant the 
instincts, in this view, but enables them as "s tructurally 
supported possibility or potentiality"36 to become actualized . 
Appa rently, rebellion for Lindner is the basic instinct 
tha t pervades all other instincts and seeks to give them 
direction. But rebellion is more than a "structurally sup-
ported possibility or potentiality." It is an "all engulf-
ing drive." As such it closely resembles Kurt Goldstein 's 
self-actua lizing t endency , but it adds a strong social di-
man sion. The sole basis for labelling this drive "rebellion" 
seems to be a conflictual view of the intera ction between 
the individua l a nd his culture. In order to fulfill himself, 
one has to rebel a gainst the pressures of conformity. 
It seems clea r tha t although he writes in the Freudian 
tradition, Lindner represents a r &ther ba sic depa rture from 
Freud's instinctua l theory a t one point. The necessity of 
)6. Ibid., pp . 227- 228 . 
rebelli on is implied by Freud, but it is never given the 
status of a basic instinct. If dea th were the basic urge 
1 .03 
in Freud's l a ter thought, Lindne r stands in direct opposition 
because the rebellious instinct which he r ega rds as centra l 
is cle arly the s e rvant of Ero s r a ther than Thanatos. 
While this d eparture from Freud, (no t clearly sta ted 
by Lindner) would find support with I an Suttle, other 
aspects of Lindner ' s t heory l eave themselves open to seri-
ous question. First, there is an appa rent d ua l us age of the 
term "ins tinct," which clouds meaning and posits a contra-
diction. The rela tionship between rebe llion a s an a ll-en-
gulfing drive and other instincts a s possibili t ies built 
into the organi sm is not clea rly defi ned. There is no r a -
tiona le for treating an instinct a s a drive and a poten-
tiality, a s well. Furthermore, Lindner spea ks of rebellion 
a s a n ins t inct, an in."YJ.a te urge. Yet he tre a. ts it a lso as 
L1.strumenta l beha vior, determined l a r gel y by culture. The 
result is a pa r adox ica l handling , in which he brea ks down 
the traditiona l dis tinction betv..reen urges and needs as the 
fashioners of ends, and culture as the controller of means. 
Tha t he does this without expl ana tion lea ves the reader 
wondering whether he is fully conscious of this depa rture, 
and, if so, wha t purpose is served by his withholding sup-
porting evidence and cla rifying comment. 
A second criticism deals pa rtly with the ma tter of 
semantics. In "rebellion," Lindner has chos en , for the sa ke 
104 
of empha sis, a s oci ologica l or i n t e r pe r sona l t e r m to describe 
a ba sic drive or inst inct in personality. He r e and a t o t her 
point s , his l anguage tends to sacrifice p r ec isene ss for the 
s a ke of a quas i-s e r mon ic development . The ne t effect is to 
weaken his own a r guments, for by i mplica ti on, rebellion 
eme r ges fina l l y a s rea ctive rather t han ins tinctive. It is 
the manifesta tion of a thwa rting of the ind ividua l's se l f-
actua li zat ion (thi s is actua lly the ba sic ''ins tinct" of which 
Lindne r spe a k s ) by a repressive and a li en culture. Both in 
his use of "instinc t" and "rebellion,n Lindne r a t tempts to 
redefine establi shed concepts in wa ys tha t crea te more shadow 
than li ght. Much of the time, one ha s the fe e ling of a 
theory going f orth in sea rch of evidence r a ther than a sense 
of clinica l evid enc e giving bir t h to a t heory. 
A third consider a tion is the undue negat ivity with 
which Lindner views t he role of society. Nowhere is the pos-
itive influence of soc iety acknowledged, although there is 
the recognition tha t not all rebel l ion is therapeutic, e . g . 
"ch ronic r ebellion" which is "without c a u se." Once the be-
nevolent infl uen ces of cul t ure a r e se t over a gainst the 
pressure s t owa r d conformity, there i s lit t le justifica tion 
for making r ebellion the keystone of one's p sychology, as 
Lindne r does. The r e remains in Lindne r a s in Fre ud an 
affinity for dua lism and a tendency thus to ov ersi mply the 
comp lexities of pe rs onal ity and s ociety. 
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The ma in contribution of Lindner's theory is his con-
t en t ion tha t rebellion ma y have hi ghly positive a s well a s 
ne gative effects both for indivicua l s and f or soci ety . The 
va lid ity of thi s ins i ght is not dependent upon the question 
of ins tinctua l o r igins. Since etiology is t he present con-
cern, however, an eva luation of Lindner's concept of "posi-
tive rebellion" will be reserved for a l a t e r section of this 
disserta tion. 37 
To summa rize, the major weakness of instinctua l theories 
of rebellion is tha t they f a il to sa tisfy the re quirements 
o f logica l a r gument and clinica l subst antiation. The bulk 
of evidence shows tha t rebel lion or its e quivalents a re re-
a ctive rathe r than ins tinctua l in nature . We may appropri-
a tely spea k of a capacity for r ebellion and then try to 
recognize the manifold influences of constitutiona l, soci-
ological, interpersonal, and existent i a l f actors to a degree 
tha t Freud did not. The solution, in a word, l i es in en-
l a r g ing our pe r spective, r a ther than na r r owing it. 
3. Conflictua l Theories 
A third eti ologica l ca tego ry consi s ts of conf lictual 
theorie s--those which stres s uns ol ved conf l i c ts between 
st ructura l e lements of persona lity a s the r oots of rebe l l ion . 
In a s ens e , t he frustra tion- aggres s i on hypothesis is con-
f l ictua l, scoring the cla sh between t he pleasure and rea lity 
3 7. Chapter VI. 
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principles. The present category, however , unites those 
theories which focus primarily on intrap sychic stresses. 
Such theories a re numerous and diversified , so tha t only a 
s ampling is poss ible here. 
The Freudi an position concerning the r e l a tionshi p of 
conf l ict and rebellion i s sta ted succinctly by J. C. Flugel 
in Man, Mora ls and Society.J8 Following Freud, Flugel draws 
a clos e approxima tion between the supere go and external 
a uthorit y , the former being l a r gely an interna lized agent 
of the latter. Beca use of this close relationship, it is 
natura l tha t patterns of rebellion against authority fi gures 
should be seen as the product of inner conflicts involving 
the superego. Flugel finds tha t many persons are constantly 
projecting their superegos outwa rd and establishing authority 
rela tionships tha t drama tize thei r intrapsychic condition 
through dependency, rebellion, or some other mode. 
Some rebellion is rebellion for its own sa ke, an 
assertion of the e go in the face of prohibition or threa t. 
It is an attempt by the individua l to re-establish lost 
feelings of infantile omnipotence. All susta ined rebellion 
a gainst authority , however, is the product of internal con-
flict, says Flugel. It signifies a split or a wea kening in 
t he supe rego. In this split, "part (usua lly the more super-
)8. New York: Internati onal Universities Press, 1945 , 
pp . 174-202. 
ficial and conscious part) of the superego (sides) •.• 
with the id ... "39 
The essential conflict behind rebellion, then, is be-
tween the supe re go (generally the unconscious aspects) and 
the id in alli ance with parts of the superego. Although the 
resulting rebellion is highly subject to repression, Flugel 
observes tha t temporary manifestations of rebellion are 
likely. These come when the rebellious forces of the id 
suddenly and briefly overpower the supe rego. 
Flugel's portrayal of Freudi an theory extends the 
frustration hypothesis to include the complexities of cha r-
acter formation. The outward antagonisms between the in-
dividua l and his environment became interna lized and the 
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supe rego a s sume s the thwarting role of the a uthority ve s t ed 
in pa rents and other representa tives of society. Normally 
powerful enough to repre s s the id's rebellion agains t chronic 
frustration, the supe rego will a llow tempora ry outbursts, or 
when, split, more sustained patterns of insurrection. 'l'hus, 
frustration breeds conflict, and conflict fo s ters rebellion. 
This elabo r a ti on does represent an improvement over 
many fo r mula tions of frustration theory beca use it moves 
from t he i so l a t ed incident to the long-rang e consequences 
o f thwa rting , and from a limited externa l perspective to a 
considera tion of i n tra p sychic forces. 
J9. Ibid., p. 196. 
10~ 
The relations hip _between chronic frust r ation a nd 
chroni c rebellion c annot be explored ful ly a part fr om p rob-
lems of cha r acter f o rmation. When vi ewed in depth , this re -
l a tionship clarifies the a lmo s t i ncidenta l role tha t a pres ent 
targe t of rebe l lion may play in evoking a rebell i ous response. 
The psychoana lytic approach ma y at times exagge r ate the effects 
of t he past upon pe rsonality , but it a lso modifies the in-
fluences of the present with its r ecogniti on tha t character 
colors pe rc epti on and t hat perc ep tion ma y be as important a s 
ex terna l real ity i n the dynami cs of rebellion . 
On the othe r hand , Flugel's view r elies too heavily on 
an unrealisti c dualism between the individual and his culture . 
I t a lso deni es the superego, however inf antile its ori g in, 
a functi onal autonomy tha t includes the possibility of 
creative change and therapeu t ic effects upon the t ot a l per-
s onality . In th i s connect ion, recent studies of the s uper-
e go 's po t enti a lly positive function ha ve c aused a number of 
leading psychologi sts to sugges t a r ad ica l revision of 
40 Freud's view. 
Id ve rsus supe rego is only one of numerous theories 
based on conflict . Ambiva lence, t he s i mult aneous experience 
of powerful antithetical drives in relation to a uthority, 
opens another d i men s ion. As agents of rea lity, authority 
40 . E. g . 0 . H. Mowrer, Gordon Allpo r t , and Paul Tournier . 
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figures may cQash with the individual's world of fantasy and 
thus foster rebellion. Or, the desire to be accepted may be 
crushed by experiences of rejection at the hands of parents 
and other significant adults. In these and other types of 
conflict spawned by authority relationships, there are the 
seeds of rebellion. 
A weakness of all conflictual theories so far as re-
bellion is concerned is their failure to establish a basic 
causality. As with frustration theory, one finds exceptions 
too serious to be discounted. There is ample evidence that 
not all conflict does result in rebellious patterns.41 Fre-
quently, conflict represents a springboard to growth, insight, 
and deeper, more meaningful relationships with authority. 
What is needed is a common denominator that underlies 
both the frustration and the conflictual orientations con-
sidered thus far. In search of this denominator, we now con-
sider an element intrinsic to both theories that offers a 
simplifying, unifying solution--threat. 
4 . Threat-Oriented Theories 
We have seen that frustration offers a significant but 
at best partial explanation of aggression in general and re-
bellion in particular. The failure of frustration to cover 
many manifestations of rebellion raises the question of 
whether any external stimulus, apart from the way it is 
41. Cf. Horney, Allport, English and Pearson, and Maslow. 
perceived and interpreted -by the ind ividual, is sufficient 
to expl a in the individua l's re sponse. 
A fourth type of theory ma y be c a lled threa t-oriented 
theory . In simplest form, it sta tes tha t r ebellion is one 
product of threa t and tha t fru s tra tion or c onflic t is a 
f actor only to the degree that it c onstitutes a threa t to 
the individual. Closely r e l a ted to threa t, is the concept 
of anxiety. In fact, it is virtually impossible t o isola te 
th e t wo. Rol lo May defines anx iety p rima rily in t e rms of 
threa t: "Anxiety is the app r ehen s ion cued off by a threa t 
to some va lue wh ich the individua l holds es senti a l to his 
42 
existence a s a persona lity." · 
In a s imil a r wa y, Karen Horney links anxiety and threat. 
She d i a gnos es "ba sic anxiety" as "a .f eeling of he lpl e ssness 
toward a pot ent i a lly hostile world ." In this condition, a 
person "fee l s the env ironment as a mena ce to his entire de-
velopment and to hi s most l eg i tima t e wi she s and strivings."43 
Horney finds tha t anxiety and neurosis a re the products 
of r e l a ti onships tha t a r e not only frustra ting but r epres s ive 
and hos t il e . The child f a ils to experi ence love and, e qua lly 
important, he is not able t o accep t himself as lovable. 
In protest, the child may expe ri ence rebellious feel-
ings but fre quently these feel ings c l a sh with hi s dependency 
4-a. Rollo May, The Me aning of Anxiety (New York : Rona ld 
Pre s s , 19 5 0 ) , p • 191. 
4·}. Horney, .£12.· ci.t., pp . 74-75· 
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needs toward the very persons who have denied him love. 
This ambivalence, this "conflict born of incompatiable at-
titudes constitutes the core of neurosis." 44 
Horney does not s ay that all neurotic conflicts in-
volve rebellion but s he does note a hi gh frequency of re-
bellion-dependency in neurotic syndromes. 
The basic anxiety is itself a neurotic manifesta-
tion. It results largely from a conflict between 
existing dependency on the parents and rebellion 
against them. Hostility toward them has to be re-
pressed because of the dependency ••.• repression 
of hostility helps to render a person defenseless be-
cause it makes him lose sight of the danger which he 
should fight. Ir he represses his hostility it means 
that he is no longer a ware that some individual re-
presents a menace to him; hence he is lik e to be sub-
missive, compliant, friendly in situation s in which he 
should be on his guard. This defenselessness, in com-
bination with the fear of retaliation, which remains 
in spite of its repression, is one of the powerful 
factors accounting for the neurotic's bas ic feeling 
of helplessness in a potentially hostile world.45 
At the root of basic anxiety, then, there lies what may 
be called a "basic hostility" or "basic rebellion" born of 
relationships experienced as "unreliable, mendaci ous , un-
appreciative, unfair, unjust, begrudg i ng , and merciless." 46 
It is clear that Horney is not proposing a monolithic 
etiology of rebelli on centering aroun d threat. Rather she 
thinks in terms of multideterminants whose common bond is 
44. Karen Horney, Our Inner Conflicts (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Co., 194 5), p. 47. 
45. Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, p. 203. 
46. Ibid., p. 74. 
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that they create i n the personality a sense of threat. The 
internal perspective is crucial sinc e threat as an objective 
reality may be difficult to di s cern. To illustrate, Ho rney 
lists parental lack of respect for the child, unreasonable 
demand s and prohibiti ons , injustice, unreliability, s up-
pression of criticism, domination ascribed to love , and mis-
use of the child for the sake of parent a l presti g e or am-
bition.47 In short, an authoritarian relatinnship between 
parents and child seems t o be the seed bed of the sense of 
threat from which rebell ion may flower. Vfuereas the frustra-
tion theory stresses the what, Horney s tre s ses the how. 
Because both his dependency and his rebelli on are felt 
as i mperatives, the child i s helpl es sly caugh t in a dilemma. 
Usually, he will repress his rebelli on because of hi s de-
pendency and display a pattern which Horney describes as 
"moving toward others." 48 Essentially, t hi s pattern i s a 
type of reaction formation. 
On the o ther hand, the indivi dual may repress his de-
pendency in favor of h i s rebelli on and demon s trate patterns 
of "moving a gainst others." The same pat t erns result if re-
bellion is displaced. Through this mechani s m, t he original 
i mpul s e i s unaltered but its directi on is changed so that 
the original object s are the targets no longer. Th is 
47. Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, p. 83. 
48. Horney, Our I nner Conflicts, pp. 17-21. 
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manifestation will be considered in Chapter IV under the 
heading of "Neurotic Rebellion." We might also call it, 
11 secondary rebellion" since it repre s e n ts a transformation 
of "basic rebellion" under t he i nfluenc e of conflict and 
anxiety. 
Two kinds of threat are apparent in Horney's thinking. 
One type is manifest threat or danger posed by external 
reality: illness, destitution, death , powe rs of nature, 
enemies. Under destitution and enemies, Horney apparently 
would include the adverse conditions that make a child feel 
menaced, helpless, and often rebe l lious. If s o, we may s ay 
that basic rebellion is a re s ponse to manifest threat, 
whether this threat be perceived a s having a personal, 
natural, or supernatural origin. 
A second kind of thre at could be called "potential 
threat." 49 To use Fromm's term, it is "character-condition-
ed" rather than reality-oriented. Dynamically speaking, 
potential threat originates within the personal ity and is 
largely due to repressed hostility a n d rebellion. Because 
of its unconscious nature, however, t h is hostility is ex-
perienced as the anticipated hostility of others. 
Being constantly exposed to both manifest and potential 
threat, the neurotic personality become s s afety -oriented and 
49. The s e interpretati ons of threat are related to Horney's 
definitions of basic vis a vis manifest anxiety. 
Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, pp. 202-203. 
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fre quently will fore go the satisfaction of needs in the 
interest of safety. This insi ght by Horney places serious 
limita tions on the frustration-aggres s ion hypothesis. 
If this interpreta tion of Horney is accurate , there 
a rises a conflicting view in the writing of Rollo Ma y. 
Horney indica tes tha t anxiety s prings from conflict, in most 
cases the conf l ict between rebellion and dependency. May 
finds tha t while hostility and anxiety a re intima tely re-
l a ted, "in neurotic patterns, anxiety is the primary etio-
·5~ logical phenomenon." For May, anxiety does not p recede 
all hostili ty , but without exception it does seem to under-
lie all instances o f repress ed hostility. 
Perhap s , the differences between these t wo views are 
more apparent than rea l. Both Horney and May agre e that 
anxiety is cued by threat. May is inclined to speak of 
threa t to va lues while Horney t ends to analyze t hreat in 
terms of conflicting emotions. A threat to va lues may 
originate from without but threat as conflict must necessarily 
originate from within. The question a ppears to be what is 
the personality's primary initia l response to manifest threat, 
be it to one' s values , one' s security, or one ' s s a fety? 
Horney does not say tha t r ebe llion is primary or ini-
tl al. It ma y be tha t she would consider Ur angst ("the ex-
p r ess ion of human helples sness in the face of existing 
5@. May , Q£· cit., p . 22J. 
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dangers") 51 a prior condition to what we have labeled basic 
rebellion. If so, then the following progre s sion wou l d seem 
to satisfy both hypotheses: 
Manifest Threat~ Urganst ~Basic Rebellion-~}t':'Re-
pression of Rebellion~Basic Anxiety. This formula is 
tentative and subject to variation, but it does reflect a 
predominant pattern in the development of neurosis. 
It is quite possible that anxiety and rebellion will 
be experienced concurrently. Once initiated, it s eems likely 
that the s e neurotic patterns may best be described i n terms 
of circular determination, "the continual flux of dynamic 
interaction within a syndrome, whereby any one part is al-
ways affecting every other part in some wa y and is in turn 
being affected by all other parts, the entire action going 
on simultaneously."5 2 
Whether anxiety always precedes rebellion or not, the 
i mportance of threat in the genesis of rebellion remains. 
Harry Stack Sullivan gives further emphasis to this etiology 
in h is studies of a nxiety i n the schizophrenic pers onality. 
Like Horney, Sullivan clas sifies all need s under t wo 
major headings : the need for sati s faction a nd the need f or 
interpersonal s ecurity (roughly analo gous to Horney 's need 
for safety).53 During waking hours, both needs produce 
51. Horney, New Ways i n Psychoan alysis, p . 203. 
52. Maslow, QE• cit., pp . 37-38. 
53. Sullivan, QE• cit., p. 59. 
tensions which re quire physio-chemica l s a tisfa ction on the 
one hand and t e ndernes s on the other. 
'T enderness, f o r Sullivan, is the mothe r of inter-
persona l security. Ne ed t ensions in the c hild induce acti-
vities (e. g . c rying ) which in turn create tens ions in the 
mothering one . She expe ri ences these tens i ons a s tender-
ne ss and as induc ements t o such activity a s will r elieve 
the infant's need s . Through the mo thering res pons e , the 
i n f ant rec e ives both satis f action a nd security, for he is 
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sensitive both t o wha t the mother does and the atmosphere or 
mood in wh ich she does it. 
Wha t disrupts this smooth intercourse of child-mother 
tensions is the t ension of anxiety . "Anxiety is a tension 
in oppos ition to the tensions of needs and to acti on appro-
pri a te t o their relief . ~~ 5~ Once p resent in the mothering 
one, it is imparted to the child through an interpersona l 
proce s s which Sul livan c alls "empa thy." The effect of 
anxiety is to disrupt the c hild's r ela tionship with the 
adult persons whose cooper a tion is necessary f or his sur-
viva l. General need deprivat ion ma y produce fe a r, but only 
an empa thic bond between child and si gnificant older persons 
c an produce anxiety. 
If the anxiety is prolonged or severe , it influences 
the child's energy transformations, his intrins ic "potentia lity 
54· I bid ., p . 44. 
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for a ction."55 One product of such anxiety i s "a relatively 
enduring pa ttern of energy transformation" (a "dynamism 11 ) 
c a lled a "ma l evol ent transformation."56 
~1alevol ence r epresents a "ve ry ser ious dist or t ion of 
c:,?--
wha t might be cal l ed the fundament a l i nterpersonal attitude."-' 
It is a genera lized attitude of which rebellion is one mani-
f es t a ti on . Sull ivan finds tha t this d yn amism i s disjunctive, 
tha t is it l eads to the disintegration of interpe r sona l re-
l a tion ships . 
Tl1e pattern of its development is f a irly cons t ant : 
the child's n eed f or tende rness meets anxiety in the mother-
ing person in such a way tha t n o t only is t ende rness denied 
but anxiety or pain is induced in the child • 
. . . the perceived need f o r tenderness br ings a 
foresig~t of anxiety or pa in. The child learns , you 
see, tha t it is hi ghly dis a dvantageous to show any need 
for t ender cooperat ion from the authoritative fi gures 
around him, in which case he shows some t hing else ; and 
tha t something e lse is the basic malevolent a ttitude, 
the a ttitude tha t one rea lly lives among enemies . . • 
This quota tion bea rs striking simi l a rity t o Horney 's 
58 
concept of ba sic a nxie ty. Although it is not defined in the 
s ame terms, Sull iva n ' s concep t , l i ke Horney ' s , l ays stress 
on threat to one ' s security , safety o r self-sys t em a s the 
55· Ibid., p . J 6 . 
56. Ibid. , pp . 213-2 16. 
57. Ibid. , p . 21 6 . 
_:e. Ibid., P· 214 . 
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core of rebellion. 59 The rebellion is reinforced by the 
self-image that one is unlovable or that one i s a personifica-
tion of "bad me." 60 In agreement wi th Rollo May, Sullivan 
finds anxiety to be more basic to psycho pathology than re-
bellion. Howev er, in contrast to Horney and May who view 
anxiety as a response to threat, Sullivan s tresses that on 
an interpersonal l eve l, anxiety is threat and is perceived 
as such by the child. 
When t he child i s subjected to anxi e t y , he u sually 
will deal with i ts s ource in one of two ways . Either he 
will attempt to avoid the source or he will try to destroy 
it or drive it away. Sullivan thus i mplie s tha t rebellion, 
with which we identify the lat t er alternative, is a likely 
response where avoidance of t he threatening agent is not 
possible, i.e. where one's primar y relationships are c on-
cerned, or where one's dependency is mo s t acute. 
When the child rebels, his r ebellion may have one or 
more emotional componen t s of which ange r , rage, and hatred 
are foremost. Anger origi nates wi th anxiety born of er r or 
on the part of a s i gnificant a dult. Because anxiety had 
59 . It needs to be s aid that in Sull i van ' s vo cabulary , the 
word "threat" is not predominant. However, t he meaning 
is clear when Sulliv an speaks of "a very severe drop in 
euphoria" as a product of anxiety . Clinical St u die s in 
Psychiatry (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1956 ), p. 91. 
60. Sullivan, The Interpers onal Theory of Psychiatry, p. 205. 
" • • • rebelliousness tends to be part of the person-
ification of bad me." 
been induced by the child by mistake, he feels abused and 
angry. The primary function of his anger is to drive away 
or destroy threatening situations. Sull ivan finds that 
anger also serves to dissipate anxiety. 61 Thus, it offers 
119 
a means of dealing both with the source of anxiety and the 
anxiety itself, but it lacks the fores ight and adaptability 
required by an intricately dangerous situation. 
Rage occurs when anger, however great, cannot ac-
complish this destruction or avoidance of the situation, 
but has to be sidetracked into a relatively symbolic 
discharge. It must be sidetracked because the person 
who calls out the rage is either of s u ch extreme 
significance or of such p owe r that it would be ex-
tremely ri sky to attack, and very harmful.62 
The discharge may occur through integrated patterns of 
hatred in which the principal object is damage to the 
prestige and security of the one in authority. 
According to Sullivan, dissociation i s n o t a so luti on 
for the dynamism of rage and hatred because t hey have been 
a part of the self's security mach inery since the self came 
i nto existence. They are a part of the self- s ystem, there-
fore they cannot be dis s ociated, even though the i ndividual 
now regards them as wrong, bad, or socially unacceptable. 
61. Sullivan, CliNical Studies in Psych iatry, pp. 95-96. 
62. Ibid., p. 99. 
120 
As a consequence, the person may develop what Sullivan calls 
11 specious ideals•• 63 by which 11 one becomes very sensitive to, 
and extraordinarily critical of, the type of behavior in 
others which one is constantly afraid one will show." 64 
Apropos rebellion, the parent who is most repressive where 
his child's aggressiveness against authority figures is con-
cerned, may be one in whom these same tendencies represent 
a terribly threatening part of the self-system. 
In summary of Sullivan's views, we find rebellion 
identified with the dynamisms of anger, rage, and hatred 
and traced in every instance to the threat or the exper-
ience of anxiety. While anger or hate-oriented rebellion 
can be justified in terms of anxiety reduction, its concen-
tration on attack and injury limits its effectiveness both 
in situations of genuine threat and in those where the sense 
of threat lacks objective reality. Such rebellion tends to 
be neurotic, rather than creative, adaptive, and flexible 
in character. 
One other psychologist for whom the concept of threat 
is central is Abraham Maslow. Maslow like Horney and Sullivan 
is concerned primarily with psychopathogenesis and his dis-
cussions of threat and rebellion must be read in this light. 
Writing from a holistic-dynamic point of view, Maslow 
attempts to redeem the frustration-aggression hypothesis by 
63. Ibid., p. 101. 
64. Ibid., p. 102. 
making "threatening Jeprivation" 6~ r ather than frustration 
in genera l the c a us e of undesira ble effects on personality. 
As a rule, Maslow finds tha t "threat" properly appli es to 
deprivation of the bas ic needs, e. g . phys iologica l, sa fety, 
belongingnes s needs. If a lesser dep rivation seems to 
constitute a. threat to the individua l it is probably be -
ca use a symbolic val ue a s wel l as an intrinsic va lue is in-
va lved. For example, the deni a l of an ice cream cone is 
i nterpreted by the child as a den i a l of love f o r him on the 
part of his mother o r father. To support t his hypothesis 
tha t threa t is more ba sic to psychopathogenesis t han de-
privation , ~ ~' f1aslow cites his ob serva tions of chil-
dren , who ass ured of pa rent a l love and affec tion , a re able 
to handle depriva t i ons with r ema rkable ease . 
Mas low finds tha t the con cept of conflict ha s limita-
tion s s i mila r to those of the frus tra tion theor y . He lists 
f our types of confl ic t : "sheer choice" (involving a c hoi ce 
between t wo paths t o a. si ng l e , r e l a t ive ly uni mportant goal); 
choice betwe en t wo paths to the same basic goal; "threa ten-
i ng conf lict" (i nvolving a choice between t wo different but 
vita lly nece ssar y goa.ls); and "ca t a strophic conflicts " 
(which "mi ght bet ter be called pure thr ea t with no al terna-
66 
t ive or possibilitie s of choice " ). - These f our c a t egories 
c an be r educed to t wo : non - threa t ening and threat ening 
65·. Maslow, 212.· cit., p . 15 6 . 
66. Ibid., p . 160 . 
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conflict , of which the l a tter is ordina rily pathogenic . 
These considerations lead Ma slow to adopt the con-
cept of threa t a s fundamental to a so und theory of psycho-
pathogenes i s : 
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The one concept that is important is neither conflict 
nor f rustration but the essentia l pathogenic character-
i stic of both , namely , threat of thwa rting or actual 
thwarting of g~e ba sic needs and s elf- actua li za ti on of 
the or g::mi sm . ( · 
In addition. to sharpening the frustration and confl ict 
theories , this hypothesis points to a number of phenomena 
the. t cannot be subsumed under the fir st two headings. In-
eluded among such phenomena are brain injury, "basic and 
severe t r a uma tization ," and situations one is powe r less to 
cont rol such as imminent death or severe pain. 
In gene r a l , however, it is the thwarting , a ctual o r 
potentia l , the misuse or nonuse of bas ic needs and capa.ci -
ties whi ch are expe ri enced as threat and which become the 
root of pathologica l s ymptoms and behavior . 
The chief strength of Maslow ' s theo ry is tha t it 
identifies the s ource of rebellion wi th in the fram ewo rk of 
deprivation and conf l ict, ut i lizing their insights while 
setting aside the r athe r broad exceptiona to ea ch of these 
hypotheses . 
Even so , a threat-ori ented theory of rebelli on must 
recognize tha t no t a ll threat leads to rebe lllon or to less 
spec i fic pathogenic symptoms . Furthermore , a s with any 
6~ . Ibid., p . 160 . 
s i mi l a r theory , the concept of threa t must be integr a ted 
wi th a psychology of mo t i va tion and a r ecogniti on of the 
manifold ways in which threats are experienced and react ed 
to by different indi vidua ls. 68 When individua l differences 
i n p e rc eption of and reac tlons to thr ea t a re kept c learly 
in mind , th i s hypothesi s appears to offe r the mo st valid 
a nd workable statement of the etiology of rebellion . 
68. Maslow is cognizant of these qualifica tions and e xp lic-
it ly ca lls a tt ention t o tr.em . 
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P!_T:-IOLOGIC ~L R'::3SLLIO:t\ 
l ~erlier i~ this d i ss e r tat i on , - we noted t hEt r ebell i on 
can best be categorized accordi ng to it s etiology s i nce t he 
eoa l of freedoill f ro~ some f or m of a uth~ rity doe s not ch2nge 
end s i n c e the ~ul t ipl i c i ty of mod e s 2nd the elusiveness o f 
a c company i ng e~o tions do not lend themse lve s to a comprehen-
3i ve , loci cs l en a l ys i s . In thi s connecti on , we not ed Mu rre y ' s 
du.:.: l e_,j j e c t ives o f "p roe.ct i ve " ve r sus -,' r e2ct i ve " &nd lt'e found 
these to be c ompE r ab l e to FromJJ ' s es i e,nc tions o f "ch c. r c; cte r -
condi t i .Jned" versus nr es.ct i ve . " 
Re l ~ t i n; thes e dist i ncti onE t2ntot ively to r ebel lion , 
we then de f i ned 11 proEct i ve rebelJion" c'S d ::: fi c-__, nt o r resistive 
oehe. vior which i s or i ented Drim.::' r i ly e r :::n.md n i YLner orga.n i zo -
t ion c f ne )·CJ t i ve f e e l i ng and th oug-ht , and d i rected t o~'.'e rd one 
o r more f o r ms of e uthori ty fo r the sake o f e chi ev i ng total or 
~rt i a l f r eedom fro!n the c l i ms and c ontr l o f the: t a u thority . 
~urr~ y ) ~ rov ided t he oEs i s f o r th i s forJJu l at i n . 
Fi n&lly , we sue~es t ed t ha t pro ~ ct i ve , r el i g i ous r ebe l -
lion i s 2 JJore speci f i c t ype ~h ich f i nds i ts t ~rget or ob j ect 
i n " c onc eptua l ob j ects and pr i ncipl es thEt t he ind i vi du&l 
l . Ch:::-_r::te r I 
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reg2.rds as perm;:ment or centr2l i n the nature o f things ." 
l'he t e r m "p2 th logical r ebell ion" r -:3present s s.n 8 t tempt 
to d ea l with proect i ve rebe llion in a dime_3ion wide ly illu-
mi nated by the literature o f psycho l ogy . It m~ y be self -
evident t o sey th .:= t under this rubric , we are 8oncerned with 
tho se form s o f rebe llion which der i ve ~r im3ri ly , if no t ex-
clus i vely , f r oo emot i Jnal di so rders o f person2l ity including 
the n eur oses and psychoses . Int ~ restin~ly , the r elat i Jnsh i p 
b t1.;een psych opetho lot;y c:md rebellion 2g2 i nst s.uthori ty has 
not been the f ocus o f p r e vious st udy , although nume r ous im-
:;>_Lic c t i o~1S and st2 tement s C' ncerning t h is r ela tL:mship h<c ve 
been of f ered . 
I n the p resent chapte r , we a re concerned with summariz -
ing the psychologice l liter~t ure dealirg with rebell i on in 
psy8hope tholo gy 2nd as.sess ing th e inf luence of such beh&vi or 
on the proce.ss o f reliei : us mat~rat i on . One necessary l i mita -
tion needs to be noted . Although we shall employ the term 
'' pa. thologic 3. l r eb,::; llion , " the ms_ j or content f or it s ? l12lys i s 
is drawn fr om th e psychologica l study o f neur os i s . I t is no t 
a ssumed t ha t all the rebellious strains in psychosis and the 
pers nelity diso rde rs a re compr ehended thereby , but tt> ere is 
r eEson to o~l i eve thst neurotic di stu r bances in a uthority 
r elat i on shi s are f ei rly repre s ent at i ve o f emo ti ona l disorders 
of greater or lesser· severi ty . I n gr 2nt i ng thi s c entral i ty 
to th e neur o tic chore cter structure , ~e endors e t he theory 
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of Karen Horney, for whom neuros is i s the central focus in 
her s tudies of the dynami c s of personal i t y . Qualification 
will be made where this i s not true , i n orde r t hat we may 
observe realistic limits without r esorting t o fal se general-
izat ion or overs i mplification. 
1. Definition 
We begin with a tentative definit ion of patho log i c al 
rebellion, as one manife s tation of t he proactive or cha ract er-
conditioned type j u st discussed. Pathological Rebellion is 
an enduring organ izat i on of inappro pri a te, defiant, and re-
s istive i mpulses orient ed to the threat of repressed f orce s 
in the pers onality a n d di rected indiscriminately agains t 
all authority or specifically a gains t certain type s of au-
thor ity. 
Several correlaries to t his definit i on ma y be stated 
at the out s et. First, not all patholog ical rebellion is 
overt, s i nc e overt reb elli on a gainst authority often requi re s 
a courage and directness of which the emotionally d i s t urbed 
personality i s incapabl e. In the treatment t hat follows, we 
will look briefly a t masochism as an i l lus trati on of patho-
logical rebellion that di sguises itself i n the interest of 
security. Overt rebellion will als o be con sidered. 
Secondly, our definition shows tha t pathological rebel-
li on is the resu lt of psychic forces rathe r than ex te rnal 
reality. It is therefore inappropriate becaus e its motivation 
is s eldom a pparent to the observer. The tri ggering caus e may 
n ot be evident either i n the nature of authority or in the 
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quali t y of t he perso~ ' s rela ti on sh i p ~ i t h autho r i ty . If the 
i n t e r pe rsons l r e l 8t i onshi p d oes p r -:>v i de ps r t i a l e xp lc=mat ion 
o f t h e r ebell ious patte rn , t he pa t h l ogica l element is i nt ro -
du ~ ed by the exac:e r a tion of the r e sponse ou o f a ll propo r -
t i on t o the f ac tor s wh ich s e me d to evok e it . 
A th i r d c ons i de r st i on re l ~te to thi s defi n i t i on i s 
t h~:: t p a tl1ol og i n eny a nd a ll f o r ms ul tims t ely fi nds expres -
s i on 9S r disturba~ ce i n on e ' s rela tiJnshi ps ~ i th ?uthori ty . 
The assumption i s thLt one c an~ot ha ve e~ot i ~no l d i o r d e r 
and ma i n~2 i n C 0 ns istently wholesooe pa tt e rns o f i ntera t i on 
wi th those in posit i ons o f ma r ked po~e r or i n f luence . I ndeed , 
~e may go so f s r as to s a y tha t i n one ' s relat i Jn sh i ps wi t h 
a uth · r i ty i e so:ne o f the cle ~ r es t c l ues "'s to one ' s p~ychic 
h e a l t h . Pe r s i s i n£ p2t t e r ns o f reb ell i on r e present one ty e 
o f d i sturbance in auth r ity r e l a ti onshi ps . To the d eg r ee 
th s t t he c ~ use o f t h i s d isturbance ~ay be t r2ced to uncon-
sc i ou s f acto r s in the insur g e n t r ath e r th0n consci ous l y a f -
fi rme d values o r a contempo r a ry authorit2r i on r elat ionsh i p , 
we ma y pro e rly s rea k o f the r e b el l on as psthol og ica l . 
2. ?~ycl1opa thology - Gene r a l Observat i ons 
Sec 2use so muc h a s been wr i tten aj~ut m~n tal i l l ness , 
i t i s not poss i ble t summa r i ze e ven the mo r e i mpo rtant theo-
r i es and s t ud i es . Here we s h a l l a t te~pt on l y to l i f t up 
ce rt a i n ob-e r va ti ons o r gene r a li zat i ons wh i ch seem to speak 
po i ntedl y to the p s ych ology o f rebe l lion and to the sub j ec t 
o f pat~ologica l r ebelli on . 
128 
1) To a large d~~ee, emotional disturbance is the 
product of early relationships, involving the child and his 
parents or parent-surrogates. In both Freudian and neo-
Freudian thinking, the child-parent relationships which lead 
to sickness are based not only on inequality but often on 
other factors which are clearly part of the authoritarian 
syndrome as defined in Chapter I. The child may perceive 
and experience these relationships as basically hierarchical 
and exploitive in contrast to others which he identifies as 
affectionate, permissive, and basically equalitarian. Be-
cause of limitations in experience and development which af-
feet his perceptions and communication processes, the young 
ehild has great difficulty in matching his experience with 
his awareness. At times he may distort or misinterpret the 
benevolent actions of his parents and thus rebel against that 
which fosters his highest good. 2 Where the child's percep-
tions of threat are more accurate, there may be, on the part 
of the parents, a marked devaluation of the child as a person 
in his own right, and often a strong dependency on the child's 
ability to gain prestige for the parents. To the extent that 
he feels depersonalized by his parents the child later tends 
to depersonalize authority. All of these elements lie well 
within the authoritarian syndrome. 
This is not to say that the authoritarian label exhausts 
the varieties of abnormal patterns existing between parent and 
2. An example of Murray's "beta press.'' Cf. page 12. 
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c i ld o r thc t authorita ri ani sm is a l wa ys a n e ~ i o l ogical f a cto r. 
J f ~qua l s itnificance a r e r e l Et i onship s of ext r eme pe r missive -
n ess i n which pa r en ts f ? il t o e3 t abl i s h th e co~t ro ls and dis -
c i plines so essent i a l to p sychi c h ea l t h . ? s ycho2n~ lysi s , in 
pa r t icule r , t ends to trac e rebe llion t o a poo rly int e rna li zed 
supe r ego wh ich i s n o t able cons i st ently t o cortrol the rebe l -
li ous t endenci es of the id . Thus , e i t h e r ex tre:ne - - o);:- r ess ive 
restric t i on s ( sutho rita ri anis~ ) or freedo~ wi t hout r ea list ic 
l imi t s - - a ppea r t o be i mpo rt nt f ac t ors i n t he dynam i cs o f 
patho lo z ica l r0be l l i an . 
2 ) .~-!h en the prima ry re l c:. ti onsh~.P.§_ f a il to sa tisfy the 
child ' s ba sic emo ti onc:: l needs , he l ive s in a. p s;y_chic <?. t mosnhere 
2_f.._thr~a t c orTJp ounded by the i n e qu 1 · t y i n his r e l a t i onships 
with a utho r ity , par ent El ma lice , or i ndiffe r enc e , hi s own am -
b iva l ence t owa rd hi s p3 r ents (usua lly hosti l i t y ve r sus de -
~endency ) , and c onc urrent f e e lings of i so l at i on a nd i mp o tence . 
This s ense o f t h r ea t or anx i ety f osters behavi o r pa tt e rns 
which a r e d i r e cted toward goa l s of safety and s ec urity or the 
a vo idance of t h rea t . Rebellion , as one r esponse to this 
sense o f threat , can be expressed ove r tl y only t o the e xtent 
t hct it does no t unde r mi ne t hi s s ecurity - orient a ti on . 
J) In pathologic~l developm nt , the child d e ve lop s an 
int e r na l i ma 2e o f 2utho r ity which i s e i t he r h ighly a utho ri ta r -
i an o r extre:re ly wea k a nd ine ffectiv~ in r e:);atign to th e i m-
'Juls i ve tendenci es i n _persona li t y . 
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·,~h -:;ther 'v e use "c onsc ience , " " supe rego,>~ or " idealized 
i ma.ge " as terminology , t h e re i s general egree!Ilent that in 
neur osis conflict c en t e rs a r ound an internel i zed ty_anny 
wh ic h echoes the ini t i al demands and prohibit i ons of exte r na l 
2uthori ty . Thi s organizat i on tends to perpet 'J.2 te bo th t he 
threat s and the potentia l f or rebell i on wh i ch inhsb i ted the 
chi l d ' s earli est rela ti onships . 
Most s ns lysts egr e2 tha t , i n i ts early stages o f deve lop -
!Ilent , t he consc i ence i s usua lly a utho ritori an , but that g r a d -
ual ly a trans f or mation occurs i n wh i ch it becomes i ncreas i ngly 
free o f irrat i ona l prohi bi ti ons , f e.:- r s , :Hld d e:m<:nds . I n this 
pro ~ ess , i t c hieves autono~y and an i ntegr a l place i n the 
t otal pe rsonsl i ty . It becomes i ncre2 singly ce pE:ble o f chaos -
i ng 2nd cre&tively a ffirm i ng i ts va lues . Neurosis , ho~ever , 
s igni f i es a breakd·y,m i n th i s deve lopment , so tha t the ori g -
ina l i mec::;e o f a ut!Jori ty reme.ins 1 ~r2_·e l y un.110difi ed b~r e~-:per­
i ence and uni ntegr~ ted i n rel2tion to other espects o f pe r -
s nality . Long- r ange , i ntra psychic conflict i s the r esult . 
Thr:: oest knm·:n pBthol o· ical except i on to this emphasis 
on t h e euthor i ter i an consc i ence is the sociopathic person-
e li ty and r e l eted type,s i n whom th e re is an ?p ,_e rent le.c k 
of the controls end restra int usuel l y ?tt ri buted to con-
s ci~nc e . Thi s and other anoua lie s no t ed by Steke l and Mowr e r 
suzgest strongly tha t Freud e rred i n his one - sided indi ctment 
o f the i rrs t i onc l , ove r~c~ i ve consci ence . It seems equally 
t rue that whe re the e_so o r id at tempt to exercise s ty r st::J.ny 
o ve r the supere~o , intrEc t a bl e illness may result . If so , 
ps y c hic he a l t h i mplies a balEm~e. o f pe r s:::;na li ty f unct ions 
between the p e22ur e principle , the r eolitr pri nc i ple , and 
~h2 t mi~ht be cel l ed th~ mo r a lity p rinciple . 
4) ? 2th lo£ical rebell i n inv~rie~ly i n volves a dis -
t orted r::erc:::;Jt i on o f outhori ty , wh i ch p::- rti <: lly c :i:.IJ- a i ns the 
in2 [? p r opri 2' tenes s o f the r ebell i .. us re s po~se . 3y me .ns o f 
:re j ection , e~tern~l i zation , or negat ive tr2ns f e r e ce , the 
neur o tic is inc lined to endow al l those i n pos i t ons of au-
tho rit · v-T i th E"'l.J.thor i t.srisn cherc-~ t-::r · i.:; ti cs simiL r to those 
o f his coJsc i eD c e . 
• To r men Ca.me r on uses the te r m " rec-c t i ve se:ns i t i v i ty " to 
deccri:)e "a re2.d i ':1e.ss t o r eact se l ect ively to ert8 i n com -
~onents s f 2 stimul2t i n· sit~At i on snd no t c others . " J 
Th2 neuroti~ ' 2 " re2·~tion sensit "vi ty " is oriented to t r e2t 
f actJ r s , f rustr:t i or s , d emEn.s , c ~rc i on , and so f o r th . I n 
rEl8t i. Ol1 to '•Utho ri t~- , h e f!lcJ "~aX~!Ti i '7e e uthor·it;Jri ::n st i •r. uli 
~h i le ~inimiz in£ all other s , o r he m?y introduce distortions 
i Y'_t otheP:i s.c; veridical pe rc e; tions . Eis ne rc e~t i on o f o 
host ile rL hor i t r fi gur e ma.y Ori~ · !l[ te ':(i th his O'·.'!J. sense Of 
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personal i !ls.de '~us.cy o r result fr m l/Jha t Ce.:-neron cal l s 11 recip-
r oc<:' l mo.x i m:? ti on . " By p r o j e cting hi s <)~'>'n h os ti l i ty upon 
J . Normc-.n Ca.meron , "Ps rc e p tus. l Orgsni zst i on a!ld Be .. av i o r 
?2.th oloc; , " Perc e·~·t i on : Pn l'pp r oe ch to Pe rsonc=~ li t y , e d. 
Ro 'o "' r+- K ~-'ak e an-" ..., leYllYl v R.-.rnso·.' ( 1\T;:::,,.- '·-ork · '11h P RoYI"' ld .l ,_, V - l • W...L~ . - • ......A.. J .. ~ • l. C~~l '-'v -'-- '1.1 ......... _ • -.1 -- .L.!...V. 
Press , 1951 , p . 236 . 
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others, the mentally ill person arouses in others defensive 
measures of rejection and counter-aggression. Having made 
himself the center of reciprocal hostility, he confirms and 
reinforces his original hypothesis that authority is essen-
tially malevolent. 4 
5) In addition to a negative image of authority which 
resists modification and distorts perceptions, pathological 
rebellion is further motivated by the inevitable frustration 
of excessive, unrealistic demands. Because he demands so 
much, the emotionally disturbed person is intensely intolerant 
of frustration. Even reasonable deprivations may become the 
occasion for rebellion because they further threaten an al-
ready impoverished ego. Thus, neurotic claims reinforce 
the negative image of authority by creating relationships 
in which deprivation and denial are inevitable. Lacking in-
sight, the neurotic will see the cause of this response as 
residing in the structure of authority rather than in the 
unreasonableness of his own demands. 
6) Pathological rebellion is both without cause and 
without responsibility, because its source is a limited, 
divided, unfulfilled self. It is without cause in the sense 
that its true motivation is largely unconscious and 11 self-" 
rather than 11 other-oriented. 11 If there is a cause, it is 
safety and security. 
4. Ibid., P• 301. 
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Repression also robs the self of responsibility, or, 
more accurately, the ability to assun1e responsibility for 
one's actions and decisions. For if one's motivations are 
largely unconscious, the void must be filled, and rationali-
zation may seem the only alternative. In any case, genuine 
responsibility belongs to the spontaneous integrated auton-
omous self, and this the neurotic or psychotic personality 
has not been able to achieve. For he has sought to renounce 
anxiety by renouncing an essential part of himself.5 
7) Dependency is the most frequent deterrent to overt, 
neurotic rebellion. In the conflict between the need to hold 
onto and the need to reject or destroy, the former usually 
prevails. When rebellion is repressed in favor of dependency, 
the basic conflict is resolved, but its offspring is a pervad-
ing anxiety that the negative sentiment will burst forth, 
endangering the authority relationship. An alternati ve to 
repression is displacement, whereby the rebellion occurs 
against someone or something other than its true object. 
With these generalizations serving as an initial over-
view, we turn to a consideration of three basic modes of 
pathological rebellion: mastery, morbid dependency, and 
passivity', These modes are related to Karen Horney's 
5. Concerning the limiting effects of anxiety and threat, 
Paul Tillich writes: "Neurosis is the way of avoiding non-
being by avoiding being." The Courage to Be, p. 66. 
6 tr i nity o f mc j or solutions t o int rapsychic ca~flicts , but 
there a r e e l abo r a tions end extens i ons s i~ce Horney i s con-
~erned ~ i th the to t ol i ty o f i nt e rperso-al r e l ~ ti onsh ips 
r Ethe r t ~~ n t_ ose ~nly which i nvo l ve r ebell i on aga i nst eu-
thority . 
3. Reb 9l l ion As t he Dr i ve f o r Ma s tery 
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The fi rst ~ode to be c ons idered - - reb~ll i on v i s m~ste ry --
is , l i ke Ell neurot i c trend s , s ecuri ty - ori ant ed . Es senti Elly , 
it r el) r es':::_:_lts an at ten- tei r esolut ion of t he host ility- de -
pend e:'1c y conf l i ct throush a r epress i on of or.:.e ' s derenden c y . 
Si nce sec· r ity is equi va l ent to t he avoi d2nce Jf anx i ety , the 
n e urotic reb e l se 2ks t o o void th e thr es t of his r epres sed de -
pendenc y by ex2..::::.:::'' r 2 t e1 , i nap:-ropri &te p8 tt e rns o f host ility 
a nd rebel l i on . He 1isplays a pa s i an f or an outhori tPr i an 
me ste ry o f oth er s , end thereby masks c: po i ,s:nent dre.:.d o f 
h e l plessness . 
One of the cle ~ rest an s lyses o f th i s neurot i c type is 
f Jl.r~.l i n K,: r·en Horne y ' s descri_,_ t i on o f t he pc ttr:;r n o f 191TIOv i ng 
2 t:;8 i ns t othe r s . ·~ Horne e 1 so re f e r s to thi s p8 t te rn as t he 
"e.x:p8ns i ve so lu t i on " to bas ic a nxi ety o r 11 U ;e E':J;·ec:l of m2s -
te r:,r . " 
The exp~ns i ve so lut i on is one wh ich indic ~ tes 'n identi -
f i catio::J. J f the -- c tu2 l .s e lf wi th whet Hornsy CP1ls the "ideal i ze d 
- - ---- --· 
6 . Kc: r e:n Horney , ~Jeurosi s End Human Cr.Y;,r th ( ~~el'' Yor:{ : :i . '.0. 
l\iort on and Co rnpany, 1~50 ) , chapters c. , 9 , and 11 . 
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irnoge . " 'I'hi s i s "a f i c t itious or i llusor · :oe:L f " bc;,_sed -pe r -
tic-ll;y on ;/; i shL; l think i ng and pa r t i 8 l ly on r ec:.li s i c f c> cto r s 
and genu i ne i deels . 7 Li ke Freud ' s supereco , the i dea l i zed 
i mege is hi:hly ~ ut~ori tar i Bn i n i ts fun~t · on and serve t o 
smoth e r t he erective , spont aneous str l v i n2 s o f the re2 l self . 
3y drs i n i Lg off the ene ri i es of the r ea l Ge l f , i t i~pe i r s 
t he per sane; li t y ' s dir-:=c t i ve e.nd in t.e[, rc=: t i ve po1•re r s , nd the 
f .culty 0y wh ich i t a s sumes re spons i b i li ty Bnd , g r 8dua ll y , 
f u l l a utono~y . Pt t h i s po i nt , Horney cleerly different i a tes 
the i de e l i zed i :naze fr om the hee l· h~: cons c i ence ,,r ich £:Uc rd ~ 
t he oest inte r ests of the r e a l s el f. 
3y hi s very natu r e , t he expens i ve n e urot ic mu s t av~ i d 
o r f i 3ht Pll r e l ~ ti onsh i )s in whi ch he pl~y~ ~ s~bordinate 
r o l e . He _ust re s i st any th i ng and anyone who ~auld encour age 
h i s lat en t de )end ency . To h ide a dee~ i m~ce ~f bei nz both 
unl ove1 and l..LYllov c- ble , he must prove h i s worth by mestery . 
I n the ''lords .:Jf Horney , "he c Enn ot tol e r .:: te 2n.Jrbody w_ o knot•Js 
o r c b. i e ves ,nore t han he does , wi e l d s mo r e powe r , o r i n any 
c; ues ti ons his sup-- r i or i ty . ,S 3ec r use he is r i ven by 
i mposs i bl e s t end ~~ rds of p erf e c t i on '!h ich e r e L ·rge l y uncon -
scious his r eb3lli on is c ompul s i ve rsthe r thsn r e t i ona l . 
At t:'!e s Dm e moment i t g ives h i m an i n~'3 r sense ) f sec uri t 
i t rn e y be sha tteri nc r e l a ti on sh i ps dee;ly bene f ici e l to t he 
7. Ksr en Horney , Our I n.:.Y1e r Conf l ic ts ( ~e~-.1 Yo rk : ';J . ·, . No r ton. 
and ::omps.ny , 194 5 ) , o . 1 8 . 
3 . H:::rne· , S2l2. · c i ·- ., Xe,J r os i s ani 4um;:n ~r.::wth , ·:-:; . 193 . 
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s trivings o f t he reEl se l f . I n . this sens~ , neur~t ic re' el -
l ion is p? r edox ical and sel f - e f eating . 
I n va r i abl y , exp?ns i ve r ebelli on is mixed wi th sadism . 
JVlo r e a c:;urately , vindict i ve need s end sad i s tic trend s combi ne 
to produce a rebellion tha t emphasizes the sat is f scti on gaine d 
i n bri nc:,ing others own from superi or to inferi or pos i tions . 
To use Horn e y ' s "lo rds , "a compul s i ve crEJv i ng f or at~gress i ve 
q 
domin::- t i on , ex~:lo i t~- t i on , and excell ing" - merges wi t " Em 
ins~ t i able need for vindi c tive tri umph , a need to de f ea t and 
humiliate others b' r i 0i 21g Flbove them . ·• 10 3ut beh i nd t e 
h~tred of oth~rs , there re s ides f-l h~tred of nesel f. Beh ind 
the need f Dr vindictive t riumph , the r e i s " "' pe rs o:c v·'hO hs.s 
-'l • d f ' . h " l f ., ll ~esp2 1r e a ever oe1ng 1mse . 
To re;eat on eErl i e r obs e rvat i on , the e xpans i ve neuro t i c 
is e r ebe l without c~use and witho ut r esponsijil i ty . e is 
wi thout cause in thc:t he l e e ks th e rnotivet i on Jf ve.l ues i nde -
~enden tly a rri ve1 at . I n his ori ent .t i on , he is eEo cen tric 
and narcissistic --devo t ed to r es t orat i on of the i mag i na ry 
grandeur in wh ich hi s pri de is i nve s t ed . 5o s~vere is his 
bondege t o h i msel f, he is almost i ncapable ~ f a llying him se l f 
with a ca use Jr pur rose g r ea te r than hi msel f . Wh en he does , 
h i s ~oa l i s l i kely to oe no t the f urther::mce Df the c 2use , 
9 . .Yo r ney , £12. . cit . , Our I nne r Conf licts , p . l l. 
10. Ho rney , 00 . 
__._ 
s:_it. , ~;eu ros i s and Hum en Growth , ~9 . ?R -v • 
11. Horney , 22· cit. 
' 
Our I n_'le r Conflic ts , p . 18 . 
but the bending of th csuse to the sat i s f action of hi s own 
neurotic needs . At the m ment an es;ous ed c ~ use ceases t o 
f 1J.rther _is L1e::-l i ?e:i E!lds , t he n eurotic ' s '1 l_.y c. ltJ " ma,y 
eas i l y t urn t~ tr~a~he ry . 
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As t e neurotic rebe l is without cause , he is likew i se 
without res ~onsibility . Respon- i bility i mpli e3 aelf - a~a reness 
and ere the neurotic is ext r emely l imited . Hi s needs and 
'T~ Otives a re 1:::-r.::;el unconsc i ous . 3y means of extern~li?ation 
h i s m-.;n inner expect:; Jio:..1.s .?re seen ss cc inint: from ot~ers . 
He constc::.ntly yro j ects t he t yrcnn· th.s,t i s wl th i n , and thus 
perceives a s 2 tyrant even l ecitimP te au t hori y , ALains t whom 
his rebel li on i s consequently j ust i f i ed . I n th i s way , re -
s:ons i bili ty f or one ' s ac tions may c~nt inu=lly re Eide out s i de 
onesel f , sym6ol i zing the abserce of auto~om ~nd a lespai r 
of e ver achi evin~ it. 
I n action , neurotic re bel lion may j ust ify i ts~l f via 
i mpo ss ible dem.?n s of authority fi gures , with the inevitable 
1eni a l ~ f these demcnls serving as the basis f ur rational i za -
ti on 2::-1d r ev)lt. Through this mc:m.e!J.Vl-r , t:he rebel seek;:; to 
r emove t e irrat i onal element f r om his co . tumacious behavior . 
Thu s the prelude ~o r ebe l lion o f ten is the m3k i ng of mi l i t ant 
end excess ive cl~ims upon autho ri ty. The ~e claims may be 
foll Ol,·ed by enti l ocut ion , o r violent rs.:_::es f rom hich :phys ical 
a tt e.ck or ex ter::n i nat ior1 o f the a.uthority fi :_u r e result . 
Vi goro~s destr ct i ve o tburs ts of r ebell i on are possi~le 
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only ~hen there i s a tempo r a r y or per~anent ~~lfunct. on of 
t r ee 'J.:r:it _n,:; f a ctors : l ove , fe 2 r , n :i self- prese rvst i on . 
Whi s rebellion thro~gh the dri ve f o r m~stery ~2y be 
;resent in m?ny pe r sons , it be tra y s it s neuro t i c f o r ms b• 
i t s ove r whelming i ntens ity , i ts all - pe rvadi n: i nflu~nce upon 
s to tal l if e p t tern . The s u s p i c i on t hEe t .11 :::. ut .·::Jri ty fi g-
u r es a r e b~sic a l y malevol ent , crooked , and hypocrltic2 l , 
re~d e r s : enuine trust i~possible . Neve r to ~e s~bo rdina ted 
:r:or d e~endsnt , al~a·s to be prepered o r defens i ve we rf2re 
or r e t a li?t i on a~a l:r: s t real or imo~lned sli2 ts -- these sent i-
ment s :iescri je the ex~2ns i ve n2urot i c ' s posture . Hi s i s a 
chro ~ i c i ns.Arrect i o~ cons t cntl · i n se-:::rc o f reasons f r i ts 
ex i s t ence Pn~ Op)or tunity f or i s e~rress i on . rlven by an 
i ns8t i ~·b l e pri e , tt-is t y pe f r ebel l i on i nc r ec-s ingly crushes 
811 ot e r f eel n:J wjlch would a t as res tra i n ts : l o ve , 
fri endshi p , comp3s~ i on . 
I n re l i ~i on , the expans ive r e l::. t L:msh i p to God m.a y be 
char0cteri zeJ by a d es i e t o be equol wi th 3od , ( c ~- 2 ..... . '--" . eh-'Jvah 
c0mpl ex , Jr ~e rh ?ps by means of exclus ive cl ai~s to divi ne 
f a vor . An all i .s' n c e with ultimote :-uth J ri · · 3xe11pl i fie s pe r -
fect l y the i nner 9 l l i Ence With t he i deDl i zed i mage and GiVes 
thLt i mage cosmic propor t i ons . The n e rotic ' s God ma y be a s 
ruthle ss as he is pe~fect and t h is t o the d egr ee tha t he is 
En ex tens i on of the autho rit~ri an co ~sGience . e s t i n tl1 i s 
image , God mD r be c a l led upon to aff irm one ' s maste r~ by the 
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s~b j ~~ati n J f one ' s en~m i es and the exaltc t ion of onesel f. 
Th i s a t t empt at div i ne manipulat i on i s e vident , b i b l i c 2l ly , 
in c. number 'J f the i ·nlJ recato r _ ssl1 .s . 
I f d i s; loce~ent has com t be 2 ds~ inEnt mec heni sm 
in the i _ i i viduEl ' s neuros i s , a r8d l call · d i ff e r ent rel i gi ous 
pat te r n may eme re:, e . I n these cases , rebellion ms y be c ~& ins t 
God who is seen rlmsr i ly as a pare~t -surro:ate r sther than 
as Ul t im a te ~ uthori ty . He r e th e expens i ve so lut i on is l i mi t e d 
b· one ' s de "- e!'.d e'1Cy , or_e ' s ne ed fo r the vs r · a uthorit j' which 
one desp i s es . Si_ ce r epr ess i on h?s be en only part i a lly sue -
ces s f ul , t he neurotic protest s his de~endent rel~tionsh i p b 
di s plac i ng his r eb 2l lion aga i ns t an al te r nate t a ree t . Thus 
the dependent son em Jr-c·ces h i s f .g t l1er but r eno'J_nc es hi s f athe r ' s 
1 2 God o r church . t t th i po i nt , w witnes s a compromiEe of 
the e~pans i ve solut i on ~1 ich bor ders on a secon mode of n eu-
r ot i c re bell i on to which we now di rect our a ttent i on . 
4 . Rebe l l i on a s Morb i d De~e!rl ency 
A sec ~d solut i on to the threa ening o~f li ct o f r ebel -
l i on ec_;a i nst c.ut ' ori ty s.nd dep:onder1cy u1Jon 2'~th o ri ty lies i rl 
the r epressi on of r ebe l l ion and i t s su iy:;ec:yent e:x:.pr ession 
through syillb i o ti c pat t e rns of d epend enc y . i ~a in , ~e a r e in-
ds oted to K· ren Horn~y who aptly l abel 3 th i s '-' lternative the 
12 . Fri tz Kunkel i llus tr2t es gr2ph ic ~ l l~· hO '·'r t!'.ts '!!e chc.n ism 
cen work i ..r: s i e scr .:.. pt i on o f 2 t -- r:'lnice l , a uthor i t 8_r i an 
f s. t tv'" r ' s reLtions_ i p " i th h i s son . Un8ble , beceuse of 
fe c;r , to r·ebe l openly , t he boy r e j ec t ,:; Cod who h?d grs.d -
'-t?l l y c ssumei tl1 ':; f s.ther ' furi o'~2 , j e: lous , E'nd r e ven,se -
f ul c ~ r::-cterj st i ~s. I n se,~rch of i\18.t1J.r ~!X_ , ~:. _;_: . '35-3 7. 
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" sel f - e ffa ~ ing s::>l'~l t i on " and de sc_ri be s " <novin2' tow<-' rd _:Jeople " 
as a "c ompulsive craving fo r c loseness . "lJ 
I n ~srked c~ ·rest to the exp8nsive ' s ;o i gnant dread o f 
helplessness , the sel f - e ff 2. c i nr; neuro ic 1:10'/'IS s~1 "'PPBrent 
dri ve t J,.·:c::rd tot2l surrender . Hi s need f or n i ncessan t con-
firmation o f his personal v ~ lue is ~e not by ~~stery over 
others but thr uch acc ept ence by others . 'Thi s accept once he 
seeks by su~mittin~ hi~sel f to the ir des i r es and wi sh es - - by 
~tt a chment 8ni co~o- i cnce . Only i n this ws c an he di ti ll 
hi s sense of f c ilure e ::1.d co~oensate f o r his leek of ge,1uine 
sel f -cor:fid ence . H r n ey finds in t e mo ve t y·.Ja. rd ne ople , 8. 
e;enui ne de s ire to love a. s tH l l a s the o ft en e"!'pr,as ized , parB -
s i tic des · re to be l oved . 'This i~pul se t love ~eans a 
subm e r g ing o f onesel f in a kind o f e c s t acy. By s L1rrende r , 
t' e neurotic hopes to find unity wi th enoth e r being , to 
co'llpensate f or the imler divis i on \JIIh ich is 8lt·Ja s with him . 
Al though thi s lonLinc to surrende r po ssesses the powe r o f 
~enuinely r el i _s i ous motiva -~ i n , Horne y fi nds it to be "a 
cc-ricature o f th e heal thy yearni ng ."14 
Strone neur:)tic d epend ency points to P ch ildho od l ived 
p r ec2 riousl:/ i n the s~ sdow of e pre f e rred s ibling , 2 oet:.'lut i -
ful mother , or a. benevolently d espot ic f e.ther . ~orne ob-
serves tha t l ife unde r th i s she 01•! i s not --: ev.o id of ;::.f f ect i on 
14 . Ibid ., 9 · 240. 
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so long as the c~ il d i s wi ll i ng t o purcha se it wi th a se l f-
subordi m:jt i n::; devot i on . He must <:l. l so suppress hi s rebe l -
1 i -:J u s Hi .3 , e s and f i g h t i n s ) i r i t . urir..~ adol esce~1ce , th i s 
r eb elli on rna · r eessert it self , i n l eague wi th co~ pul sive 
o~bi t i on , but ~ge in t he child is f o r ced to cul t i ve t e i ns t ead , 
2n i ngr at i et i ng co~oli ~ nce and a helpless ad~ira i on o f thos e 
he 110 s t fe2rs . 
As n eurotic exp£n3 iveness i 3 inv~ ri E~Ly · ln;ed wi th 
E? dism , so the sel f- e ffa cin[ neurotl~ betrays ev ide~ces ~ f 
11~soch i sm . Th~o ch his e l f - e f f acin[ sub j u=a~ i an of hi ~sel f , 
he o f t en manifests a se ek i ng a ft e r pe i n and an en j oyment of 
suff e ring . 
If t 1. i s oe t r ue , whet is t he j ust ifi ~~tion f s r i ncludi n e; 
t he sel f - e ff ac i ng neuro tic i n & t r e&tment of rebell i on 9gs inst 
authority ? The snswe r is tha t , pEradox ic2lly , the r e may be 
a g rea t de9 l of rebe l li on in submiss i on End subservi · ce , 
?nd p r ofound ho st i l i t y in t he w illi n~ue.ss to suff e r . 
Theo .a r e Reik ver ifi es thi s i ns i cht i n his study , 
JVle,s ochism :2.n :·,Iod e rn ~c' n . 1 5 Li ke Horney , B.e i k st re sses t he 
se1 f- e ffaci~g :ualities f this type of disorder , spec ifying 
i ts pass i ve nature , its fe el i ng of i mpotenc e , and the com-
~.:-u 1 s ive submiss i on to others . He 2lso fi nd s 2 s ec. rch for 
gloi·y , <:: s does Horney , not ing tha t the JJean s bec omes suffer -
inc r s ther thEn mas ery. 
15 . lew Yo rk : Fe rra r cE1d Ri nehar t , 1941 . 
142 
Wh~t ~ ! ves masoc hi so i ts _re belli ous ~ur lity , seys He i k , 
i s i ts pe.s s i ve res i s t Gnce to t he c c i ~s o f a uthori ty and the 
r e l entless a i mi ng of i ts mE rty r dom a t Na che r ished snd hE t ed 
l 6 
vic t i m," - who ms. y be a p ren t or o th er ~1J.thori t y fi QAre . 
There; is i n this n e u r otic pette r n ::< 11 despoti~ ~- :. 2cter , " 
a.n "exaspe r a ted r e s i s t 2nce ," or a de fi :::nt obe·Ji ence 1 1 ich 
'
1 I n the :-- une;en cy of the az" ress i on 
t he E1E;s·: ~h i sti.c ~ h £ re.c ter i s i 'l :10 •·ray i n f e r i o r to t he s'? -
d i st i c ."17 
9y Re ik ' s defi ni t i n , t e mEsoch i st i s one who uses 
r eversa l as a weepon f o r h i s EJgg r essi•Jn . Hi s i s 8 "v i olence 
up ::: i de own ." 
L 
i s 
The mas0chi st is e. r evolut i oni st o f se l f - sJ.rr2Y1der . 
The l a~bakin h5 wea r s hide s a wol f. Hi s y i eldi n: in-
c l udes def i c.nce , h i s s ubmis s i or: op;os i t i Tl. . ·enee< t h 
h i s softness , th.:: r e i s h2rdne§s ; beh i nd h is obse uious -
ness r 2bellion i a conc e .l ed . l 
h i s comp J.l -i ve cra.vi n[; f r c tt8crrnent ~Y.l d c l o.seness , the r e 
t he i ntenti on to drag hi s 0b j ect dO'Ain by cl i ngi ng t o i t . 
Re i k l ays t:,rec- t st re ss on the ro l e . .J f ph2ntas y i n the 
l i fe of the me.sJch i st . Preceding a l se lf- e ffe.cing patte rn s 
o f behav i or is a " t ho ush t - r ehear s = of vi l en t and c:;t:,ress ive 
ac t i ons , whi ch s.re chB.n~ed and r esn["pe t h r ·:me;h a c12nge o f 
r o l es ."19 The chc·n::;e r e sult s from rea l i t y ' s den i el of t he 
16 . I b i d . 
' 
iJ . •::>:) .:) ./ . 
1 7 . I bid . 
' 
r . 3? . 
... 
18 . I b i d . 
' 
l) . 156. 
19 . I b i d . " 186 . 
' 
l-' . 
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sadistic i mpul se and i ts direct expre ss i on . Through phentasy , 
the initisl urce che n~es i ts form i n ord e r to .c hi eve i ts 
s.sg r essi ve ends . Through phsnt2.sy , the ·-r:c:sochi st co:r.pensc:tes 
for de l Ey ed set isfa ction through a hi ~hly re fi ned enticipa-
tion of r e ven;e . 
I n a ll i"':. s f r rn s , con t ends R2ik , msscch i sro is a second-
e ry r ather L Jcm a pri me. ry phenomenon , " ::; psych i c t rS~ns f o rma ­
t i on of scd istic and ag~re ssive i~pulses ." 20 It is not a 
devist i on of norms l i nst i ncts but the gra tifi c2tlon of norrn2 l 
i ns cincts by a devi ous ?nd c stly r oute . "Fir 3t , the atone -
rn ~n t , then the s in . Only l a ter does ple2sure edge into dis -
c 'Jrnf J rt its el f.n 21 
Re li8io~s ly , Reik finds in m[rtyr. om the ~os t int en s i ve , 
r e ligious exp r ess i on of ~&sochism . f~ rtyrdom is ev ident both 
in Christi an i ty 2ni in the hi s tory of the J ew i sh n _ti on wh ich 
y i elds only ez teriorly but clines to l ife . Despite he rdsh i p 
snd compla i nt , ths r ligious 'Tiasochist possesses 2~1 unshe.k2ble 
optimism th2t his hidden a ims ~ i ll be r e2 li zed . Gr0und i nto 
the dust by bl 01\' S '·L i ch he h c:: s pro oked , he ri ses ·:: ss.in and 
~~ g -~ i n . 
?? 
":J:e i s tl e j ec k- i n - the - box ::> f Cod . '' "'- If he i s con -
tinus·lly tn1.·Je rt ed i n th is l ife , he l :))ks t. o t l1 e l ife beyond 
a.nd finds in t he pr · ph:.:;cy of j udt;'Ti ent 2nd. resurrecti on the 
2 0 . I bid . n 24J . , ;,- . 
21. Ibid . , p . 12J. 
2) 
-. Ibid . , p . 324 . 
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assertion of his personality, the appreciation of his value, 
and the rehabilitation for which he longs. 
The message of resurrection is a guaranty against the 
annihilation of the individual existence. The judgment 
day will see the punishment of the sinner and the triumph 
of the meek souls. It is a heavenly vision of the hos-
tile and cruel wishes, projected into the highest sphere. 
Only by de~'ees do paradise and hell gain a different 
character. 
Religious eschatology, then, is the product, in large 
part, of masochistic tendencies utilizing the mechanism of 
displacement. The Messiah concept is "a gigantic, unearthly 
projection of the ego," 24 and salvation is a sublimated form 
of sexual or instinctual satisfaction. Reik believes that 
all eschatalogical phantasies have been created or colored 
by a "mass masochism" which compensates for the reality of 
earthly misery through the hope of eternal bliss. 25 
Through his observation that pathological rebellion 
and symbiotic attachment are not opposites but the two sides 
of a single coin, Reik casts light on the long-standing 
eni:gma which is masochism. His alternative to Freud's Eros-
Thanatos bifurcation supports the predominant view that self-
destruction is not a primary force in the psychic life. Reik 
also sustains Horney's judgment that rebellion and dependen-
23. Ibid., p. 337. 
24. Ibid., p. 338. 
25. Ibid., PP• 341-342. 
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cy are central components in most neurotic conflicts. Then 
too, Reik unmasks the disguised rebellion in patterns of 
extreme dependency, revealing both the subtlety and ingenui-
ty of the unconscious mind. All of these represent positive 
contributions to the examination of rebellion. 
Contrariwise, it is necessary to append a qualifying 
notation to Reik's interpretation of religious martyrdom. 
There is no quarrel with his portrayal of the masochist's 
affinity for martyrdom or the related observation that many 
manifestations of religious martyrdom are neurotic. 
are religious martyrs always neurotic personalities? 
But, 
Reik 
implies an affirmative answer to the question. In so doing, 
he succumbs to the overgeneralizing tendency which we noted 
in Freud. This extension of a legitimate theory beyond the 
limits established by logical reasoning and clinical evi-
dence is a serious flaw in Reik's study, but, fortunately, 
one which does not negate the important contributions cited 
above. 
Considering the emotional components which are likely 
to accompany pathological rebellion, overt rebellion seems 
to be a close relative of hatred. The covert form of re-
bellion we have just been describing appears to be most 
compatible with resentment. Resentment is often defined in 
psychology as a passive form of hostility springing in part 
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from rebellion which has been repressed into prolonged im-
potence and manifests a high degree of envy, bitterness, and 
delight at the anticipated pain of its object. 
By our definition, this type of resentment represents 
a failure to come to terms with authority and a corresponding 
loss of one's integrity as a person. Resentment is first 
lodged against the self for what one has failed to become. 
Depending on the person's strength or weakness, the sentiment 
is redirected outward in varying degrees of intensity. Re-
sentment is unaggressive hostility, in that its indulgence 
in the delights of another's suffering is more a matter of 
phantasy or passive observation of reality than self-initiated, 
overt punishment. This is why it may be viewed as a psychic 
compensation for the unconscious rebellion to which it is so 
26 
closely related. 
Psychologically, resentment against authority may be 
interpreted as a manifestation of repressed rebellion, with 
love, fear, and dependency as probable conditioning factors. 
The presence of realistic threat is not the cause of 
such hate but it may trigger the latent readiness into overt 
expression. Always the basic causes are to be found in the 
personality of the hater rather than the nature of his victim. 
26. For parts of this comparison, the writer is indebted to 
a philosophical analysis by Albert Camus, The Rebel 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, In., 1956), pp. 17-19. 
However, the above definition attempts to differentiate 
resentment and hatred in a way that Camus does not. 
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T sum11ar i ?e brie f ly , :'Je have seen th :::. t psthol ogic2l 
rebe l lion 112 y ex:;r itsel f through mester end 11or'oid d::' -
p8 'ld enc r . T!'-J fi r s L .!!8th · d i S overt , 9nd t~1e SeCO-~d , ~ h i le 
iis~uised &~d ind irect i s no l ess e ff ect ' ve . '3oth 'Tiodes 
~~y assume stro~:~Y r el i g i ous postures where in identi fic a -
tion ·r i th G;)d on the one h .nd , or c onplete 0u.bm i ss i or:. t o 
God Jn the other r r e prob2ble outco~es . 
There r ema i ns ~ t hird mode of pstholo~ i cel rebellion 
wh ich mu t ~e co~sidered bri e fly , be f Jre t e ~uest i on o f 
e ffec t u;on re~ i3i ous matur~t i on ~ n be 2~e~u8tely assessed . 
5. Rebellion Thr ~£h Re3 iznat i on 
In gorney ' s 9ne lysi s , the a~,e:l ~ f 11~stery essenti s l ly 
lle~~s on ide t i fic?tion ~ ith the ide? li zed ' 'TI?~e , or the 
2uthori t_r i Gn co~science . Where the pe r sonality seeks 2 
sol'J.t i on thr-J:J.gh sel f - e f fr-:ce!ent , t ·~ iden~- i t~- i s 'Hi th the 
" s 1J.bdue d sel f ," t h ,:: t P'='rt o f t h neurot ic sy;::; te11 wh i ch is the 
f ocus o f self - h3te and t he t a rget of the idea lized i mage . 
Resi:;n.s.t: i o:'1 , 8 third ms. j or 2lternst ive , 2 7 repr~se11ts an ,c:t -
t empt to withdrsw fro11 the psychi c conf lict in order to 
sch i eve 2 s 'J.ri ous trcmquil i t ~r . _''-n "smr& o f restriction " 
and avo idance surrounds t h is solut i on . ~ather thsn exclude 
27. Horney re oc:-n i zes thc:.t the three n& j or solJ.t i ons to 
n eu r otic confl i ct are not mutu~ll exclus i ve o r i nde -
pendently V[ l i d . She finds it l i kely th ~t 211 three 2re 
operat i ve in everJ pe r son to ver; i n: decrees but bel i eves 
thst one o f the three wi l l usu8 l l; p reda~in:te over the 
oth r t·-·o i n r, c:;i ven pe r s ~e li ty . 
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e ithe r r ebellion cr dependency f ro~ consc i o~sness , th i s 
so l ut i o~ t conf l i ct seeks the immobil izPt i o~ of both ten-
ere es . 
As bas i c ~h8r~c te ri stics 28 o f t~ i s group , Horney n t e s 
ubi qu i tous detach~ent , a v e r s · on to r.c 1 ieve:'1:ent and effort , 
absenc e o f g~~ l - direct i on and pl9nni~g , severe r es tric t i on 
o f wL;hes , " ry_pe rs ens i t i v i t~r to L'J.f 1ue::.tce , ]res3ure , co ?rcion 
or t i es of cny ki nd ," ~nd EVe r s i on to ~h8n~e . I t is the 
prese~c e 0f a ll these qu~ lit i es t o r~ ther ms rke degr ee tha t 
diff e renti s t es neurot i c from normal pat t ern of res i ~nGt i on . 
T~e res i ~n ed ne ~rotic i s a rebe l e v ~n ~hou3h hA Pttempts 
t o 1E1 L ~t2 i n safe p.s y ~hic di ::-, t ence bet'•Ieer. himse lf >md t he soil 
of h i s rebe l li on . Si nce he cannot t o l e r ate i nt imacy or t i es 
of any ki nd , i t i s self - ev ident t hs.t he c enrwt c om::; to t erm s 
with Puthori tJ Jr i ts r epresentat ives i .:1 the f :~ i Jial , soc i Pl, 
e> r reli e; i ous se tti ng . Although hi s tend.encJ i s to fl ee rsthe r 
than fizh t , rea lity r e quires his frequent c0nf ront2t i on by 
authori ty . 3ec :.: u se he i s hype r sens i tiv~ t) in : l uence , pres -
~ure , snd c os rc i on s uch c or f ront a ti ons s tir resen t~ent and 
this i nevi t ably expres ses it sel f s rebell i on . He f ee r s 
open r ebell ion as much as t he s e lf- e ffacing ty;e and e -
pend enc y as much ss ~e vind ic t i ve , .cs terinc type . ~hen he 
yi e ld s to ·:; ither , it is unde rstandeble t hc:. t h i s ma"!1:1.e r is 
d i szui sed r athe r th an ove r t . To quote Horney , e is " ~ 
28 . I bid ., ~P · 260- 269 . 
:S 1Jbd1J.e 29 r e be l . 11 
Res i [;ned rebe l l i on , if we 'Tl ::: y u;se such a p:::<. r ::: dox i c21 
]hr _se , ap~rox i r~ t es whe t m2ny common y spe2k ~ f PS pass i ve 
All pos: l vE r es i stance i s n o t neurot ic , but the 
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method i s especis lly s.menabl e to the end s o f th i s pe r ;::onc:.l i ty 
t ~r e . The r e s i ._;ned r ebel i s not a fi gh t r , so he r ebel s 
i nwo rdl y . Consc i ous ly or unc n sc i ously , he fru _tr3 t es othe rs 
i ns pa ss i v e manner--by no t r es endi ng , by p r ocra st inEt i ng , 
o r f or;se tt i n ' . 
Horney s t a tes tha t open r e be lli on is not i mposs i ble f or 
the r es i c,n i neurot i c ou t it i s to be r ez: rd ed c.s 2 seconde r 
dev elopment , l a cki ::1g an a c t iv e f orce , - nd de s i ·:c·ne to defend 
h i s ri~ht to de t_chmsn t , i ndependen c e , o r fr eed ox--hi s de -
ter~ in2 tio~ not t o pursue amb i i cus g 0 l s . - i s vs ry r e fusrl 
t s tri va or to do even t ha t of wh ich ~e is c Epable expresse s 
hi s r ebelli on . Or his : c t i ng pr~ductivel y bu i n de fi ance 
o o r with disda. i n for the wi sh es and t aates o f thos e i n a u-
t horit y , ac 2o~pl i sh ss the s ame end . 
Subdued ur pot ~n ti 2 l n euro t i c r ebellion mAy become 
a ct i ve n t 2ny t i me , d epend i ng o_ the re l ~ t i ve strength s of 
eAp2:.s ive end sel f - e f ec i n __, t r end s . .:!he r e 8 . . p -- ns i ve t en-
denc i es en j oJ a ~er~ i n of s upe r io r i tr , r b~ll i ou s pa tte r ns 
0[/.l. in s t res t r ic t i ve f orc es a r e :n o s t li k'::- ly . "Reb<.:- ll i on 
Ega i r_s t " ex:;:,res.:::es d i sc):1t entme:1t t<v' i t ~1 e"_tern<: l condition s , 
1•rhile ar ebe l i on f r " r evea.l dissat i;::;fect i on '.·J i t h o ~1es el f. 
?9 ,- b . - ? n l ~ • .l. l U. • , p . e- · ... • ..., • 
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The f o r mer mo~e , ~b 2rves Horne y , is no t ~c8e3 s2 ri ly con -
s tructive end mc.y fur ther l i ena te t he n e urot ic r ,Jm hi. sel f . 
~ i t hi n l i ~ i ts , t : e l Ptt e r ~ ode o f r ebe l l i on , direct ed age i ns t 
the i nne r t yr ·-nny , c n e xe rt a l i berct i:n;__; inf luence . It mr- y 
free f o r e·:ore s· i o~ ce rt c- in cre2tive f&8u l t i 3 wh i c h he r e to -
fore ~sve been s ~if ed . I ~1 such c e se s , Horne finis the r e -
~e llion to be : r 2du2l r &ther 
a ry r~th e r t~r n rev ~ lut i one r 
then 
J O 
turbulent , and e volution-
As a so l ut i on t o the c ent r a l 
i nn r co~flic t end i ts a tt end i ng a nx i e ty , this type o f open 
r eb e llion i s o~l ~ p~ r t i slly e ffec t ive en i s n o s ubstitute 
f o r a wo rk i n,: t .. rouch , under e_ e lysi s , o f P 1e who l e true tur e 
c f re s ic,na t ion . 
By w2; of summa ri zi nz the psych l oeics l s tudy of pa tho -
logic ~ l reb~l l i on , l e t it je sa id thr t s uch r~b~ll ' on z-n-
e r :J l ly ep i tom izes re s i s t ence to per3.Jn:: l i t / grYH t}1, 2nd w1-
he.s l th ." i i ft'J. r oe!'_ce s i n i nt e r pe r sor:: a.l r e l.eti Y s ·-li £JS . T e 
soil of such r e e l l i on is susta i ned l ove - deprivat i on i n early 
l ife and a8c ompany in~ da m2ge to t he c h i l d ' s s el f - i ma ~e -- his 
sense o f c ~nfidence and well - be i ng . ~h ~ t r esults is 2 ~~ ra -
l ~'z i nc; c::::1b i v··le'loe ~· f f eel i ngs t o:,:s rd pc- r ent :: l c 1J. th.Jri t y- - r e -
be li on ve r sus d e e~dency . The child re c~~n i zes t h[ t he ha t es 
th e pe r son 'rJ.e needs c.nd needs t he person he h :- tes . 'The ex -
te rnsl po~e r ~hi ch r es t r icts a lso sus t a i ns . Thus re b e llion 
i s exeg~e r: ted , r e, res s31 , o r i m~ob i l i ze i n t he nam e of 
s a f ety . 
JO . I bi d ., p . 28LL 
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Because it is so freighted with danger, rebellion 
against parental authority is usually displaced, (as in 
patterns of mastery), disguised (as in morbid dependency), 
or immobilized (as in neurotic resignation). 31 When 
pathological rebellion does occur, it generally is no 
longer a direct expression of primary energy, but a 
secondary system--a defensive reaction against threats 
to one's security system. 
Unless rebellion is directed inward against the 
authoritarian conscience, it is not likely to serve any 
therapeutic purpose. In fact, it is more likely to 
accelerate interpersonal and intrapsychic conflicts. At 
best, it fails to alter the basic personality structure 
and the inherent conflicts which gave it birth. 
6. Pathological Rebellion and Religious Maturation 
Having attempted a limited analysis of pathological 
rebellion, we now turn to the important question: What are 
the influences of pathological rebellion upon the process of 
religious maturation, described in Chapter II? Although the 
foregoing discussion has touched on this problem, a more 
direct consideration is now in order. 
31. Erich Fromm's analysis of the neurotic or "nonproductive" 
personality approximates Horney's, except that he dis-
cerns two basic patterns--symbiosis and withdrawal--
rather than three. Man for Himself, ££• cit., pp. 107-117. 
Fromm regards masochism and sadism as alternating forms 
of symbiosis, and destructiveness and indifference as 
active and passive manifestations of withdrawal. 
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Psychologically, it is evident that pathological 
rebellion represents a serious disruption in the growth 
of personality. From the standpoint of needs, one 
accurate interpretation would state that in neurosis 
the need for safety pre-empts the psychic energies that 
normally would be directed toward satisfying the need for 
self-actualization. Neurosis thwarts the trend toward 
autonomy, and this negative function does have important 
religious as well as psychological implications. But a 
larger question asks, Is the trend toward theonomy neces-
sarily obstructed by pathology? 
For the sake of economy, we shall concentrate on 
the criterion of theonomy rather than autonomy in the re-
mainder of this chapter, since we assume that the former 
comprehends and is meaningless apart from the latter 
trend. Recalling an earlier definition, 32 we have stated 
that religious maturity involves behavior in which the 
primary motivation is the harmonizing of one's life with 
the values and purposes of Ultimate Authority. As a 
corrective against the possibility of pathological ex-
cesses in personal devotion or surrender, we have stipu-
lated that one consequence of mature religious behavior ia 
an increase in the individual's powers and potentialities 
as an autonomous person. 
32. Page 76. 
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The i mmediate concern, then, is to ascertain 
specifically why or at what points pathological rebellion 
is antithetical to the religious demand for self-surrender. 
This concern le ads to the following considerations: 
i. Inability to Trust God 
Pathological rebellion denotes the i ndividual's failure 
or inability to develop "basic trust," a concept developed 
by Erikson. This failure arrects all of the person's 
authority relationships, including thos e that are re-
ligious in nature. The roots of the neurotic's basic dis-
trust are to be found in the early years of his li!·e where 
his state of extreme dependency gave parental authority 
its ultima te dimensions. In the f amily setting, t he child's 
urgent depenaency becomes linked with a sense o:f threa t, 
and this in turn :fo s ters patterns o!· rebellion against 
the parental authority. 
Earlier, we quoted Linn and Schwarz to show that in 
the regular course of events, there are many opportunities 
for the authoritarian conscience to become enlightened 
through enlarging experiences and relationships with various 
kinds of interpersonal authority. In addition, the latent 
years of childhood are characterized by an idealizing tenden-
cy which partially compensates for the child's shattered 
i mage o!' parental perfection. Often the concept of God is 
the magnetic center o!· the child's idealism, and this con-
cept receives uncritical devotion usually until puberty 
and the onset of adolescent doubt. Nevertheless, our survey 
1?4 
of psychological literature reveals the obstinacy of 
infantile, rebellious patterns which operate as exceptions 
to the normal progression just outlined. 
To trace adult religious responses to infancy and 
childhood patterns is to indulge in a Freudian exercise 
that we have found reason to question in earlier con-
siderations. However, there are at least three factors 
that appear to reinforce the neurotic's continuing in-
ability to establish a theonomous relationship with Ultimate 
Authority. 
a. Negative Trans:rerence 
Pathological rebellion against God is inseparable 
from a distorted perception of authority. Specifically, 
pathology in religion connotes a partial breakdown in the 
process by which one's father-image and God-image become 
discrete. Consciously, God may be an idealized syncretism 
of authority images experienced both outside and within 
the home. But unconsciously, projection has been at work 
with the results that God retains the authoritarian traits 
of the feared and hated parent. 
The pathological rebel lacks what Carl Rogers calls 
"congruence," the 11 accurate matching of experience and 
awareness." 33 He may have genuine religious experiences 
33. Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 282. 
but at the crucial point where surrender is called for, 
his maturation is blocked by the perception of threat to 
his neurotic defenses. This development provides a 
specific instance in which genuine religious experience 
and distorted awareness or perception of that experience 
blend to produce pathological rebellion. 34 
Pathological rebellion against God is a transferred 
response that was originally directed against a parent 
or parent-surrogate. This insight represents a fundamental 
contribution of Freudian psychology: 
The attitude of man to his gods is determined to a 
large extent by displacement of his attitude toward his 
parents, either in their original form as dominating 
external figures or as incorporated in the super-ego; 
in which latter case there is a projection of the in-
ternal super-ego on to the external figure of. God, as 
in the notion of the "all seeing eye of God."-'5 
What is lacking in this statement is a clear dis-
tinction between abstract authoritarianism and mature re-
ligion. The latter comes about through enlarging experiences 
34 . Interestingly, the plight of the neurotic is similar to 
a state of sin as defined theologically by Nathan A. 
Scott, Jr., The Tragic Vision and the Christian Faith 
(New York: As s ociation Press, 1957). Discussing the 
sin of hubris or pride, Scott speaks of "absolutizing 
the relative" and "making the preliminary ultimate." 
Unconsciously, this is what the neurotic does. For him, 
parental authority never fully surrenders its childhood 
ultimacy and thus the progression toward theonomy is 
thwarted. The term negative idolatry might be used to 
convey this emotional binding to a hated and feared pre-
liminary authority and the crippling of one's powers to 
love and worship God. 
35. J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society (New York: Interna-
tional Universities Press, 1945), p. 273. 
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of authority and reality, which normally move the person-
ality far beyond its infantile origins. Quoting Gordon 
Allport: 
The error of the psychoanalytic theory of religion • • • 
lies in locating religious beliefs exclusively in the 
defensive functions of the ego rather than in the core36 and center and substance of the developing ego itself. 
What Freud offers as a basic mechanism for all 
religious belief and behavior, we accept as manifesting a 
neurotic type of religion. His important concept has 
validity, if we recognize that this transference is neither 
as universal nor as inexorable as Freud apparently be-
lieved. Allowing for the modifying influence of non-author-
ian figures outside the home and a gradual differentiation 
between preliminary and ultimate authority, it may be said 
that very often rebellion against God in late childhood, 
adolescence, and adult years, is the result of an unre-
solved conflict with one's earthly father. If the emotion-
al link with the father is one of hatred, this hatred may 
be transferred ~ God as an unconscious means of solving the 
dependency-rebellion ambivalence toward the worldly father. 
This displacement is especially likely if the father is 
religious. By rebelling against the father's God, the 
individual symbolically revolts against his earthly father. 
36. Gordon Allport, Becomin : Basic Considerations for a Ps -
chology of Personality New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1955), p. 96. 
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The tenacity of the transference mechanism in a dult 
religious life may denote an impoverishment of personal 
experience with authority figures. Or, t he perceptual dis-
tortion of authority rel a tionships may be so severe, that 
benevolent, loving attitude s toward the anxious person are 
misconstrued by him. 37 The unconscious authoritarian 
stereotype filters all experience so that only data con-
sistent with t he stereotype are assimilated. What results 
is a tragic, selective inattention to positive, therapeutic 
factors in religious experience. Unconsciously, one's God 
is bound to t he infan tile percepti ons of a g rossly imperfect 
and irrational parent. Such is the thwarting power of 
repression over t h e creative forces of personality. 
To the degree that a pe rson nourishes a projective 
concept of God based on unconscious authoritarian i mages, 
we may expect to find the strong a mbivalence which Horney 
observes is the patholog i cal response to a u thority in gener-
al. We may also predict that characte ristically he will 
attempt to repress one side of the conflict or to imrnob ilize 
both through resi gnation. Attempted manipulation of God 
and martyrdom approximate the behavioral patterns studied 
earlier as the maste ring and self-ef facing modes of ex-
pressing rebellion. 
37. One example of s u ch distortion is the "dread of the good" 
manifested by New Testament de moniacs in their encounters 
with Jesus. 
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b. Projection of Unconscious Sentiments 
A second explanation of the persistence of "basic 
distrust" as a phenomenon in adult religious life derives 
from the Freudian concept of projection, although the same 
principle may be expressed in a variety of ways. As the 
victim of "reciprocal maximation" may project his hostility 
upon others, his unconscious mind may also charge his 
theology with highly negative sentiments. In a word, one's 
repressed anger, for example, is experienced consciously 
as God's anger, and this distortion further cripples the 
individual's capacity to trust. 
Neurotic personalities may also project upon God 
responsibility for their own actions and their frequently 
unhappy consequences. Coupled with their low frustration 
threshold, this tendency may make daily adversity the 
occasion for renewed contumacy against God, or religion, 
or the church. Psychological literature offers a catalogue 
of instances in which it is less threatening to blame God 
for one's misfortunes than to accuse oneself or those per-
sons on whom one feels a special dependency . Thus, the 
manifestation of a God-concept of causality is really a 
regression to the extent that it hides pathological irrespon-
sibility. 
One illustration of how unrealistic claims and their 
inevitable frustration may fashion rebellion against God is 
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the biblical story of Jonah. 38 For Jonah, religion becomes 
an instrument of the desire for vindictive triumph over 
one's enemies. Jonah's God is a power to be manipulated 
(or mastered) so that one may claim a divine espousal of 
one's values and standards. Personal and Ultimate Authority 
become closely aligned, not through a genuine surrender of 
one's life, but a moulding of God into one's own image. 
Jonah demonstrates how an individual's malice may seek cosmic 
confirmation in the concept of God's wrath against the un-
righteous. 
An equally unrealistic religious expectation is sug-
gested in the well-known Old Testament reference to faith in 
God as a defense against terror, pe s tilence, and destruction: 
A thousand may fall at your side, 
ten thousand at your right hand; 
but it will not come near you. 
Because you have made the Lord your refuge, 
the Most High your habitation, 
no evil shall befall you, 
no scourge come near your tent.39 
A poem of mature faith for many, these verses, interpreted 
literally, describe the naive, unrealistic desire for security 
on which much pathological religion is grounded. 
38. The writer acknowledges an allegorical rather than a 
historical approach to the Book of Jonah in this inter-
pretation. The interest here is not to analyze a 
historical person but to suggest through traits we have 
been discussing, something of this book's psychological 
as well as theological value. 
39. Psalms 91:7, 9-10, The Holy Bible: Revised Standard Version. 
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Returning to Jonah, we find further a brief study 
in the rebellion that may follow a shattering of unreal-
istic claims made upon Ultimate Authority. When Jonah's 
resentment against the unrighteous is not vindicated by 
God, the reluctant prophet lapses into a state of self-
pity which God identifies as anger. 40 There is no end-
ing to the story, so we are free to speculate on the out-
come of Jonah's religious struggle. Psychologically, it 
is not unlikely that the frustration of Jonah's claim by 
God perpetuated the rebelliousness which colors the open-
ing of the accoun;t,. In any case, the stage is set for 
a turning away from God altogether (rebellion by resigna-
tion) or a reorientation to reality and God, that makes 
possible authority rela tionships at deeper more mature 
levels. A third, more extreme alternative is a radical 
break with reality, and the identification of one's ego or 
super-ego with God so completely that the "I" becomes "God." 
Paranoid delusions may indicate serious regression to the 
infantile world of personal conscience and a corresponding 
loss of identity. 
c. Personal Guilt 
A tertiary consideration which will be mentioned only 
briefly is that of personal guilt, which may be equated 
with a felt need, conscious or unconscious, for punishment 
in some form. Even when this guilt is largely pathological 
40. Jonah 4:4, The Holy Bible: Revised Standard Version. 
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in character, there appears to be an added dimension which 
correlates directly with the degree of one's rebelliousness. 
One may say, almost axiomatically, that there is no 
rebellion without guilt and that this rule applies to 
pathological as well as reactive cases. To rebel against 
God carries both a sense of alienation from him and expec-
tation of retribution by him. Neither mood is compatible 
with trust. The pathological rebel may finally project 
his guilt onto God, but this maneuver hardly reduces the 
estrangement which he feels. Because he has rebelled, he 
has no sense of continuity and compatibility between 
Ultimate Authority and wha tever measure of personal author-
ity he may have obtained. 
Like the two factors preceding it, guilt growing out 
of neurotic patterns helps to explain the pathological 
characteristic of infantile patterns and perceptions to 
remain largely unchanged by experience and thus to per-
petuate themselves in destructive ways. How often and to 
what degree these manifestations account for the inability 
to trust and actively harmonize one's life with Ultimate 
Authority, is a matter of conjecture. It does seem reason-
able to assume, however, that one's religious attitudes can-
not be divorced from his generalized attitudes toward author-
ity, and that if pathology is present in a given personality 
to any significant degree, it will make itself known in 
the individual's observable responses to the felt claims of 
Ultimate Authority. 
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ii. Incapacity for Self-Giving 
In a d dition to the chronic inability to trust God 
because of neurotic patterns or mechanisms of defence , the 
pathological rebel betrays an incapacity for s elf-surren-
der or self-giving. This applies equally to his reli g ious, 
sexual, and social life. He is incapable of sustained, 
di s ciplined devoti on to a caus e or an ideal beyond himself. 
More than this, any experience or encounter which lays 
claim to this kind of giving or devoti on may carry pro-
found threat and motivate rebellious patterns. 
The idea of religious surrender or devotion, there-
fore, illuminates in stark outline s the neurotic's limita-
tions--the degree to which hi s spiritual growth has b e en 
hampered by unco n s ci ous barriers. Some of the s e impedi -
ments may be sumiii.arized briefly: 
a. Threat of Repressed Dependency 
Karen Horney ' s analysis of the neurotic pers onality 
shows that rebell ion may become a neurotic trend when the 
security system depends on the repre s sion of one's depend-
e ncy feelings. Essential ly , the maneuver involve s t he re-
placing of one's dependency by negative transference. One 
indication that s u ch repression has taken place is the des-
peration with which all reliance upon any authority apart 
from one s elf is den ied. An unrealistic, c ompulsive inde-
pendence is the a pparent g oal of this struggle. 
163 
To the degree that the God-concept is a u t h oritarian 
and therefore larg ely repressive in f unction, the reli g ious 
threat to autonomy is clea r. Intrapsychically, God be-
comes identified with t he pride sys tem in its tyranny over 
the real self. This struggle is chara cteristic of the 
heteronomous state and becomes clearly neurotic only as it 
perpetuates itself into late adolescen ce and early adulthood. 
There is a certain irony in the fact that in his 
desperate defense against the repressed forces of infantile 
dependency, the neurotic also resists the realistic de-
pendency which accompanies religious maturity. Honest ac-
knowledgment of affiliative needs bears the stigma of weak-
ness, and is intolerable for a system of values that 
stresses mastery. 
The problems which this orientation presents for 
religious growth are obvious. Nearly all reli g ions re-
quire a realis t ic recognition of individual limitations 
and dependency needs. When the security of one' s personal-
ity--that is, the avoidan ce of overwhelming conflict--is 
based on a denial of these limitations and needs, a rejec-
tion of genuine reli g ion is inevitable. Under certain con-
ditions, religion ma y be t wi sted to the ends of personal 
mastery, or submission to the ends of rebellion, but the 
theonomous relationsh ip is missed. In numerous instances, 
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an incapacity to establish a realistically and creatively 
dependent relationship with God identifies itself as the 
thwarting agent. 
b. Narcissism 
In Freudian terminology, narcissism represents a 
binding of libidinal energies to the self in such a way 
that there develops an undue independence of or indiffer-
ence to persons, objects, or concerns beyond the self. 
What emerges is a neurotic character or a "pride system" 
which brooks no rivals to its own supremacy. The center-
ing of one's psychic energies around an idealized self-
image bars any real giving of oneself, because such giving 
would require nothing less than a rearrangement of one's 
libidinal investments. Such an impasse has strong sexual 
as well as religious connotations. Where personality is 
so devoid of the capacity for disciplined devotion, the 
religious demand for surrender is both i mpossible and in-
tolerable. 
Emotionally overdetermined rebellion against God may 
signify the neurotic person's anxiety lest he lose himself, 
yet this is precisely what must happen if he is to broaden 
his personality beyond its individualistic limits. One 
context for this change is the counseling relationship where-
in the counselee is encouraged to acknowledge and assimilate 
aspects of his personality that were previously rejected 
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by the conscious mind. A second context is an emotional 
crisis, culminating in religious conversion. William 
James probes the dramatic experiences of the "twice born" 
and discovers "an immense elation and freedom, as the 
outlines of the confining selfhood melt down."4l 
In any event, the antithesis between narcissism and 
religious surrender or devotion is underscored by psycho-
logical literature. Without exception, a radical re-
structuring of character is seen as a prerequisite to 
significant progress toward religious maturity. 
c. Exaggerated Fear of Passivity 
H. c. Rumke, in The Psychology of Unbelief, 42 offers 
a psychoanalytic interpretation of religious rebellion, 
based on seven stages of religious experience. Starting with 
puberty, Rumke observes a growing tendency to feel that 
one is ;nmeaningfully linked up with the whole of creation. "43 
A psychological return to a non-separation of ego and non-
ego accompanies this feeling. Gradually there emerges an 
experience of "primary cause" as the source of all being, 
including one's own. By the time the individual has identi-
fied the "primary cause" as "God," he recognizes the demand 
41. James, QE• cit., p. 273. 
42. London: Rockliff Publishing Corporation, 1952. 
43. Ibid., P• 1. 
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for obedience which his deepening relationship lays upon 
him. 
As the ego a s sumes responsibility in the face of this 
demand, guilt characterizes one's relationship with God. 
The guilt increases when the person experiences God as de-
manding not only obedience but complete surrender. This is 
not the final stage of religious experience, but Rumke 
stresses the great difficulty most persons have in moving 
beyond it. The problem of coming to terms with the demands 
of Ultimate Authority is isolated as a crucial one. 
Not all resistances to obedience and surrender are 
pathological and these will be considered in the next 
chapter. However, Rumke does illuminate some of the special 
conditions under which the religious crisis is heightened 
by defensive mechanisms, unconsciously at work. In essence, 
Rumke describes pathological rebellion in terms of exagger-
ated fears. 
To a significant degree, according to Rumke, exagger-
ated fear of religious surrender reflects an over-identi-
fication with the mother, resulting in a blunted reality-
orientation. The child who develops in this way is unable 
to adapt to masculine authority, which, by its very nature, 
both defends and oppresses. Rumke does not deal with 
Mariolatry in this connection, but the distinct possibility 
exists that emphasis on the feminimity of the divine would 
neutralize this type of rebellion to some degree. 
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Rumke finds that pathological fear may focus at 
one of three points and cause the demand for surrender to 
be perceived as a serious threat: passivity, with related 
fears of effeminacy and vanity; sexual surrender, as-
sociated with images of a dangerous mother and speculated 
outrage if one surrenders; death, in most cases an outgrowth 
of the first two forms of fear. 
The germinal role of these fears in relation to rebel-
lion against the ultimate demands of religion is clearly de-
fined by Rumke. 
Fear of passivity is already an obstacle to just offer-
ing oneself. How very much greater this anxiety must 
become when it is not only a matter of offering oneself 
but when it means to accept the leadership of the great-
est power, to4relinquish one's ov;n will power to be dictated to!4 
What surrender means psychologically and what the neu-
rotic perceives it to mean are quite distinct according to 
Rumke. In reality, surrender releases the ego from bondage, 
eases unhealthy tensions, and liberates psychic power. 
These effects cannot be comprehended by the abnormal person 
who may see God as a projected mother-image. Because of 
this distortion, surrender to God equals subjugation by 
woman. The feared danger is tha t one will be swept from 
spirituality into sensuality. 
Again, it ne eds to be said that rebellion is only one 
response to the menace which surrender poses to the neurotic 
44. Ibid., P• 46. 
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personality. Two alternatives are escape from threat and 
repression of threat. Both of these solutions are more 
tragic than rebellion because in the latter mode, the demand 
and its source remain clear even when one's resistance is 
unconsciously motivated. Speaking comparatively, rebellion 
connotes struggle, involvement with the reality of religious 
claims. Escape and repression may mean a denial of both 
the claim and its source in order to be free of the attend-
ing threat. The rebel would seem to retain a clearer grasp 
of reality and a greater opportunity for working through 
the barriers to further religious growth. 
7. Summary 
In the present chapter, we have drawn from psychologi-
cal literature in order to assess t he meaning and function 
of pathological rebel l ion against God. By way of explicat-
ing our original definition of religious rebellion, we have 
eq_uated "negative experience" with perceived authoritarian-
ism that first permeates the home and later colors religious 
attitudes through the mechanism of projection. Following 
Horney, we have elucidated the "certain habitual ways" of 
pathological expression as three in number. I mplicit in 
this development has been the assumption that a close re-
lationship obtains between parent-child and God-man relation-
ships but that this relationship is not strictly determined 
in the Freudian sense. 
One outcome of the foregoi ng cons i derati ons is tha t 
the protean chara cter of reli g i ou s rebel l i on is reaffirmed. 
Beyond its orientati on to threat and its resistan ce to 
g enuine religious commitmen t, religious rebelli on defi es 
g eneralization. Always there a r e idiographic feature s 
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which reveal the limitati ons of formulati on s s u ch a s Horn ey's. 
The student of rebelli on stands indeb ted to the psy c h o-
analyst, however, for the insight that behavior pa~terns do 
not always represent character traits with accuracy . De-
fiance may lurk in uncritical s u bmission to God, a n d rebel-
lion in religious pas sivity or indifference. 
A second conclus ion is that patholog ical rebelli on 
against God does correla te closely wit h Allport's definition 
of the negative, religious sentiment, and is one indication 
that su ch a sentiment is active. More specifical ly , we 
have suggested t ha t t h is sentiment is most likely to bec ome 
overt where the individual encounters the demand for s ur-
render or devotion to Ultimate Authority, because of the 
threat wh ich this demand poses to his precarious, psychic 
equilibrium. Seen in this light, rebellion cann o t be treated 
as a responsible act of the will, but rather it must be 
understood a s a compulsive r e sponse, motivated b y u n cons cious 
determinant s . 
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Thirdly, pathological rebellion does highlight, in 
negative fashion, the religious significance of the child-
hood years and early authority relationships. Freud argued 
that adult religion springs from infantile needs and long-
ings, while we have taken the alternate position that the 
persistence of these needs in unmodified form is disruptive 
of maturation processes. It appears that the child cannot 
respond positively to God whom he has not seen without a 
precursory, positive relationship with a significant author-
ity figure whom he has seen. The absence of this latter 
relationship provides the soil for pathological rebellion 
against God in the adolescent and adult years. In this 
development, the Freudian concepts of projection and nega-
tive transference play an important role. 
A fourth principle to emerge is that more than any 
other single factor, dependency bears an obverse relation-
ship to pathological rebellion. The neurotic personality 
may vacillate between the two extremes of unrealistic inde-
pendence from God or an uncritical, overdependence upon God. 
More often, his security depends on a rigid adherence to 
one extreme and a complete denial of the other. As we have 
said, dependency appears to be the most fre~uent deterrent 
to overt rebellion, and, in relation to Ultimate Authority, 
fear growing out of dependency tends to dominate and repress 
hatred, aggression, and rebellion. 
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As a final observation, we note that from the per-
spective of the neurotic, surrender, self-giving, or sus-
tained devotion all assume the character of a dreaded 
passivity which exacerbates deep-seated conflicts. Harmoni-
zing one's life with the claims and purposes of God is 
perceived as a terrifying loss of self and a prelude to over-
whelming anxiety. What the pathological rebel cannot see 
is that only in surrendering his neurotic self can the 
broader, more creative powers of the real self become oper-
ative. The paradoxical truth is that in losing his life, he 
does find it. But a profound sense of threat accompanies 
the opportunity for this change to occur. 
Viewed as a dynamic factor in religious maturation, 
pathological rebellion is a decidedly negative concept. It 
precipitates feelings of alienation and guilt in relation 
to God, but, more important, it signifies a crippling ambiv-
alence toward God as Ultimate Authority. To feel dependency, 
hatred, and fear toward the same object at the same time is 
an intolerable situation, which the neurotic resolves through 
repression. That solution undermines the goals of both 
autonomy and theonomy. 
The only positive thing to be said for pathological 
rebellion is that it may represent a psychologically superior 
alternative to both submission and withdrawal in the neurotic 
sense. This possibility stands in need of clinical sub-
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stantiation. Nevertheless, it is implicit in Horney's 
view, and it commends itself for further study. For the 
present, t here is greater wisdom in regarding pathological 
rebellion and dependency as psychological eQuivalents, 
which point with eQual emphasis to the power of unconscious 
determinants and the need for psychic security, to disrupt 
meaningful relationshi ps with Ultimate Authority, to turn 
developmental bridges into barriers, and to postpone in-
definitely the goals of autonomy and theonomy. 
CHAPrER V 
AUTONOMY-ORIENTED REBELLION 
Using t hrea t as the central etiological factor in 
rebellion and making this factor the basis of our analysis 
of rebellion, we cons idered in Chapter IV the tentative cate-
gory of pathological or s ecurity-oriented rebellion. The 
pre s ent chapter is devoted to a sec ond putative category: 
autonomy-oriented rebellion or resistive, defiant behavior 
in the face of perceived threat to one's freedom or produc-
tiveness as a person. 
1. Comparison with Pathological Rebellion 
Whereas pathological rebellion is an outward manifesta-
tion of inner conflict, our second t ype is primarily a ra-
tional response to negative stinmli in the environment . For 
this reason, we are justified in classifying autonomy-oriented 
rebellion as reactive, rather than character-c onditioned, al-
though the artificiality of these di s tinctions and the strong 
likelihood of overlapping boundaries need to be kept in mind . 
Reactiv e rebellion is not withou t its intrapsychic di -
mension, since we may well regard one of its sources as a merg-
ing or fusio n of the capacity to resist and the need for or 
1 trend toward autonomy . However, the trend toward autonomy 
1. This need is recogni zed or hypothesized by many leading 
psychologists, although it may be identi f ied in different 
ways, e.g. "ego-enhancement" (Allport), or i nc luded under 
a more general designation such as "self-actualization" 
(Goldstein , Maslow, and others ). 
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would not lead to rebellion _unless the environment produced 
a clearly perceived threat to this trend so that defiant or 
resistive behavior becomes an appropriate alternative to sub-
mission to or conformity with external authority. To the 
degree that it is based on conscious striving, autonomy-or!-
ented rebellion will cease to exist when the element of vital 
threat is removed. 
In relation to religious maturity, this second type of 
rebellion, directed against God and/or God's human or institu-
tional representatives, indicates a temporary or prolonged 
refusal or inability to relate oneself harmoniously or co-
opera.tively with the religious demand for surrender, as pos-
tulated by Rumke. On the surface, the manifestations of such 
rebellion may bear remarkable similarity to the pathological 
variety. While comparisons between the two types will be 
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evident throughout this chapter, several tentative distinctions 
may be offered at the outset. 
First, pathological rebellion against God is largely 
past-oriented, while the second type, as a concomitant of 
2 psychological striving, has a future reference. Secondly, 
autonomy-oriented rebellion grows out of the legitimate 
strivings of the real self, as distinct from the unrealistic, 
often irrational claims of the neurotic self as described by 
2. See Gordon Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a 
PsYchology of Eersonality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1955), p. 51. 
Karen Horney. This observation implies a third distinction 
which is that of unconscious versus conscious motivation. 
The greater role of repression in pathological responses to 
authority is usually evidenced by a proportionate decrease 
in the critical differentiation of authority types, the ob-
jective evaluation of authority relationships, and the ap-
propriateness of one's responses to authority. 
Finally, we may note that while pathology is closely 
linked with the anxiety of intrapsychic conflict, autonomy 
is more subject to guilt as a product both of interpersonal 
conflict ("power to" versus "power over") and a perceived 
dichotomy between what one is and what one ought to be. 
Gordon Allport refers, in this connection, to "a sense of 
violated value, a disgust at falling short of the ideal self-
image. "3 Although this dichotomy may be traced to short-
comings within one's own personality or character structure, 
rebellion against God in terms of the religious demand for 
surrender, conveys that the central threat has been attributed 
to the divine rather than oneself. 
Two psychologists, in particular, have been protagonists 
in the cause of autonomy-oriented rebellion. Erich Fromm has 
championed an implicit rebellion against ultimate authority 
by his emphasis on a "humanistic ethic," 1n which autonomy 
supercedes both heteronomy and theonomy as the ideal solution 
3 • Ibid. , P. 73 • 
17.5 
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to the problem of authority . Theistic r el i gion is opposed 
as an authoritarian force , offering man security in exchange 
for his freedom and h is potency . 4 
A second psychologist , Robert Lindner , espouses a more 
explicit form of rebe l lion, but his views also are designed 
to be both rational and constructive in their opposition to 
religion as a "conformity cult." Lindner goes far bey ond 
Fromm in making rebellion the central theme of h i s therapeutic 
program, designed to counteract t he intensely n e gative in-
fluences of soci~l and religious institutions upon individual 
personali ty. 5 Both Fromm a n d Lindner recognize the i mportant 
role of surrender in religious behavi or but they would dis -
agree radically with our use of this response as a criterion 
of maturity. Instead, these men would vi ew su ch su rren der as 
a neurotic or i mmature denial of one's cre a tive pO'Ner s . 
2. Principal Factors in Autonomy-Oriented Rebellion 
Recognizing tha t Fromm and Lindner are only two repre-
sentatives of a psychological s cho ol that elevate s autonomy 
over homonomy and theonomy as the measure of maturity , we 
turn now to consider some of the prin ci pal factors in the 
percept ion of reli gious surrender a s a threat to autonomy . 
It is believed that most of the precepts of Fromm and Lindner 
4. Fromm's equation of religious surrender with authoritarian 
submission is clearly stated in three of his ma j or works , 
Man for Hims elf, Escape From Freedom , and Psychoanalysis 
and Religion. 
5. Lindner's basic t he ory of rebelli on is in the book , 
Prescription for Rebellion ( New York : Rinehart and Company, 
1 952 ). 
can be treated in a listing that begins with several observa-
tions drawn from H. c. Rumke's The Psychology of Unbelief. 6 
i . The Need to Resist 
Rumke postulates seven stages of religious experience, 
in which the third stage is experienced as a beginning, per-
sonal relationship between the ego and the primary cause. 
This relationship crystallizes the individual's feeling of 
"meaningful dependency,"7 and this dependency in turn brings 
conscious recognition of a demand for obedience. The subject 
further discerns that the penalty for disobedience is a loss 
of the feeling with which his religious pilgrimage began: 
"feeling oneself meaningfully linked up with the whole of 
8 
being." 
Despite the recognized penalty, the individual finds 
within himself an "unexplainable opposition 11 which becomes 
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effective rebellion as "the primary cause takes shape in the 
mi:od." This opposition is a universal characteristic, believes 
Rumke, and it represents "one of the strongest roots of un-
be1ief."9 
6. See Chapter IV, pages 166-168 for a summary of pathological 
factors which Rumke makes relevant to religious rebellion. 
7. H. c. Rumke, The Psychology of Unbelief (London: Rockliff 
Publishing Corp., Ltd., 1952), p. 15. 
8. Ibid., p. 1. 
9 . Ibid. , P. 15. 
178. 
Although Allport contends .that negative, rejecting 
attitudes and responses toward authority are, technically, 
11 a secondary condition of mental life,n10 H. A. Murray posits 
a need for autonomy that has the goal of shaking off restraint, 
resisting activities prescribed by domineering authorities, 
11 
and freedom to act according to impulse. 
Apparently, Rumke does have in mind a deep-seated, 
non-neurotic characteristic which responds negatively to all 
forms of external control, whether religious or otherwise. 
If so, Murray's 11 need for autonomy 11 provides a theoretical 
basis, although one could wish that his concept were differ-
ently named, since freedom to act according to impulse is 
not the same as self-government which is closer to the real 
meaning of autonomy. For this reason, we prefer to think 
of a generalized need to resist all forms of control and 
restraint which may or may not contribute to the trend toward 
autonomy. This need becomes modified as one matures emo-
tionally and socially, but it retains sufficient force to 
impair religious development, especially when the religious 
claims are seen to be broad and permanent in character. The 
need to resist may function further in alliance with other 
10. Gordon Allport, The Individual and His Religion (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 100. 
11. H. A. Murray, "Variables in Personality, 11 Ex1lorations 
in Personality (New York: Oxford Press, 1938 , pp. 159-161. 
needs such as the need for .self-actualization, as posited 
12 by Maslow. 
i i . Pride 
By pride, we refer to a second non-neurotic factor 
which may have serious, negative consequences in relation 
to religious maturity and the capacity to surrender oneself 
to the claims of Ultimate Authority. Pride is, functionally 
speaking, a "restraint resulting from excessive obligations 
to oneself. n13 
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14 Rumke prefers to use the term "excessive individualism" 
when referring to this barrier to religious maturation. Never-
theless, he notes the close relationship between excessive 
individualism and narcissism, and he traces the former to a 
prolongation of "the period of individual becoming."15 Among 
the more important characteristics, Rumke finds an avoidance 
of all ties that impose limitations on one's freedom to find 
his own way. Also, there is strong reluctance to recognize 
guilt or responsibility towards anything outside of oneself. 
On the positive side, there is often a heroic element in such 
individualism, but the heroism is in effect a violent antag-
onism to the sacrifice which religious surrender requires. 
12. A.H. Maslow, Motivation and PersonalitY (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1954), p. 91. 
13. Rumke, 2£· cit., p. 44. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
Psychoanalytically, excessive individualism or pride 
may be interpreted as a libidinal distribution in which the 
cathecting of the self leads to an overestimation of the self 
16 
and an undue independence of the object world. The normal 
process of investing psychic energies in the body, the ego, 
or the superego so as to establish self-regard, self-esteem 
and a sense of well-being, is overextended with the result 
that the person is unable or unwilling to surrender his in-
dividuality, i.e. to rearrange his libidinal investments. 
Theologically, pride or 11 hubris'' usually refers to a 
deep-seated urge in man to escape from God's claims or to be 
equal with God. Pride involves a renunciation of the recog-
nized demand for submission to Ultimate Authority, and, in 
part, it betrays man's unwillingness to acknowledge his de-
pendency and his finiteness--his creaturehood. 
In our previous discussion of neurosis, we have referred 
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to Horney's analysis of neurotic pride as the investment of 
one's psychic energies in an "idealized image" which victimizes 
the "actual self" and drains the creative energies of the "real 
self." Horney contends that the pride system is irrational 
both in the demands it makes on the personality and on the 
surrounding environment. 
16. This interpretation is based on Anna. Freud's draft of a 
diagnostic profile in her "Assessment of Childhood Dis-
turbances," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. {New 
York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1962), 
XVII, 151-154. 
Something of this irrationa~ity is present in hubris, 
because it carries the deception that the creature can assume 
the role and authority of the Creator without bringing him-
self down to destruction. Man's allegiance to an unrealistic 
self-image that feeds on anxiety and paralyzes one's fullest 
potential as a person brings us to the misty borders that 
separate sickness from sin. However the demarcation line is 
drawn, it is important to note that the primary responsibility 
for his salvation or restoration rests upon the individual 
himself. Both psychology and theology require that the person 
who is victimized by pride, die to his old self (renounce his 
investment in the pride system) in order to be born as a new 
self (the real self which has been repressed and thwarted 
until now). 
It is clear that in the concept of pride-oriented rebel-
lion we cannot accurately speak of reactive or character-con-
ditioned rebellion. For pride says as much about inner char-
acter as it does about the nature of religious obligation. 
Our reason for including ·pride under reactive rebellion 
is that, in league with conscious values and courage, it may 
assume a posture that is distinct from the neurotic types 
referred to earlier. By many standards, this form of pride 
or individualism represents the best solution to the problem 
of authority. It is only as we view maturity from the stand-
point of theonomy that its basic egocentrism becomes apparent. 
Before the recognized demand for religious surrender, the 
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extreme individualist is threatened by potential violations 
of self-interest and personal whim. He has not developed 
values or attachments that transcend his own i 'mmediate wel-
fare. In this sense, his autonomy has made him a prisoner. 
It has given him a large measure of freedom and responsibi-
lity, but it has also disrupted the development of those 
broader and deeper relationships which are the essence of 
mature religious experience. 
ii£ . Fear of Passivity 
At the emotional level, the fear of passivity may be 
related to fears of effeminancy, sexual outrage, and death. 
However, as in the two previous categories, this fear may 
have non-neurotic components. In relation to autonomy, there 
may be the fear that surrender to the will of God violates 
the role which a society places upon its male members. Be-
yon~ this, Rumke notes how deeply this fear may strike into 
the heart when submission to an omnipotent God is called for: 
Thus, fear of passivity is already an obstacle to just 
offering oneself. How very much greater this anxiety 
must become when it is not only a matter of offering 
oneself but when it means to accept the leadership of 
the greatest 20wer, to relinquish one's own will to be 
dictated to!ll 
This fear cannot be isolated from attitudes toward de-
pendency and one's images of authority which we shall discuss 
next. However, here it is interesting to note that this fear 
17. Rumke, ££· cit., p. 46. 
18 
seems to be more predominant among men than among women 
although for both sexes it may be a serious deterrent to re-
ligious growth. To what extent these resistances grow from 
negative stereotypes of religious men and erroneous portrayals 
of meekness, forgiveness, and love in sentimental garb,19 we 
can only conjecture. The irony is that in reality, religious 
surrender and passivity are far from being identical. As 
Klages notes: "In surrender something of the ego is released, 
20 
tension is eased, psychic power is liberated." 
iv. The Struggle for Identity 
Although autonomy-oriented rebellion may characterize 
a lifetime of struggle, there is a sense in which it finds a 
unique focus in the crises and opportunities for growth that 
come in adolescence. Two factors make this so. First, ado-
lescence marks the beginning of the growing person's capacity 
for the primary, religious experiences which lead to a per-
21 
sonal recognition of the demand for religious surrender. 
Secondly, the struggle for autonomy which begins in the second 
year of life with "standing on one • s ot-m feet, 11 does become 
18. Rumke, ££• cit., p. 46. 
19. Here the writer has in mind as an example the passive 
effeminancy which has crept into many classical and con-
temporary portraits of Christ. 
20. Quoted by Rumke, QE· cit., pp. 48-49. 
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21. This statement is not meant to contradict our earlier em-
phasis that childhood provides crucial embryonic exper-
iences that affect later religious attitudes and relation-
ships. On the contrary, the above statement presupposes a 
childhood which sets the stage for the~e primary experiences. 
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a crucial task which the adolescent must accept in order to 
enter the world of adult responsibility and fre e dom. The 
process of testing limits, and developing skills and con-
trols, extends into adolescence where a heightened depend-
ence-independence conflict is inevitable. What precipitates 
the conflict is a simultaneous emergence of the need for de-
votion and the need for repudiation. Both needs are part of 
what Erikson calls 11 identity conflict 11 or 11 identity diffu-
sion.1122 
Adolescence is a period when the struggle to be inde-
pendent of parental authority is strangely concomitant with 
a search for a cause or purpose beyond oneself, worthy of 
youth's growing capacity for loyalty and commitment. It is 
a time of searching for freedom undergirded by discipline, 
for adventure permeated by tradition. 
In the process of breaking free of parental restrictions, 
the adolescent may feel constrained to overthrow, at least 
temporarily, the parents' religious, ethical, and moral values. 
If he does so, however, he must quickly find another authority 
and other values to fill the void. Confusion of identities 
and ideologies may create shifting devotions, bu t a healthy 
resolution of this confusion and conflict is evident in a new 
sense of who one is and a new system of values which one has 
proven, at least partially, in the crucibles of doubt, critical 
22. Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: W. w. Norton 
and Co., Inc., 1958), p. 42. 
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examination, and personal exper~ence. 
Ambivalence toward the authorities of childhood results 
from a new attitude toward one's dependency on authority 
figures. The dependent relationships which form erly foster-
ed growth and learning no\'J loom as a roadblock to personality 
development. Particularly where parents fail to match grow-
ing freedom and responsibility with the child's growing skills, 
the threat of one's dependency and one's inability to repudiate 
infantile attachments may be extremely painful. 
Ideally, this conflict finds its resolution in a trans-
ference of one's dependency to a new cause, goal, or authority, 
chosen with a measure of independence by the young person on 
the basis of personal values, however nebulous and transient 
they may be. Here an independence of choice mingles with a 
continuing dependency on a higher power, to satisfy both as-
pects of the adolescent's dilemma. 
Amid the constant risk of false choices, doubt arises 
as one of youth's instruments of testing authority. What the 
adolescent seeks is evidence that with his new source of au-
thority he can enjoy 11 a living process which inspires loyalty 
as it receives it, maintains allegiance as it attracts it, 
honors confidence as it demands it. 112J 
In this connection, it is important to be clear in our 
distinction between rebellion and doubt--between rebellion 
23. Erik H. 
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and the testing of the limits of one's own authority and the 
authority of others. To the extent that the adolescent re-
sists or defies in order to be free, temporarily or permanently, 
partially or totally--to this extent is his behavior rebellious. 
Critical examination of old relationships and previously ac-
cepted codes may lead to rebellion, but the two activities are 
not identical. 
As we observed earlier, 24 adolescence is a time for dis-
cerning the limitations of the self, of preliminary authority, 
and of one's earlier concepts of Ultimate Authority. In his 
anxiety to repudiate, the young person may confuse rebellion 
with the freedom he seeks and thus fail to establish a value 
system to satisfy his need for devotion. Persons who associate 
the perceived demand for religious surrender with an outmoded 
or inadequate concept of the God who makes this demand, may 
feel threatened and rebel, but their rebellion may become an 
end in itself. It may serve the useful purpose of shattering 
a now non-productive relationship, bu t it may fail to issue 
in a new and deeper relationship. "Their sense of inner moral 
strength comes only from knowing what moral conventions they 
do not live up to; they get an oblique sense of conviction by 
proclaiming their atheism and disbelief." 25 
What happens in such cases is that one becomes devoted 
24. Pages 62-63. 
25. Rollo May, Man's Search for Himself (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Co., Inc., 1953), p. 155. 
to defiance, which emerges as a value in itself. As in the 
case of extreme individualism, the adolescent's rejection of 
God demonstrates an inability to come to terms with any form 
of authority, either within or beyond himself. Carried to 
sociopathic dimensions, this extremity confronts us with the 
rebel without a cause, or perhaps more accurately, the rebel 
whose only apparent cause is freedom without responsibility. 
Religion is a threat in the sense that it denies license and 
imposes responsibility. 
The identity crisis may foster other forms of religious 
rebellion which are less intense, more transitory in nature, 
and less disruptive of the maturation process. Describing 
the adolescent's "search for something and somebody to be 
true to," Erikson writes: 
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Youth, always set to grasp both diversity in principle 
and principle in diversity, must often test eY-tremes be-
fore settling on a considered course. These extremes, 
particularly in times of ideological confusion and wide-
spread marginality of identity, may include not only re-
bellious bu~6also deviant, delinquent, and self-destructive tendencies. 
In these struggles, the final response to the religious 
demand for surrender cannot be understood apart from the in-
dividual's image of God, the strength of alternate causes 
that claim his attention and devotion, and his capacity to 
endure anxiety without repressing either his need for devo-
tion or his need to repudiate authority. 
26. Erikson, 2£.· cit., "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity," p. 7. 
Considering these variables, at least three outcomes 
seem possible, in addition to the sustained rebellion without 
cause, referred to above: 
l) An escape from anxiety through a renunciation of 
one's freedom and an uncritical allegiance to God or some 
surrogate authority in whom great power is invested. 
2) A repudiation of God and a concomitant alignment 
with some other form of homonomy such as devotion to the 
state or nation, or a humanistic dedication to the service 
of one's fellow men. 
J) A positive response to the religious demand for 
surrender, with a concomitant repudiation of some other 
cause or authority which is deemed to be less worthy of 
one's devotion. 
Since these attempts to resolve the identity crisis 
have important implications for religious growth, they need 
to be considered individually in some detail. 
{l)Authoritarian submission to God 
Great quantities of psycholog ical literature have been 
devoted to the problem of authoritarian submission in the 
last two decades. Without exception, these studies have 
shown this response to be a serious barrier to autonomy and 
the creative development of one's productivity as a mature 
person. Since many of the basic ingredients of authoritarian 
submission were included in Chapter IV under 11 Rebellion as 
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-27 Morbid Dependency," we shall only summarize here those 
qualities which particularly relate to adolescence and the 
struggle for identity. One function of this summary is to 
show how the next two categories offer marked contrasts to 
this response. 
A salient characteristic of authoritarian patterns in 
adolescence, as in later years, is the suspension of the 
critical faculty in relating to authority. Applied to re-
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ligion, authoritarian submission is uncritical obedience to 
God, growing out of a psychic compensation for one's repressed 
hostility or rebellion. Fromm and Horney find this reaction 
formation to lie at the heart of neurosis, and their view is 
supported by the studies of Adorno and his collaborators in 
28 
The Authoritarian Personality. They report: 
An attitude of complete submissiveness toward "super-
natural forces" and a readiness to accept the essential 
incomprehensibility of "many important things" strongly 
suggest the persistence in the individual of infantile 
attitudes toward the parents, that is to sa~~ of au-
thoritarian submission in a very pure form. 7 
Following its emphasis on the positive correlation be-
tween ethnocentrism and exaggerated, uncritical allegiance, 
the Adorno study concludes that the healthy alternative to 
authoritarian submission is not necessarily rebellion. It 
is a response of acceptance or rejection, based on "objective 
27. Pages 136-14). 
28. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950. 
29. Ibid., p. 220. 
appraisal," and leading to a s~ate of "principled inde pend-
ence." The cardinal factor is the role of the critical fac-
ulty in governing the ultimate response to authority. "The 
fact of acceptance or rejection of religion is not as impor-
JO 
tant as the way in which it is accepted or rejected." 
The adolescent who seeks to resolve his identity crisis 
via authoritarian submission to God, fails because repression 
is always a spurious solution to conflict. In partially . 
190: 
satisfying his need for devotion, he denies his equally power-
ful need to repudiate and his powers of critical evaluation 
and discernment. In a word, he substitutes the irrational 
for the rational and aligns himself with "power over" in a 
way that defeats his potential "power to" as an autonomous 
person. 
'2) Critical rejection of God 
A second possible solution to the identity crisis is 
to reject the religious demand for surrender on rational 
grounds and to substitute another cause or authority as be-
ing more worthy of devotion. While this response may take 
many forms, it is usually cued by a sense of threat, closely 
associated with the perceived effects of religious surrender 
on one's autonomy. 
As we move from the emotional plane to consider possible 
rational bases of rebellion, we inevitably encounter the 
3 0 • Ib 1 d . , p . 218 • 
phenomenon of doubt. The susceptibility of religion to 
varying styles of doubting and disbelief is duly noted by 
Allport: 
191 
Religion, aiming to deal with the most inclusive of re-
lationships--aiming to bind fact, value, and ultimate 
reality--is the most controversial, the most doubt-ridden, 
the most elusive of all the fields of mental activity.31 
Doubt may represent a conflict between fact, value, 
and ultimate reality as they converge in the individual, but 
doubt does not lead to rebellion unless the catalyst of threat 
is present. We may assume that doubt will be undefiant until 
it encounters the religious demand for surrender either as a 
primary religious experience 32 or as a convention mediated by 
some religious representative or agency. 
When doubt encounters religious demand, it may rebel 
out of a sense of intellectual integrity, closely associated 
with an autonomous self-image. In one analysis, Allport 
lists "scientific doubting," growing out of professional habits 
of scientific thought, and "referen tial doubting ," "the re-
curring conflict between acceptable standards of evidence and 
this or that specific content of religious teaching ." 33 
31. Allport, ££• cit., The Individual and His Relig ion, p. 102. 
32. Walter H. Clark in ~he Psychology of Religion (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1958), distinguishes three levels 
of religious experien ce: primary, s e condary, and tertiary. 
He defines primary experience as "an authen tic inner ex-
perience of the divine combined with whatever e f forts the 
individual may make to harmonize his life with the divine." 
p. 23. 
33. Allport, ££• cit., The Individual and His Religion, p. 117. 
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Other sources of doubt include what Allport calls the 
"genetic fallacy," the shortcomings of organized religion, 
and the theory of relativism that God is a projection of 
one's wishes, one's inventive faculty. 34 Along with this 
last theory, one may not only question the genesis of re-
ligious belief and behavior but may also feel subconsciously 
the threat of being duped by inflated values, misguided pas-
sions, distorted perceptions, or false interpretations of 
experience. Religious surrender always involves risk, and 
for the autonomous person who requires that transcending 
values and ultimate reality be fully substantiated by fact, 
this element of risk may be intolerable. 
Psychology presents striking evidence of rational re-
bellion against the claims of theonomy upon persons, in the 
writings of the two men alluded to earlier. Both Fromm and 
Lindner reject theistic religion in the name of a humanistic 
ethic which lays great stress on individual autonomy or free-
dom. In highly articulate fashion, these writers represent 
the cause of rational rebellion against the threats of au-
thoritarianism, which includes the religious demand for sur-
render. It is not possible to review this point of view 
adequately here, but an evaluative summary of major strengths 
and weaknesses will serve to relate this type of rebellion to 
the basic purposes of the dissertation. 
34. Ibid., p. 105-110. 
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First, autonomy-oriented rebellion that is rational 
in its motivation usually demonstrates a legitimate concern 
for individual freedom in the face of authoritarian threats, 
whether these emanate in religion or elsewhere. Both Fromm 
and Lindner have done religion a service by laying bare au-
thoritarian modes and tendencies in doctrine and in practice, 
and showing how negative heteronomy may suppress autonomy . 
Fromm has followed Freud in emphasizing how unconsciously 
the authoritarian conscience may endow God with its ovm ha-
tred and thus work to convince man of his depravity and 
helplessness. 35 However, by suggesting that neurosis is a 
private form of religion, Fromm makes an important inversion 
of Freud's earlier generalization. 
To the extent that psychology encourages rebellion 
against authoritarianism in the name of autonomy, it serves 
a second positive function. For rebellion may be a construe-
tive alternative to that form of religious conformity which 
stifles love, freedom, justice, and the dignity of human 
personality. At this point, Lindner is quite right in mak-
ing "positive rebellion" a dynamic factor in the efforts of 
persons to exert a creative influence upon their environment. 36 
In its orientation to man's independence and freedom, such 
35. Erich Frornn, Escape From Freedom (New York: Rinehart and 
Company, 1941), p. 89. 
36. Lindner speaks of "the i nunutable rebellious, protestant, 
life-affirming nature of man." Prescription for Rebellion, 
QE• cit., p. 145 . 
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rebellion helps to reactivate the prophetic religion which 
achieved its fullest expression in Jesus of Nazareth. 
Thirdly, rational rebel l ion, both in adolescence and 
adulthood, insists that the values to which one gives h im-
self, grow out of personal experience and not be the result 
of imposition by an external auth ority. This emphasis on 
the primacy of one's own experience as a basis for commit-
ment finds no debate in the concept of theonomy. The rein, 
the autonomy of the soul before God is given similar stress. 
Autonomy in this sense me ans the capacity or openness to 
experience God personally as well as the freedom to respond 
to his claims , either positively or negatively. 
It seems enigmatic that Freud , J!'romm, and Lindner have 
not acknowledged the possibility that Ultimate Authori ty as 
"power over" can enter human experience as some thing other 
than an autocratic external voice or its internalized echo, 
the authoritarian conscience. This oversight seems to suggest 
that one's freedom to have and interpret ever broadening ex-
periences is autonomous only so long as no theistic signifi-
cance is a t tached to these experiences. If such significance 
is appended and a free response made to the experienced 
"other" in the new relationship, thes e men apparently have 
no designation other than "authoritarian" to apply to this 
response. 
A more open attitude to the totality of human experience 
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i s evident in Carl Rogers ' description of what it means to 
be c ome an autonomous person . According to his view, personal 
experience is authoritative , but this experience moves we ll 
beyond the authori ty of the i ntellect . It involves wha t Roge rs 
calls a "total orga n ismi c sensing of a situa tion ," and this 
capac ity becomes increa singly trustworthy as the person is freed 
from anxiety . 37 
The Rogerian position clarifies the c ont ext in whi ch 
adolescent rebellion a gainst God may occur . The transit ion 
fr om the parent al standards ac cep table i n childhood to the 
firsthand personalized attitudes of adulthood may requ ire 
rebellion . If so , t h e rebel l i on i s l ikely to be a way of 
s a ying , "I will n ot yi eld to that which I have not experienced 
for myself ." This insistence, mixed with an a ttitude of 
Rogerian openness , epitomizes that form of autonomy- oriente d 
rebellion whi ch appear s to mak e the grea test contribution to 
the reli g i ous maturation process. 
The contribut i ons of autonomy- oriented psych ol ogy also 
i ntroduce a number of as s umptions whi ch survive criti cal 
scrutiny with l ess success . First , possibly for t h e sake of 
emphasis , the image of authority in genera l is painted wi th 
the darkest colors . As we observed in Chapt e r II, this view-
point posi t s a false dichotomy between " powe r to " and " p owe r 
over ." One consequenc e is that the concept of God , in order 
37 . Carl Rogers , On Becoming a Pe r son ( Boston : Hough ton 
Mifflin Company , 1 961), pp . 22 - 23 . 
to be at all palatable , h a s to be made " a symbol of ma n ' s 
ovm nowers" and "not a symbol of force a n d domi nation, 
having power over ma n .•• 38 Neither of t hese alterna tive s 
captures the theonomous relations hi p between God and man . 
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A sec on d consequence i s that all t ype s of reli g i ous surrender 
and conformity are i ·,tplied to be authorita r i a n , s i n c e no ex-
ception is allowed for thos e res p ons e s which are made fr e ely, 
based on pers onal expe rience and eva l uati on . Surren der or 
conformity is n ot intrinsical l y bad anymore t han i ndependenc e 
i s intrinsically g ood. If Ji'romm is aware of t h is, it is 
unfortunate that t he r e cogn ition is n ot more in evidence in 
what he has written. 
Again , in sugge s ting autonomy a s the fi nal s olution to 
t h e problem of authority , autonomy - oriented psycho l ogy , as 
repre s ented by Frooon ,39 appears to advocate escap e from 
g enuine authority . I n its oppositi on t o irra tional influ-
ences thi s school fails to show how even the produ ctive and 
spontaneous pers on must come to terms with aut h ority. It 
apparently miss es t h e i mportant truth that irrational auth ority 
prevails on ly where r a tional authority has been put t o fli ght. 40 
38 . Erich Fromm, Ps yc h oanalysis and Reli g i on ( New Haven : 
Yale University Press , 1950), p. 37. 
39. In Fromm especially , one can a lmost sen se a f ear and 
hatred of authority and a corresp onding de partu r e from 
purely rati onal, "reactive" grounds in pr e sen ting his case. 
40. Cf. John H. Schaar , Esc ape From Auth ority ( New Yor k : Basic 
Books, Inc., 1 9 61 ), p . 288 . 
A final critici s m of autonomy- oriented p sychology i s 
that in mak ing autonomy ultimate, it negates a higher g oal 
in man's development : theonomy. Its c ommendable opposition 
to authoritarianism apparently blinds it to the su bstantial 
evidence that man i s mos t produc tive and spontaneous when he 
is committed to values or a caus e that transcends hims elf 
and his own society. The error is n o t in man' s surrender 
per se but in hi s submission to ends that a re unworthy of 
him . If auton omy-oriented psychology and autonomy-orien ted 
rebellion could mak e this rati onal di s tinct ion c on s i s tently , 
the contributi on of both to religious maturation wou ld be 
immeasurably i n creased. 
(3) Autonomy a n d creat i v e ambivalence: Martin Luther 
A third soluti on t o the identity c risis is expressed 
197 
in what might be c a lled creat ive ambivalenc e . One mani fe sta -
tion of this solution is a r eli giou s c ommitme n t to Ultimate 
Authority , whi c h enables the i n dividual t o reb e l creatively 
a gains t a le s ser a u thority and in the pr oce s s to f ashion a 
mean ingful sense of who he is a n d whe re he i s g oing . 
For illus trative purposes, we can do no better than to 
refer to the adole s cence of Martin Luther , about whose life 
volumes have been written from numerous pers pectiv e s . By 
what means wa s the s on of a German peasant able to a lter 
the cours e of religi ous his tory? ¥mat enabled t h i s c oarse 
and rugged man to defy the Pope and hi s supreme councils at 
the risk of his own life, i gniting t h ereby t h e fire s of 
reformation and enlightenment that were to engulf a whole 
continent? 
Psychoanalytically, a great deal of interest has cen-
tered in Luther's childhood and youth because the secrets 
of the man are believed to be most discernible here. One 
important observation is that Luther's life was characterized 
by 
• • • a constant ambivalence toward authority; he hated 
it and rebelled against it, while at the same time he 
admired it and tended to submit to it. During his whole 
life there was always one authority against which he was 
opposed and another which he admired--his father and his 
superiors in the mona~iery in his youth; the Pope and 
the princes later on. 
Relating this ambivalence to the identity crisis in 
Luther's life, Erik Erikson describes Luther's entering the 
monastery at twenty-one as part of a "moratorium 11 which all 
young persons need in order to fix their intense, rapidly 
42 
changing devotions to some meaningful, future identity. 
During this period of "marking time," Luther suffered from 
severe doubts and scruples which may have been responsible 
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for a reported fit or seizure in the monastery choir. Luther's 
outcry of "Ich bin's nicht" during the fit, is translated by 
Erikson as "I am not! 11 and seen as evidence that Luther had 
reached the height of his identity crisis. "The crisis in 
41. Fromm, QE· cit., Escape From Freedom, p. 66. 
42. Erikson, QE· cit., Young Man Luther, p. 4J. 
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such a young man's life may.be reached exactly when he half-
43 
realizes that he is fatally overcommitted to what he is not." 
Luther's gradual emergence as a genuine homo religiosus 
required a highly creative handling of his marked ambivalence 
toward authority. His conflict lay between obedience to the 
wishes of an authoritarian, brutal father and obedience to 
a heavenly Father whose felt claim on Luther's life found 
dramatic expression in a thunderstorm. Rebellion against his 
father, Hans, involved Martin in the same guilt that engulfs 
nearly all sons and daughters, even when their need to be 
free is most urgent and their right most clear. 'rhe ties 
which bound son to father were rather anomalous even for 
Luther·' s era, for in Hans, Martin had 11 a father to whom he 
44 
could not get close and from whom he could not get away. 11 
Through his conversion by thunder and his sudden vow 
to enter the monastery, Luther, according to Erikson, found 
a way to rebel against Hans without emasculating or being 
emasculated, and without suffering the full weight of guilt 
which such an act would normally bring down upon so sensitive 
a spirit. To turn from the profession of law in which he had 
been governed by obedience to his father and enter the mora-
torium promised by priesthood, Luther unconsciously required 
a clear calling from God. This he found in the thunderstorm. 
4J. Ibid. 
44. Ibid., p. 67. 
There remains one motive ~hich God and Martin shared 
at this time: the need for God to match Hans, within 
Martin, so that Martin would be able to disobey Hans 
and shift the whole matter of obedience and disav~l:;al 
to a higher, and historically significant, plane. ) 
The struggle does not end with Luther's conversion, but 
within religion he did find the eventual solution to his con-
flict: a center of devotion--God--and an object of repudia-
tion--the Pope. His period of moratorium gave him time to 
discover who his enemy was and how to hate him effectively. 
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The high degree of rebelliousness in Luther's righteous-
ness leaves him open to a number of non-complimentary diag-
noses. Erich Fromm contends that, with Calvin, Luther "be-
longed to the ranks of the greatest haters among the leading 
46 figures of history, certainly among religious leaders." 
Erikson believes that Luther's excessive use of repudiative 
and anal patterns provided a safety device for alleviating 
inner pressures that would have led to supreme rebellion 
against God and a malignant melancholy. Because of his 
manic-depressive nature, reasons Erikson, Luther's character 
required not only obscenity but 11 a state of unrelenting 
paranoid repudiation of an appointed enemy on the outside 
in order to avoid victimizing and, as it were, eliminating 
itself. u 47 
45. Ibid., p. 94. 
46. Fromm, 2£· cit., Escape From Freedom, p. 95· 
47. Erikson, QE· cit., Young Man Luther, p. 246. 
Although these diagnoses (and we will debate here 
neither their psychological validity nor their full reli-
gious significance) may seem mechanistic and reductive in 
their allegiance to Freudian interpretation, they demonstrate 
Luther's role as a prototype of what we choose to call crea-
tive ambivalence. Even if many of his patterns are adjudged 
to be neurotic, they demonstrate in exaggerated form the 
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strong ambivalence toward authority which appears to be uni-
versal in human experience and highly focalized in adolescence. 
Whether we label Luther's rebellion as "character-con-
ditioned" or "reactive, 11 he demonstrates that the presence, 
source, or magnitude of one's rebellion may not be as signi-
ficant as how the rebellion is handled in relation to one's 
needs and the realities of one's environment. If Luther's 
rebellion was pathological, it was also creative in that his 
handling of it represents a decisive step toward the human 
awareness and responsibility of autonomy. If his use of re-
ligion seems manipulative or opportunistic, it is also true 
that he never lost the sincerity or the intensity of his early 
dedication. Luther's crisis and his subsequent greatness 
reveal that true autonomy may both precede, participate in, 
and result from a significant act of religious surrender. 
Luther also shows the constructive role the church may 
play in providing acceptable outlets for rebellion, thereby 
stimulating rather than suppressing the forces of creativity 
which so often intermingle with deep conflict. Whereas 
rebellion against God may satisfy. the demands of autonomy 
and the identity crisis, it often fails to cope with the 
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existential crises which we shall consider in the next chapter. 
Ey offering a center for supreme devotion and varied avenues 
for rational repudiation and rebellion, the church offers all 
adolescents what it offered Luther--opportunity to deal crea-
tively with ambivalence and to establish relationships which 
satisfy both the trend toward autonomy and the trend toward 
homonomy. 
This function, largely overlooked by Freud, Fromm, and 
Lindner, invites further thought and investigation. One 
writer has suggested several categories to~hich might serve as 
the basis of such study. Thomas w. Klink48 points to the 
wide latitude within religious belief and practice as evi-
dence that unquestioning conformity is not the highest virtue, 
and deviation or rebellion not the greatest vice. Four in-
dications of religious latitude and flexibility are mentioned: 
1) The contingency and flexibility of most religious 
teachings. 
2) The possible qualification and manipulation of re-
ligious demands and prohibitions, to the point of their be-
ing set aside entirely for specified periods, e.g. Mardi 
Gras, Twelfth Night. 
48. "Some Categories of Religious Data Significant for the 
Clinician," The Journal of Pastoral Care, (Summer, 1962), 
pp. 72-80. 
3) The pre s e n ce within reli gious t e achings of " wide 
a n d n ot readily reconcilable alternatives," 49 and t h e op-
portunity for s electivity in learning . 
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4) Reli gion' s "bu ilt-in d evic es for re s toring t he 
s tatus of the i nd i v i du a l wh o has deviated f rom t h e pr escribe d 
nor ms .'' 50 The s e devices are remedial and ec onomic in the 
sense that they not only restore the deviant but also limit 
expiatory acts. 
Apropos the influence of reli g ion u pon the stru g gle f or 
autonomy, Luther' s cri s is and Klink's analysis g o far in 
shattering the illusion of rampant authoritarianism . Luther 
demonstrates the p otentially creative consequence s of re-
ligiou s surrender, ev e n when pathological a mbivalence is 
involved. Klink shows how limited rebelli on a gains t the 
church, its teachings , and even agains t God hims elf, is 
rarely the caus e of excommunicati on or re jecti on . 
3 . Final Ob s ervati ons 
Th is leads to s everal final ob s ervati ons : reli g i ous 
surrender to God on the basis of pers onal e xperience and 
c onsci ously affirme d values i s cons i s t ent with the trend to-
ward autonomy and the onomy. Potentially , it frees t h e indi-
vidual from the r adi cal conflict of hi s ambivalence toward 
authority by offeri ng him a cen ter of devoti on beyond him-
self, and crea tive opportunities for rebellion a nd repudiation 
both within and beyond the s phere s of institution al rel igi on . 
49. Ibid., p . 75 . 
50. Ibid., p . 75. 
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Autonomy and identity ~re preserved because within the 
concept of surrender and obedience there is wide latitude. 
Saintliness is known by many names. Autonomy finds its highest 
expression not by rebellion against God, but by the character-
istic modes in which the individual makes and fulfills his 
commitment. In Luther, there are the marks of courage, hon-
esty, sincerity, and devotion, common to all great men. But 
in his manner, his language, his humor, his hatreds, and his 
eccentricities, there reside the many colors and qualities 
that are uniquely Luther. 
CHAPTER VI 
EXISTENTIAL REBELLION 
Thus far, we have used etiological reasoning to differ-
entiate two basic types of rebellion. Pathological rebelli on 
is oriented primarily to intrapsychic threat and seeks to 
c ounter this threat with security patterns that tend to b e 
ri g id, emotionally overdetermined, a n d limited in their ef-
fectiveness. Autonomy-oriented rebelli on is a particular 
focus of adolescence and is the consequen ce of environmental, 
or more specifically of int e r pers onal t h r e a ts to one ' s free-
dom or independence a s a g rowing person. 
l. Definition 
A third category is existential rebellion. Th i s t ype 
may be defined a s a disposition built up throu gh negative 
experience, to re spon d unfavorably, and in certain habitual 
ways, to conceptual object s and principles· that the indi-
vidual perceives as posing an ultimate threat to h is exist-
ence, since he regards them a s permanent or central in the 
nature of things. 
Existential rebellion may be thought of as re active, 
because it is triggered by manifest threats a s is the second 
category we have postulated. In separat i n g the two t ype s , 
we make Freud's di s tinction between the frustrati ons i mposed 
by society or its representative au thorities, (interpersonal) 
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and the frustration of "natu.re 11 with its uncontrollable 
catastrophes, d.estructi ve forces, and the process of bodily 
1 decay (impersonal). These represent what Maslow would call 
11 catastrophic conflicts 11 or "pure threat," allowing no alter-
2 
native or possibility of choice. 
Another way to clarify existential rebellion is to 
speak of those causalities which relate to "the human sit-
uation. 11 This situation may be interpreted to mean "the 
peculiarities of human existence common to all men. 113 It 
underlies the pathological grounds of rebellion in the 
Tillichian sense that existential factors are transmuted in-
to pathological factors under special conditions which do not 
4 
apply universally. This assumption is consistent with an 
earlier schema in which we made basic or neurotic anxiety 
the outcome of a progression that began with manifest threat 
5 
and the experience of Urangst. 
What are the common peculiarities of human existence 
which may pose a threat to the individual? Included are 
1. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and. Its Discontents (London: 
The Hogarth Press, Ltd. and The Institute of Psycho-
Analysis, 1939). 
2. cr. page 118. 
3. Erich Fromm, Man for Himself (New York: Rinehart and 
Company, 1947), pp. 38-39· 
4. Cf. Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 65. 
5· Page 112. 
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certain dichotomies resulting from man's unique powers of 
self-awareness, reason, and imagination--contradictions be-
tween life and death, human achievement and human potential, 
order and chaos, justice and evil. All of these constitute 
potential threats either to one's existence per se or to the 
value system by which one chooses to live. 
In order to limit the broad range of possible exist-
ential threats from which rebellion may grow, we shall con-
centrate in this chapter on what Jl'rornm calls "the most fun-
damental existential dichotomy (which) is that between life 
6 
and death." Here we will be interested in the psychological 
effects of death, viewed as an existential threat. Although 
death or the threat of non-being is pure threat and offers 
no possibility of choice in a strictly behavioral sense, 
there is a range of attitudinal responses which may be legiti-
mately related to rebellion. The question here, as in pre-
ceding chapters, is to what extent defiant or resistive at-
titudes toward death or God as the perceived Author of deat~, 
influence or illuminate the process of religious maturation. 
2. Rebellion in the Psychology of Lindner 
That existential rebellion is a highly positive force 
constitutes the central thesis of Robert Lindner's later 
writings. In Must You Conforrn?, 7 he describes rebellion as 
6. Fromm, QE• cit., p. 41. 
7. Robert Lindner, Must You Conform? (New York: Rinehart and 
Company, 1956). 
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. . • the quality, com~on among all men and characteristic 
of the species, to change the environment and circumstances 
comprising the medium of both individual and social life. 
In contrast with other animals, man adapts "alloplastically." 
The changes he effectse that is, are wrought Qr him, rather 
than imposed upon him. 
Thus equated with 11 alloplastic adaptation," rebellion becomes 
for Lindner the vehicle of change, flux, and evolution--the 
9 dimension in man which actually defines him. 
Applying this concept to the human situation, Lindner 
makes rebellion the servant of Freud's Thanatos in opposition 
to the 11 triad of limitations"--human endowment, nature, and 
mortality. Only by dynamic and continuous revolt against his 
own finiteness and humanity can man affirm his basic nature 
10 
which is immutable, rebellious, protestant, and evolutionary. 
Because of its emphasis on submission and its deadly 
conspiracy against the rebellious spirit of man, Lindner 
excoriates formal religion. 
One and all, they have conspired, in the name of the 
Spirit, against the spirit of man; one and all, they 
have sold him into slavery •.•. And while most of 
them were founded upon protest and by rebellion, these 
are the very things they now hold in horror ••.• All 
they have to sell us subverts the nature of man. Con-
fermi ty, humility, acceptance--with these coins we are 
to pay our fare to paradise.ll 
8. Ibid., p. 1)8. 
9. Ibid., p. 1)9. 
10. Ibid.' p. 145. 
11. Ibid., pp. 170-171. 
Lindner appears to be attacking a kind of creeping 
fatalism in the name of scientific endeavor. He calls for 
man to persist in using all of his imaginative and intellec-
tual powers to master his environment and to overcome his 
human limitations. Lindner does not suggest that death can 
be eliminated altogether, but he does imply the scientific 
goal of indefinite postponement. True man, says Lindner, 
never fully accepts the fact that he must die. Nor does he 
indulge in the fantasy that by passive resignation to his 
fate, his will to live will be rewarded through some other-
worldly existence. 
There is constructive force in many of the arguments 
against authoritarian forms of religion, and we have made 
this acknowledgement earlier. Such religion, rather than 
religion .E.§.!'~, seems to be the object of Lindner 1 s attack, 
although he is prone to the same error of overgeneralization 
that we detected in Freud and Fromm. 
Aside from this, there is no necessary antogonism be-
tween the concept of theonomy ·and Lindner's "alloplastic 
adaptation." Despite the historical evidence of institu-
tional religion's opposition to scientific investigation 
and discovery of natural law, it can be argued with validity 
that theistic religion may serve to stimulate man's pursuit 
~09 
of truth and the increasing mastery of his environment. This 
is so because to the religious person, an orderly, law-abiding 
universe requires a source at least as personal and as wise 
as the man who seeks to understand and control his world. 
At its best, scientific or rational rebellion against 
the human situation and death in particular, may reflect the 
creative handling of ambivalence which we observed in Martin 
Luther. In his desperate struggle with Urangst, man may 
openly express his dependency upon God and find an outlet 
for his rebellion against death in constructive ways that 
increasingly limit the destructive forces of external and 
internal nature. For the man who has committed himself 
freely to a theonomous relationship with God, there is no 
conflict in this solution, because he recognizes a basic 
affinity between his striving for life and meaning, and the 
values and purposes of Ultimate Authority. 
If Lindner's concept of 11 positive rebellion" does not 
negate theonomy, neither does it presuppose this culmination 
in the religious maturation process. Rebellion against the 
"triad of limitations 11 may be neurotic to the degree that it 
represents an inability to come to terms with reality and 
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the inevitable anxiety that accompanies the existential dicho-
tomomy between life and death. In such cases, existential 
anxiety may seek transformation into fear, since the latter 
focuses on a definable object or stimulus and thus is more 
manageable than anxiety. The fear of death may represent a 
person's desperate attempt to avoid the threat of non-being, 
and the fear in turn may foster defensive behavior that as-
sumes the outward form of positive rebellion. 
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3. Problems of Limited Research 
The qualified nature of these remarks stems in part 
from a dearth of psychological research into the question 
of how death or the threat of death affects personality in 
terms of attitudes and responses. This poverty exists de-
spite a number of psychoanalytic and psychiatric theories 
that emphasize death. Herman Feifel has deplored the "lack 
of any systematic endeavors to bring this area into the 
d . f t ll d . t. t. 1112 omaln o con ro e lnves lga lon. C. w. Wahl asks if 
the psychiatrist and psychoanalyst's glaring inattention to 
the phenomenon of death anxiety may not serve a defensive 
need of these practitioners. 1 3 
In the limited research that has been conducted, one 
might expect to find some evidence of the ubiquity of re-
bellion against finiteness and mortality , postulated by 
Lindner and by orthodox Christian theology, albeit with 
different evaluations. Such evidence is not to be found. 
On the contrary, the studies fail to show that rebellion is 
a significant variable in the individual's response to death 
as a threat, either immediate or remote, to oneself or other 
valued persons. 
One of Feifel's studies concentrated on attitudes to-
ward death among a sampling of normal and mentally ill pers~ns. 
12. Herman Feifel, "Attitudes Toward Death in Some Normal and 
Mentally Ill Populations," The Me aning of Death (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1959), p. 116. 
13. C. W. Wahl, "The Fear of Death," The Me a n ing of Death, 
ibid., p. 19. 
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The responses from both populations tended to gravitate to 
one of two polar p ositions: a stoic acceptance of de ath or a 
repression of the thought of death versus its ideal glorifi-
cation.14 
There is the strong p~obability that existential rebel-
lion is largely repressed in most persons, and hence not 
readily accessible to many types of research. Feifel finds 
a good deal of "camouflage and unhealthy avoidance" both of 
death's reality and the accompanying emotions which it stirs. 
The denial of death could also mean the denial of related 
rebellious reactions which in and of themselves may be highly 
threatening, especially within the context of many religious 
communities. 
Pending further controlled investigation, one a p proach 
to existential rebellion that suggests itself is a study of 
those limited cases where inhibition and repression appear 
to have minimal influence upon rebellious tendencies. Wherever 
we find overt rebellion against God or a g ainst nature in the 
name of life, order, or j u stice, we may regard these patterns 
as indicative of sentiments and attitudes which all hUL~ans 
experience to varying degrees, and handle in divergent ways. 
4. Albert Camus' Prototype of Rebellion 
Perhaps the most remarkable demonstration of open, exis-
tential rebellion is to be found in the literature of nihilism. 
Derived from the Latin word for "nothing" (nihil), nihilism is 
14. Feifel, op. cit., p. 117. 
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associated with extreme skepticism in philosophy, epistemology, 
political science, and religion. Our interest lies primarily 
in the latter realm and the nihilistic denial of all authority, 
including religious authority. From a psychological perspec-
tive, we may ask to what degree the radical rebellion in ni-
hilism reflects the universal rebellion which both theology 
and psychoanalysis perceive in the repertory of man's attitudes 
toward authority. 
Existential rebellion has yielded a great deal in the 
way of literary biography and autobiography. The writings of 
Count de Sade, Dostoievsky's The Brothers Karamazov, the 
philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, and John Milton's Paradise 
Lost represent only a sampling of the literature of existential 
rebellion. Among contemporary writers, Albert Camus, the 
French essayist-philosopher, has attempted a critical study 
of existential or "metaphysical" rebellion in history.15 Al-
though Camus' goal is to advance a philosophy of politics, 
his analysis of rebellion is freighted with psychological im-
plications, the merits of which are not entirely dependent 
upon his philosophical position. 
Like Lindner, Camus regards rebellion as "one of the 
16 
essential dimensions of man." In pristine form, existential 
rebellion is "the movement by which man protests against his 
15. Albert Camus, The Rebel (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
1956). 
16. Ibid., p. 21. 
condition and against the whole of creation."17 Man rebels 
because he finds himself frustra ted by the universe, con-
fronted with an unjust and incomprehensible condition. The 
major realities which frustrate and confound are evil and 
death. Man discovers t hat he is unjustly sentenced to suf-
fering and death, and. he protests t he contradiction bet\'ieen 
his mortality and his desire to live. Writes Camus, "Man 
is the only creature who refuses to be what he is."18 
Camus acknowledges that rebellion without limits be-
comes pathological and destructive, as in the case of ni-
hilism, but he maintains that these extremes are a perversion 
of a protest which, in the beginning, was dedicated to the 
values of order, justice, and unity. For Camus, existential 
and value-oriented rebellion are synonymous terms. "Not 
every value entails rebellion, but every act of rebellion 
tacitly invokes a value. 1119 Living in a world which seems 
to deny these values, moves man to rebel. Negatively, re-
bellion is recoil from absurdity, sterility, and meaningless-
ness. Positively, it is a plea for order, justice, and 
meaning. 
In Camus' analysis, existential rebellion is not truly 
comprehended by the myth of Adam and Eve where suffering 
17. Ibid., p. 2). 
18. Ibid., p. J. 
19. Ibid., p. 14. 
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foll0\1/ S rebellion. The early ·existential rebels are more 
20 
aptly described as "sons of Cain" rather than sons of Adam. 
Until Dostoievsky and Nietzsche, rebellion is directed 
only against a cruel and capricious divinity--a divinity 
who prefers, without any convincing motive, Abel's sac-
rifice to Cain's and, by so doing, provokes the first 
murder.21 
Here Camus makes a crucial distinction between the re-
bellion of guilt against judgment and tbe rebellion of in-
nocence against injustice. He argues that the "sons of Cain" 
can find no cause within themselves for the irrationality of 
their existence. Therefore, they must rebel against the per-
ceived caprice and cruelty of God. Theirs is the cry of the 
offended conscience, of "outraged innocence." Like Ivan in 
The Brothers Karamazov, they put God on trial and find him 
guilty of offending moral value. Thereafter, they launch 
"the essential undertaking of rebellion, which is that of re-
placing the reign of grace by the reign of justice. 1122 
At this juncture, the contrast between value-oriented 
rebellion and atheism is quite evident. The former is more 
accurately identified with blasphemy than with atheism, and 
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the blasphemy is "reverent"--"ultimately, a participation in 
holiness. 1123 Always, the true rebel defies more than he denies. 
20. Ibid., pp. 26-35. 
21. Ibid., p. 33. 
22. Ibid., p. 56. 
23. Ibid., p. 55. 
Unlike the atheist, the rebel requires a religious 
world view in order for his protest to have meaning. 
Rebellion after all can only be imagined in terms of 
opposition to someone. The only thing that gives mean-
ing to human protest is the idea of a personal god who 
has created, and is therefore responsible for everything. 
And so we can say, without being paradoxical, that 1n the 
Western World the history of rebe~4ion is inseparable 
from the history of Christianity. 
Since existential rebellion is essentially an affirma-
tion of values, how is it related to nihilism which portrays 
an absolute negation of values? Camus argues that the dif-
ferences between the two are basic, even though they emerge 
from the same historical stream. Nihilism is colored by 
autointoxication or resentment. It envies what it does not 
have, while the rebel's goal 1s to defend what he is. The 
nihilist uses the crimes of God to justify his own license 
("Everything is permitted."), but the rebel seeks to justify 
the fall of God by assuming responsibility in creating the 
values that he has sought in vain within his human situation. 
Freedom is an important criterion in distinguishing re-
hellion from nihilism. Whereas the nihilist, in denying 
everything and assuming the power to kill, lays claim to 
total freedom and the unlimited display of human pride, 
••• the freedom to kill, is not compatible with the 
sense of rebellion. Rebellion is in no way the demand 
for total freedom. On the contrary, rebellion puts 
total freedom up for trial. It specificially attacks 
the unlimited power that authorizes a superior to vio-
late the forbidden frontier. Far from demanding general 
24. Ibid., p. 28. 
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independence, the rebel wants it to be recognized that 
freedom has its limits everywhere that a human being is 
to be found--the limit being precisely that human being's 
power to rebel .••• The freedom he claims, he claims 
for all; the freedom he refuses, he forbids everyone to 
enjoy.t:.J 
26 Camus closes his essay by redefining existential re-
bellion as a highly rational and creative force. Because it 
is a protest against death, rebellion can never legitimize 
murder. It must find its meaning somewhere between a silent, 
passive accep tance of death at one extreme, and an acceptance 
of murder at the other--somewhere between the arrogance of 
blasphemy and the temptation to become a god. The rebel must 
master within himself what can be mastered, and within his 
universe he must rectify what can be rectified. He will re-
ject his own salvation if all cannot be saved and thus dem-
onstrate the strange form of love that is part of rebellion. 
And he will continue to protest even though his dream is be-
yond fulfillment. 
Even by his greatest effort man can only propose to 
diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. 
But the injustice and the suffering of the world will 
remain, and, no matter how limited they are, they will 
not cease to be an outrage. Dimitri Karamazov's cry of 
"Why '? 11 will continue to resound; art and rebellion will 
die only with the last man.27 
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we have focused on Camus at some length because he offers 
a penetrating analysis of two dimensions of existential rebellion--
25. Ibid., p. 284. 
26. Ibid., pp. 302-306. 
27. Ibid., p. 303. 
rational and irrational. Concerning nihilism, Camus demon-
strates how rebellion may merge with the will-to-power and 
assume pathological proportions in terms of rigidity, final-
28 ity, and limitlessness. He also shows how resentment may 
require an extremely negative, authoritarian image of God in 
order to rationalize its own destructiveness. 
Finally, he traces the defiance in nihilism to a form 
of despair which has replaced the conscious values beh ind 
genuine rebellion. This despair is infested with hatred for 
existence, and it holds on to God not out of trust or depend-
ency but out of malice. Its perversity is such as to make 
religious growth virtually impossible. At this point, there 
is a close parallel between Camus' diagnosis of nihilism and 
Soren Kierkegaard's description of ultimate despair. Writes 
Kierkegaard, 
••. with hatred for existence it wills to be itself, 
to be itself in terms of its misery; ... it does not 
even will in defiance to tear itself free from the Power 
which posited it. It wills to obtrude upon this Power 
in spite, to hold on to it out of malice ••.. Revolt-
ing against the whole of existence, it thinks it has 
hold of a proof against it, against its goodness. 'rhis 
proof the despairer thinks he himself is, and that is 
what he wills to be ••• It is (to describe it figura-
tively) as if an author were to make a slip of the pen, 
and that this clerical error became conscious of being 
such. . • • it is then as if this clerical error would 
revolt against the author, out of hatred for him were 
to forbid him to correct it, and were to say, "No I 
28. These factors are also noted by Harold Kelman in his 
analysis of irrational authority. "Rational and Irra-
tional Authority: A Holistic Viewpoint," American Journal 
of Psychoanalysis, (1952), XII, pp. 50-61. 
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will not be erased, I will stand as a witness against 
thee, that thou art a very poor writer.29 
Psychologically, nihilism betrays a basic mistrust of 
a universe which is perceived to be hostile and alien. It 
represents a flight from dependency into a role of irrational 
responsibility. It is autonomy carried to its most absurd 
limits--anarchy. It reveals ultimate pride in that the ni-
hilist literally seeks to replace God. 
Nihilism is evidence that autonomy requires some ac-
companying form of homonomy if it is to retain a rational 
perspective. Whatever courage the nihilist may show in fac-
ing his estrangement and loneliness is tainted by the obsti-
nacy and rigidity with which he glories in his aloneness and 
seeks to develop an ethic of isolation. The final result is 
madness. Count de Sade 1 s inexhaustible devotion to new com-
binations of pain and pleasure or Ivan Karamazov's reflective 
patricide serve as examples. This culmination is clear to 
Camus, and another student of nihilism, Helmut Thielicke, 
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who draws a close analogy between nihilistic and schizophrenic 
phenomena.30 Ironically and tragically, what begins as 
29. Soren Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1951), pp. 118-119. 
30. Helmut Thielicke, "Nihilism As a Psychiatric Phenomenon," 
Nihilism: Its Origin and Nfture--With a Christian Answer, 
trans. John w. Doberstein New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1961). Thielicke points to a "loss of center" and a dis-
appearance of the concept of"ownness" in both schizophrenia 
and nihilism. pp. 44-45 He concludes that in both there is 
an essential connection between the breakdown of the 11 ob-
jective world" and the 11 self-world." p. 54 
autonomy in defense of integrity and value ends with the 
disintegration of all of these. 
At this point we a re indebted to Ca mus for h is d is-
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tinction between t h e path ological and rational forms of ex-
istential rebellion. There remain s t h e task of evaluating 
the rational dimension in order to see whethe r it is as free 
of destructive element s a s Camus woul d h ave us b e lieve. Of 
more i mmediate importance is the question of how existential 
rebellion influences the trend toward homonomy a n d theonomy. 
5· Critique of Camus 
An appraisal of existential rebellion yields a number 
of positive considerations. First, e x istenti a l rebellion, 
as defined by Camus, establishes anxiety and/or threat as 
dimensions of experienc e which are ins eparable f r om t he 
struggle towar d relig ious matu ration. Quite a part f rom the 
question of how one handles t h ese t h reat s , t h ere is remark-
able courage and honest, inner scrutiny in t he diaries of re-
bellion. The reade r has the feeling, upon sobe r reflection, 
that he has been transported into t he world of repressed 
emotion and that a mirror has been raise d to al l ow a discon-
certing view of his own inner nature. 31 What t h e rebel 
reveals cannot be attributed entirely to neu rotic trends. 
On the contrary , neurosis is often an inability to face the 
31. Nietz.sche apparently was aware of r epre s sion be f or e :B'reud. 
"'I did that,' says my memory. 'I could not have done 
that,' says my pride, and remains inexorabl e . Ev entu ally--
the memory yields." The Philosophy of Nietz.sche ( Ne w York: 
The Mode rn Library, 19 54), p. 451. 
raw anxiety with which the rebel confronts us. 
Religiously, the rebel demonstrates that there can be 
no genuine coming to terms with Ultimate Authority apart from 
a courageous confrontation of existential threat. In terms 
of theonomy, this says that man's ambivalence toward God is 
bound up with his existential perception of God as both 
~aemy and Friend. Paul Tillich insists that this tension 
persists, even after the individual's wavering between flight 
from God and equality with God has been overcome. 
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. . . the final solution lies in the fact that the Pres-
ence of the Witness, the Presence of the center of all 
life ••• implies both a radical attack op his existence, 
and the ultimate meaning of his existence.J2 
Existential rebellion clarifies how difficult the transi-
tion from autonomy to theonomy may become. It clarifies also 
how the demand for religious surrender may drive persons to 
camouflage and avoid their sense of threat in ways that distil 
anxiety but bar a full measure of commitment. Camus' contri-
but1on is to discourage oversimplification in both psychology 
and theology apropos the nature of religious experience and 
the pathway to religious maturity. If the rebel does nothing 
else, he shows us that faith is no substitute for courage and 
honesty. And the measure of courage required to face "the 
God who is really God" and the 11 absolute threat of nonbeing 11 .3.3 
.32. Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. 50. 
JJ. Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1952), p~ .39· 
is such that Rumke 1 s conclusion seems accurate: the ultimate 
stage of religious experience (wherein "demand and surrender 
become fundamental rules of life"34 ) is reached by very few 
persons. 
Camus• analysis of existential rebellion shows that 
such rebellion is, basically, a response to perceived threat 
to one 1 s values or to one's existence. To the degree that 
rebellion occurs so openly, there is evidence that the person 
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has refused to surrender self-awareness as a protection against 
reality and Urangst. Man 1 s very rebellion, both as a rational 
act based on values, and as an alternative to repression, 
merits, in this light, the positive connotations which Camus 
gives it. 
There is courage in the rebel's rebellion, as there is 
in his descent into the depths of anxiety. Camus' paradoxical 
reference to "holy blasphemy" suggests a compassionate courage, 
compassionate in the sense that the rebel draws his strength 
and his motivation from the struggles and destiny of all men. 
In one sense, the creature's calling the Creator to ac-
count for perceived violations of value ranks as the grossest 
form of pride. And yet, there is an integrity here which is 
not lacking in the biblical record of man's alternating tides 
of searching for and fleeing from God. Abraham intercedes 
with God before the destruction of Sodom and asks the rebel's 
J4. H. c. Rumke, The Psychology of Unbelief (London: Rockliff 
Publishing Corporation, 1952), p. 64. 
crucial question, 11 Shall not .the Judge of all the earth do 
right? 1135 The Psalms are replete with similar attempts by 
the searching spirit of man to find meaning in unmerited 
suffering, unpunished evil, and the inexorable finality of 
death. That men rebel because they cannot find this meaning 
is a recurring theme in the history of man as well as the 
history of philosophy. 
Failing to find meaning in religion and history, man 
seeks to provide this meaning by his own endeavors. At this 
moment, rebellion is born. It is a desperate alternative to 
irrationality and despair--not the only alternative, but the 
one that seems most consistent with the totality of one's 
perceptions, values, and experiences. 
In this form, rebellion may approach the final stages 
of psycholog ical and religious maturity. The final stage for 
Erikson is represented by the struggle bet~een ego integrity 
and despair. In Erikson's description of ego integrity, many 
of the constituents of existential rebellion are defined: 
It is the ego's accrued assurance of its proclivity for 
order and meaning. It is a post-narcissistic love of the 
human ego--not the self--as an experience which conveys 
some world order and spiritual sense, no matter how 
dearly paid for •... Although aware of the relativity 
of all the various life styles which have given meaning 
to human striving , the possessor of integrity is ready 
to defend the dignity of his own life style against all 
physical and economic threats. For he knows that an 
individual life is the accidental coincidence of but one 
life cycle with but one segment of history, and that for 
.35· Genesis 18:25, Holy Bible: Revised Standard Version. 
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him all human integrity st_ands or falls w1 th the one 
style of integrity of which he pa rtakes.J6 
The rebel has more than a 11 proclivity for order and 
meaning. 11 His is a passion, accompanied by extreme sensi-
tivity to the injustice and evil. His love is clearly not 
of the self, for he is identified with the community of men, 
and. this relationship offers justification for his rebel-
lion.37 The world order this love conveys is absolute per-
fection which mothers the unrelenting desire to g ive life a 
J8 form it does not have. In his post-narcissistic love of 
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unrealized unity, the rebel joins the artist and the religious 
devotee in the struggle to overcome the divisive errors of 
man and nature. 
We have already noted the readiness of the rebel 11 to 
defend the dignity of his own life style" against t hreats, 
and the inextricable way he binds his fate with the fate of 
mankind. This bond explains his tenacity. His integrity 
will not allow him to be the only one saved. He thus employs 
his integrity in defense of the life style of all others, as 
well as his own. 
Where religious maturity is concerned, the rebel has 
achieved autonomy and homonomy to a very high degree. He 
J6. Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: w. w. 
Norton and Company, 1950), p. 2J2. 
J?. Camus expresses this poignantly: "If we are not, then I 
am not •.• " 2£· cit., p. 282. 
J8. Cf. Ibid., p. 262. 
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has established his identity in relation to clear, conscious 
values which transcend selfish ends. His capacity for de-
votion to these values is so great that he willingly takes 
upon himself a terrible kind of isolation in the same moment 
that he defies a sustaining relationship with Ultima te Au-
thority. His cause is the obliteration of injustice, and 
chaos, and the establishment of unity. He applies his crit-
ical capacities to life, freedom, authority, and God and finds 
an irreconcilable breach between those inner values he has 
forged out of his own life and thought, and the realities of 
nature. 
The rebel, as Camus defines him, could take the step 
of faith, surrender himself to the claims of the divine, and 
thus gain salvation. The final barr ier is not pride, or fear, 
or even integrity--it is compassion for those who will or 
cannot be saved. With these, the rebel chooses to cast his 
lot. Therefore, he renounces his own sa lvation and continues 
to rage against the suffering of a single child or the death 
of a single human being. This he does,not in arrogance or 
bitterness. He is neither optimistic nor resigned to fate. 
He neither accepts reality as it is nor rejects it entirely 
for what it is not. He simply does that which his very 
nature tells him he must do--he rebels. He cannot or will 
not take the step that ends the radical division between the 
values within and the Creator and Sustainer of all values. 
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With this positive as~essment of existential rebellion, 
we turn next to consider its limitations in relation to the 
criteria of religious maturity. Appreciation that the rebel 
can go so far in his quest for ultimate meaning turns to 
perplexity that he can go no further, and raises the question 
of whether compassion is really the final barrier to theonomy. 
First, it is important to recognize that Camus• eloquent 
description of existential rebellion is highly idealized. 
This is not to say it is a fa~e portrayal. Theoretically, 
man is capable of enduring the supreme tensions which Camus 
describes without resorting to suicide or murder. The ques-
tion is, how many men, and to what end? How many men can 
endure the endless existential frustration of Sisyphus with-
out succumbing to utter and final despair? 
There is in Camus• concept of rebellion the same touch 
of unreality that pervades the rebel's perception of his 
world, although Camus outwardly spurns the weaknesses of 
idealism. That, historically, existential rebellion has 
given birth to nihilism demonstrates that prolonged rebel-
lion, as Camus portrays it, has within it the seeds of de-
struction. 
This destruction usually stems from a breakdown in re-
bellion's power to limit itself. Camus establishes the 
limits of freedom with some effectiveness, but he fails to 
establish clear limits to responsibility. Can an individual 
assume responsibility for all mankind without falling prey 
to some form of megalomania? The temptation is especially 
great where God has been dethroned and one•s values have no 
foundation except in one's own life and experience. Un-
limited responsibility in the midst of a self-imposed isola-
tion is not the formula for sanity. Inevitably, there creeps 
in the influence of pride and the human propensity to take 
the place of the God who has fallen. For all its restraint, 
compassion, and decency, existential rebellion, as Camus 
describes it, seems prone to confuse ultimate authority with 
personal authority. Thus, it falls prey to the very evil it 
deplores. 
From the perspective of existential analysis, a crucial 
test of existential rebellion concerns its relationship to 
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the full range of values, including what Viktor Frankl calls 
39 
"attitudinal values." Some differentiation of values is 
needed because of the paradoxical manner in which the rebel 
uses personal values to defy God as the Source and Sustainer 
of Values. 
Frankl, a psychoanalyst, characterizes the spiritual 
side of man dynamically in terms of a 11 will-to-meaning." 
Despair or "existential neuros1s, 11 he finds, results from 
frustration of this will-to-meaning. Existential frustration 
may occur at three levels: the creative, the experiential, or 
39. Viktor E. Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, trans. Richard 
and Clara Winston (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 
p. xii. 
40 the attitudinal level. Cr.eati ve values represent the 
meaning that a person may bring to his life through the 
achieving of tasks. Experiential values are meanings that 
come with the experience of the Good, the True, the Beauti-
ful, or the experiencing of another individual in all his 
uniqueness. 
Attitudinal values represent a third pathway to mean-
ing. They emerge from the way a person faces fate, distress, 
or the burden of destined suffering. Drawing from personal 
experiences and observations as a prisoner in a Nazi concen-
tration camp, Frankl declares, 11 The right kind of suffering--
2-28 
facing your fate without flinching--is the highest achievement 
41 
that has been granted to man. 11 In order to eliminate con-
ceptual conflict between creative and attitudinal values, 
Frankl makes it clear that the latter designation applies 
42 
"only when the suffering is unavoidable and inescapable." 
Frankl's three-fold analysis of va.lues serves a clari-
fying function where existential rebellion is concerned. 
First, it is evident that the rebel is heavily endowed with 
creative values. As fabricators of an ideal universe, the 
rebel and the artist are one. If the rebel possesses any 
singular talent, it is his potential power to create. Crea-
tivity is at the heart of his search for meaning. 
40. Ibid., pp. xi-xii. 
41. Ibid., p. xii. 
42. Ibid., p. xiii. 
229 
The existential rebel poses an enigma when experiential 
values become the measure of his maturity. At first glance, 
he a ppe ars t o have experienced the Good , the True, t he Beauti-
ful, a nd love f or another's uniqueness--all of t hes e--so 
profoundly as nev er t o have go tten over the spell of them. 
These values are his caus e, hi s pas sion, as we have said. 
On the other hand , these are more than offset for the rebel 
by what might be called experiential disvalues. The eni gma 
is that by some s trang e progres sion t h e rebel comes to i dentify 
hims elf with valu e and God with di sv alue . 
While t his solution i s superior to tha t of t h e nihilist 
who mimics his capricious and cruel God by denying all value, 
it scarcely alters the absurdi ty which the rebel i s try ing 
to overcome--the absurdity t hat good and evil, jus tic e and 
injustice, life and death could s pring from a common source. 
In place of a schizophrenic God, t he r ebe l posits a rather 
satanic deity who summarize s a ll t hings incomprehensible, 
irrational, a nd absurd. Such a God must fall, and the rebel 
has no recours e but to s te p i nt o the void, however reluctantly 
he may do so. He cannot or wil l not gain the theonomou s rec-
ogniti on that his cherished i nner valu e s have t heir ori gin 
outside of himself and are in fact gr ounde d i n t he nature of ul-
timate reality. 
Using Frankl' s delineati on, i t i s c l ear tha t Camus ' 
existential rebel relies on creative values to reso lve the 
perceived s talemate between experiential value and disvalue. 
2JO 
Despite his struggle and his 9reativity, the rebel is extremely 
limited in the attitudinal values he is able to embrace. One 
of the few such values open to the rebel 1s sacrifice. Sac-
rifice is perhaps the only mood in which the rebel, as Camus 
characterizes him, can accept death. 
Faithful to his origins, the rebel demonstrates by 
sacrifice that his real freedom is not freedom from 
murder but freedom from his own death. At the same time, 
he achieves honor in metaphysical terms. Thus, Kaliayev 
climbs the gallows and visibly designates to all his 
fellow men the exact limit where man's honor begins and 
ends.4J 
As one attitudinal value among many, sacrifice is a 
profound source of meaning and a triumphant alternative to 
despair. However, as the only attitudinal value in one's 
repertory, it comes dangerously close to being an exalted 
form of masochism. For the rebel, it raises the necessity 
of hastening the inevitable, and it gives his sacrifice a 
compulsive quality. 
Apart from sacrifice, the existential rebel is impover-
ished in the resources of resignation which Frankl makes so 
important to finding meaning in the inevitable. Frankl de-
clares that "the very essence of an attitudinal value inheres 
in the manner in which a person resigns himself to the in-
44 
evitable. 11 
Precisely at this point, Frankl raises the criterion 
4J. Camus, 2£· cit., p. 286. 
44. Frankl,££· cit., p. 129. 
which exposes most glaringly_ the limitation of existential 
rebellion. We may say that two of life's basic impulses 
are rebellion and resignation and that religious maturity 
requires a creative handling of the two. To rebel against 
the intolerable is the essence of creativity and progress. 
To rebel against the inevitable is the essence of that 
chronic frustration which leads almost inevitably to some 
form of madness. The wisdom of true maturity reveals it-
self in the capacity for rebellion and resignation. Each 
capacity limits the other and subverts the irrational 
extremes of suicide and murder. Rebellion elevates man 
above the animal. Resignation keeps him from assuming 
equality with God. 
Although the two characteristics are not identical, 
there is a close affinity between mature resignation and 
realistic dependency. The existential rebel cannot resign 
himself to the inevitability of death because a basic mis-
trust of the universe thwarts both confident resignation and 
creative dependence. In his estrangement from the Ground of 
Being, his dependency needs as a human being have nowhere to 
turn, except inward upon the self. The supreme irrationality 
of Camus' "rational," existential rebellion is that it so 
glorifies one of man's basic dimensions that it smothers 
another equally essential dimension. In the end, theonomy 
is thwarted not by compassion, nor by rebellion per se, but 
by the rigid, defiant exclusion of rebellion's opposite--res-
ignation. 
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A final element in our critique of existential rebel-
lion centers around the question of its "offended conscience"--
its "outraged innocence." Explicit in the higher forms of 
rebellion, such as Camus', is the accusation that man is es-
tranged from life's power and meaning through no fault of his 
own. Like Cain, his crime grows out of his rejection by God--
a reversal of the progression in the myth of Adam and Eve. 
The responsibility for estrangement and rebellion rests upon 
God. 
The degree to which the rebel's perceptions are obj.ec-
tively accurate cannot be fully evaluated by psychology, even 
when it assumes the perspective of existential analysis. 45 
Theologically, it might be argued that the rebel's image of 
a cruel God is a fiction created by a bad conscience. From 
a slightly different viewpoint, it might be said that the 
"wrath of God" concept has deep subjective validity as the 
way God's love is experienced by those who rebel against him. 
Psychologically, it is legitimate at least to ask to 
what extent the rebel's "outraged innocence" may conceal 
As a movement of growing importance, existential analysis 
has been described by one of its progenitors, Ludwig 
Binswanger, as a psychotherapy which understands the life 
history of a patient in terms of "modifications of the 
total structure of the patient's being-in-the world." 
Quoted by Rollo May in Existence: A New Dimension in Ps chi-
atry and Psychology (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 195 , 
p. 5. May adds that existential analysis seeks "to ana-
lyze the structure of human existence . (to)yield an 
understanding of the reality underlying all situations of 
human beings in crisis." p. 7 
233 
repressed guilt. The experience of guilt is almost entirely 
lacking from the soaring phrases of Camus. And yet, exis-
tenti a lly, how are we to imagin e revolt a gainst nature and 
natur e's God wi t h complete innocence, however value-oriented 
one's motives may be? 
Perhaps nowhere in literature is the interplay between 
estrangement, meaning lessness, and uncons cious guilt portrayed 
more powerfully or p rob e d more deeply t h an in Franz Ka fka's 
The Tria1. 46 In his study of Jose ph K., Kafka dramatizes the 
sense of life's inscrutable injustice which causes some men 
(like Ivan Karamazov) to rebel and oth ers (like Joseph K.) to 
accept death resignedly a s execution for some unknown and 
unexplained crime. Kafka's central fi gu r e is, i n many ways, 
more a puppet than a man, bu ffeted by dark, a wesome, a n d sin-
ister forces. 
Like oth er "sons of Cain," Joseph struggles in vain to 
comprehend why he is on trial a nd with wha t he i s ch arged. 
His search with in h i mself for some ove rl ooked crime ends in 
futility. Muses Joseph, 
Though I am accused of someth i ng , I cannot recall the 
slightest offense t hat mi ght b e charged a gainst me . But 
even that is of mi n or i mportance, t h e real question is, 
who accuses me? What authori t y is con ducting t hese pro-
ceeding s?47 
That both the offense and t he a ccuser are unkn own suggests 
46. Franz Kafka, The Trial (New York: Alfred A. Knopf , 1955). 
47. Ibid., p. 16. 
strongly an unconscious source~ Other evidence from K1 s 
struggle points in the same direction. 
Although Kafka apparently feels keenly identified with 
Joseph K., he allows Joseph's limited self-awareness to show 
through his s ometimes bizarre search for meaning. Joseph's 
genuine insights are always clouded with a certain obscurity, 
his courage colored by an obstinate pride. His is the pride 
of a banker who must seek help in the slums, where dirty 
children grab at his trousers. His pride largely divorces 
him from the raw world of feelings and reduces his life to 
sterile mental calculations and impersonal relationships. 
Women are to be seduced, men to be outwitted. 
Joseph K. perceives himself as man opposed by the universe, 
but in reality he is man against himself. He stands accused 
by an essential part of himself which he has attempted to 
deny. Always his innocence is tainted with repression, his 
rebellion with projection. His unconscious guilt arises not 
so much from what he has done as from what he is--a person 
alienated from himself, from other persons, and from God. 
Camus• rebel and Kafka's Joseph K. are distinct creations, 
but a common tragic flaw is evident in both--the inability to 
recognize and resolve the guilt to which pride is heir. The 
rebel projects his guilt onto God. Joseph buries his guilt, 
as though pushing it out of consciousness will end its exist-
ence. For both the penalty is life in a hostile and alien 
world. 
6. Job--A Study in Outraged Devotion 
Is the antipathy between existential rebellion and 
theonomy as ineluctable as Camus would have it appear? 
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In rebuttal to the position of the French essayist, we turn 
to a brief analysis of another prototype of rebellion which 
exhibits remarkable similarities to and yet differs signifi-
cantly from the patterns previously di s cussed in this chap-
ter. The reference here is to the character of Job, as 
portrayed in the sublime poetry of Old Testament literature. 
As previously in the case of Jonah, we have no zeal 
to make Job a historical figure. More accurately, he may be 
regarded as a prototype, as homo vivens. He is, like Camus' 
rebel, a concrete sample of humanity, disentangled from the 
contexts of space and time. His is the heart of essential 
man laid bare, revealing the searching, the struggle, the 
conflict, the misery, and the grandeur that have always been 
a part of the existential situation. Viewed in this light, 
the book of Job becomes pregnant with psychological, as well 
as theological, meanings. 
There are a number of striking parallels between Job 
and the existential rebel as we have previously described 
him. In the biographies of both we witne ss "the shock of 
adversity upon integrity"--the courageous confrontation of 
darkest reality and a resolute turning aside from superficial 
solutions. In both there is a strong sensitivity to injus-
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tice and a struggle to find meaning in the midst of appar-
ent absurdity. Like other rebels, Job exudes estrangement~-
he cannot reject or deny Go d altogether, but neither can 
he get close to his Creator. Like other "sons of Cain," 
Job protests his innocence before God and challenges God's 
justice.48 Man, the creature, perceives that the causes 
for his suffering and alienation, reside in God , not in him-
self. Job's concept of God combines the capricious tyrant, 49 
the corrupt judge, 50 the ravenous beast, 51 and the heartless 
. 52 
warrJ.or. 
In Job, rebellion against God as the Author of unde-
served misfortune emerges as a virile surrogate for passive 
resig~ation and black despair. The tragic hero refuses to 
curse God and die. Moreover, he proudly refuses to accept 
the limitations of his manhood. Apparently he holds to the 
belief_ that, by virtue of his own will and power, he is the 
author of his fate and the master of his destiny. A similar, 
overwe.ening sense of control characterizes all existential 
rebels. 
Despite these evident parallels, Job is a rebel apart 
from others that we have engage d in dialogue. One difference 
48. Job 9:17. 
49. Job 9:18-19. 
50. Job 9:20-29. 
51. Job 16:7,9. 
52. Job 7:17-21;13:15. 
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lies in the affiliative thrust that acc ompani e s his con-
tumacy. This thrust is theonomou s in its direction. It 
cannot be displaced altogether onto mankind, as appears to 
be the case with Camus' prototype, wherein humanitariru~ism 
is the negation of theonomy. Instead, its object i s always 
God, and the sense of long ing for God is unmistakable, even 
at the heights of Job's conflict. 
Here is the bitter challenge of a man whose faith 
will not be denied and cannot be dismissed: the somber 
and stately defiance of an outraged devotion, at its 
feet the edge of an abyss unillumined, the stiff upper 
lip of hell; across its face, intermittently, like bats 
flying, the impenetrable shadows of what all too often 
in the darkest chambers of the mind seems an evil, cos-
mie tyranny. • •• his are at least the dimensions of 
the tragic hero. • • • He stands up to the full height 
of his stature, an epic grandeur a mong the ruins, stark 
in a stark world • • • 55 
Job's "outraged devotion" is not the same as Camus' 
"outraged innocence," although the latter is unmistakably a 
part of Job's protest. Outraged devotion suggests are-
bellion growing out of a sense of loss, a bereave d form of 
love. In this sense, rebellion is akin to the hostility which 
derives its existence from the affiliative groundwork which 
constitutes its opposite. For purposes of cl a rification, we 
may cite Ian D. Suttie who regards h a tred as an expression of 
separation-anxiety, initi a ted by a threat against love. 54 
Applied to Job's rebellion, this important principle pictures 
53. Samuel Terrien, "Job," The Interpreter's Bible, III 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1 9 54), p. 907. 
54. Ian D. Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, QE• cit., 
p. 31. 
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a protest whose goal is the restorati on of a broken love-
relationship with God. Interprete d thus, Job 's ou tcry is 
value-oriented but the central value is a fLUldamental rela-
tionship, rather than an abstract principle. 
What emerges from the f ascina t ing , biblical portrayal 
of Job is a striking ambiva lence toward God, recal l ing the 
role of this phenomen on in pathological and autonomy-orien-
ted rebellion . Whereas t he neurotic struggles with rebel-
lion versus dependency , and the search for identity s e ts 
rebellion in tension with devotion, Job's r evolt conflicts 
with surrender or r es ignation, in t he healthy sense t hat 
Frankl employs the term . Longing for God and flight from God 
a re two incessant rhythms in J ob's struggle. An intricate 
interweaving of contradictions, Job 's relig iou s life reveals 
affirmation and denial, certainty and dou bt, hop e and de spair, 
love and h atred, serenity and terror. If he is less stable 
emotionally than Ca mu s' prototype, he is also more human , 
gathering unto himself the full range of man 's alternating 
responses to h is Deity. Job's ambivalence has one other 
i mportant dimension: he feels rejected by God and ye t he can-
not bring himself to believe tha t God will finally let him g o. 
We find then in Job a protest of the heart as well as 
t h e mind, a deep- seated long ing for meani ngful rel a ti onship, 
for reconciliati on wi th God. Th is is the affiliative thrust, 
the adjunct to homonomy whi ch Ca mus expresses in h is compas-
sion for human s uffe ring . But Job will settle f or nothing 
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less than an accounting from God himself. "Let the Al-
mighty answer me!" 55 For he recognizes that man cannot 
create meaning, he can only discover it. More important, 
Job is haunted by the profound recognition that an identi-
fication with mankind cannot fully overcome one's alienation 
from Ultimate Authority. 11 He is estranged from God and 
knows enough of God to evaluate his loss."5 6 
This sense of loss and longing is missing in Camus 
and Kafka, and perhaps it accounts for the distinctively 
theonomous relationsh ip which Job finally achieves. At any 
rate, several outcomes of Job's religious experience are 
indicated by the scriptural account. First, the language of 
God in the theophany recalls Job dramatically to an aware-
ness of his finiteness and his dependency. Secondly, Job's 
rebellious spirit is qu ieted, temporari ly at l east, and he 
ceases to argue vvi th God. 57 This development is accompanied 
by a confession of insignificance and the posture of sub-
mission before God. Thirdly, Job's religious encounter cul-
minates in a moving act of repentance, in which he attributes 
his rebellion to narrowness of understanding and experience. 58 
Fourthly, although Job's sense of injustice appears to be 
55. Job 31:35. 
56. Terrien, 11 Job," ££• cit., p. 898. 
57. Joh 40:1-5. 
58. Job 42:1-5. 
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partially assuaged by intuitions of resurrection and life 
beyond death, 59 his questions or rather his complaints 
remain unanswered. These questions are no longer i mportant_, 
because Job seems to have moved beyond h is ne ed for expla-
nations, reward, and the vindication of his honor. He has 
found a new awareness, a deeper relationship with God, and 
these are enough. At the end, God's restoration of Job 's 
fortunes symbolizes the fullness of life which follows the 
rebellious hero's submission to the transcendent purposes 
of God. 
7. Evaluation of Job's Rebellion 
Our cursory study of Job further demonstrates the para-
doxical function of rebellion a gainst God in relation to 
religious maturation. The Old Testament masterpiece conveys 
that rebellion may culminate in theonomy but it by no means 
posits a cause-effect relationship. Rather it i mplies that 
where the rebel l ion is a protest motivated by a longing for 
the restoration of a love relationship, such a restoration 
is possible, and with this achievement, rebellion loses its 
raison d'etre and disappears. A new capacity f or realistic 
self-appraisal is one evidence that the act of submission be-
fore God does not conflict with the trend toward autonomy. 
59. Job 14:14-15; 19:25-27. 
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This is further confirmed by the numerous indications of 
Job's productivity in later years. 
There remain s the enigma of whether Job's rebellious-
ness in the midst of adversity made any significant, posi-
tive contributions to his religious growth. Speculation is 
usually hazardous, but several interesting hypotheses de-
serve mention. One i s that personal integrity under the 
shock of adversity lends itself more easily to rebellion 
than to self-pity, despair, blind resignation , and self-
destruction. A second possibility is that the i n tensity of 
one's rebellion against God may be commensurate with the depth 
of one's sense of alienation and deprivation. If so, rebel-
lion may manifest that a warene ss of spiritual need around 
which Jesus developed the f irst of h is Beatitudes . 60 
An other aspect of the enigma has to do with what may 
be called the residue s of rebellion in relig ious maturi ty. 
Is the pers on who comes to religious maturi t y by way of rebel-
lion consistently different from the individual for whom re-
bellion has played no larg e part? If so, how? Psychological 
explorations in this direction might conside r the following 
variables: 
1. Sublimated rebellion. To what extent does rebel-
lion against God become channeled in new and creative direc-
tions? 
60. Matthew 5:3. 
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2. A rational approa ch to the unknovrn. Does the 
former r ebel evidence more critical tenden cies than other 
relig ious devotees? If so, to what de gre e a re these tenden-
cies directed toward God? 
3. Sensitivity to evil and injustice. Is the former 
rebel less prone than others to shallow op timism and theo-
logical naivet~? In his perception of reality, is there a 
closer balance between experiential values and disvalues? 
4. Sense of personal authority. How does earlier 
rebellion against God influence the setting of limits upon 
personal responsibility and authority? Is the former rebel 
more or less likely than other religious persons to rely 
on the totality of his O\vn experience as the basis for 
making decisions? 
These variables and the related ~uestions will re-
~uire considerable refinement before lending themselves to 
the gathering of meaningful data. Nevertheless, they do 
su~gest possible areas for future stu dy, growing out of the 
assumption, stated e a rlier, tha t the autonomou s and theo-
nomous trends are essentially compatible. The uni~uely 
individualized ~ualities and patterns t h at sur round each 
person's dedicati on and devotion to God, atte st :; to this com-
patibility. Ou r s ugge s ted categ ories simply suggest one 
approach to a me aningful organization of theonomous patterns, 
using rebellion as a k ey variable. 
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8. Summary 
To summarize our thinking in the present chapte r, we 
have b e en confron t ed with s everal distinct types of e x i s -
tential rebellion. Ni h ilism reveals a pathological dimension 
in whi ch su stained rebellion acc ompanies a deterioration of 
persona lity and value s--a gradua l collapse of both objective 
and subjec t ive worlds. 
Camus' defin ition mi ght be called valu e-ori ented, exis-
tential rebellion because man's passion for justice, unity, 
and order cause s him to take upon h i ms elf responsibility f or 
creative change i n a hostile wor l d wh i ch thre a tens to destroy 
these values. We have observed in t h i s form of rebellion 
admirable qualiti es of i ntegrity , compassion, sen sitivity, 
decency, and a willingne s s to sacrifice the self f or the sake 
of transcendent g oals. To the de gree it is value-ori ented, 
existential rebelli on can f os ter hun a n prog ress. Psycholog -
ically, it may represent a healthy alterna tive to t h e handling 
of threat by camoufl age, avoidance, or a neurotic limiting of 
self-awa reness. 
On the ne gative side, Lindner and Camu s seem i n sens itive 
to t h e psychology of pride and man's need f or attitudinal val-
ues which inclu de resignation as well as sacrifice, in order 
to find mean ing in the inevitable. The rebel's pride is re-
vealed in that his desire to be free of existential threat 
fosters an attemp ted escape from t he human s ituation. I n -
evitably, the e scape entails a struggle t o become equal with 
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God. If the rebel successfullY- sets limits on his freedom, 
pride rears its head in the sense of unlimited responsibility 
which casts man into the role of a reluctant deity. 
Consistently, the rebel is more aware of his pride 
than of the guilt which attaches itself to his rebellion 
against God and nature. His guilt he represses or projects 
onto God and these mechanisms only deepen his insecurity and 
widen the gulf that separates him from Ultimate Authority. 
In his rebellious flight from the threats of existence, 
the rebel also overlooks or represses his capacity and his 
need for creative dependency and realistic resignation. The 
religious demand for surrender is refused consciously in the 
name of compassion, but pride and repressed guilt cannot be 
discounted as important underlying determinants of this re-
sponse. The rebel's need to rebel is overdetermined emo-
tionally, precisely to the degree that it negates his depend-
ency needs and his ability to come to terms with the inevi-
table realities of suffering and death. Overbalancing life 
on the side of rebellion may be a natural phenomenon of youth, 
·but, as a life style, rebellion becomes increasingly inappro-
priate in later years. The capacity for resignation becomes 
increasingly essential with the waning of one's powers, and 
the accumulation of defeated hopes in old age. 
Because it does represent a basic dimension of man, 
value-oriented, existential rebellion is not necessarily an 
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antagonist to the processes that le ad to religious maturity. 
A third type of rebellion was equated with Job's outraged 
devotion. Herein we d iscovere d most of the cha racteristics 
of Camus' prototype. The basic difference se emed to be the 
highly ambivalent chara cter of Job 's religious profile. His 
de s ire to reject or flee God was always in tension with a 
long ing for a meaningful rel a ti onsh ip with God , so that rebel-
lion a ppeared to be more of a protest against alienation 
than a drive towar d freedom from t he claims of Ultima te Au-
thority. Job's manifes t goal i s a vindication of h is honor, 
but his basic striving is for a restoration of a love-re-
lationship with the Creator who has become his tormentor. 
Significantly, Job 's rebellion dis s olves in submission 
a t the moment he experiences the transcendent p ower and 
gre a tne ss of God . God d oes not reject J ob because of h is 
rebe lliousne ss . It is even possible t hat Job's defiance of 
a Deity concerning wh om he had only secondary knowledge was 
a precondition of the dramatic first-hand encounter. At 
least the story of Job cownunicates the important i n sigh t that 
existential rebellion is n ot an insurmountable obstacle on 
the pathway to relig ious maturity. Under c e rtain cond itions, 
rebellion a gainst God may represent the auton omou s person's 
most valid alternative to melan choly, despair, a n d passivity. 
Rebellion may als o serve to shatter aut~oritarian or second-
hand conce pts of God and thus pave the way f or a vital, trans-
forming encounte r. 
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As a symptom of the individual's spiritual and 
emotional condition, rebellion may have further positive 
connotations. It may expres s negatively a deeply f elt 
aversion to alienation and a long ing for a new rela tion-
ship with God. Rebellion may also signify a sensitivity 
to suffering and tragedy and a profound struggle to find 
meaning in the dar ker r e alities of the human situation. As 
such, this response denotes a healthy avoidance of senti-
mentality, superficiality, and rootless optimism. 
These co1nments describe rebellion under optimum 
conditions. However, such descriptions illuminate on ly 
one side of rebellion's parad oxical fQnction. On the other 
side, existential rebellion is a decidely negative concept. 
It stands in opposition to creative dependen c y up on God and 
realistic resignation to the unavoi dabl e limitati ons of 
human exi stence. At its wors t, rebellion establishes a 
radical and false dichotomy betvveen t h e rational and the non-
rational, between the trend toward autonomy and the trend 
toward theonomy. Furthermore, as attested to by nihilism, 
rebellion may place man i n a crucib le of disruptive tensions, 
issuing in madness or a courageous but tragic aloneness 
wherein man assumes the burdens of God without the r e sources 
of God. Subjectively the rebel wears h is rebelli on as a 
badge of inn ocence, honor, and integrity. But objectively, 
his estate points to h is unrecognized need for a great af-
firma tion wh ich transcends rebel lion and f or a li f e of f aith 
and trust i n continuou s fellows h i p with a God wh o un-
ceas ingly confi r ms the be s t that is i n us. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Sill'llviARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Summary 
This di s sertation represents an attempt to analyze 
rebellion against authority on the basis of t hree categ ories 
growing out of the etiological concept of threat. The analy-
sis has been no t only descriptive but normative in that re-
bellion of various kind s has been related to a process of 
religious maturat ion in which three basic stag es have been 
hypothesized. A central concern was to study psychologi-
cally the relationship between the three t ypes of rebel-
lion and the three stages of reli g ious development. 
At the outset we defined rebellion as any def ian t or 
resistive behavior by which an ind ividual seeks to gain total 
or parti a l freedom f rom the claims and control of one or more 
forms of a u thority. This definition departs somewh at from a 
freque n t equating of rebellion with non-c onformity or dis-
ob e dien ce. It reflects rather an i nterpe r sonal perspective 
by pointing to the disrupting of an authority r e l at ionship as 
a central goal of the rebellious res p onse . 
In defining a u t h ority, we have recognized b oth a per-
sonal dimension (" p ower to") a.nd an i nterpersonal dimension 
(" p owe r over"). While the two d i mens ions are often mutually 
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inclusive and supportive fro~ a subjective standpoint, the 
question of authority becomes complicated in its social and 
psychological implications. Beyond the power to impose reward 
and punishment, there is in all interpersonal authority an 
element of attraction not related specifically to Murray's 
concept of press. This element is recognized in the concept 
of cathexis as the attracting or repelling capacity of an 
environmental object. 
When the power of authority to reward or punish, harm 
or protect, attract or repel, has been considered, there re-
mains the matter of the individual's response. This response 
has multiple, inner determinants, including fear of punish-
ment, desire for reward, and one or more sentiments which may 
be positive or negative in their orientation to authority. 
In addition, the tension of independence-dependency needs 
appears to play an important part in determining the indi-
vidual's response to the claims or potential influence of an 
authority beyond his own. 
Whenever potential authority becomes actualized as in-
fluence or 11 power over," the responding person displays be-
havior which conforms or harmonizes with the claims or mandates 
of authority. wbere the exercise of power fails to elicit the 
desired response, we may properly speak of rebellion against 
authority. 
The complexity of authority relationships becomes evident 
as we recognize the degree _to which such opposed attitudes as 
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rebellion-conformity , and dependence-independence may exist 
side by si de in the human mind. One ' s res p onse to authori ty 
is always ch a racteriz e d by s.mb i val enc e which may or may n ot 
b e evident in an isol a ted act . Fo r this r eason , it is wise 
to speak in terms of patterns of conformity , patterns of re-
bellion, and patte r n s of ambivalence if t here is to b e any 
real basis for study and evaluation. 
As a bas i s for this evaluation, we hav e suggested three 
levels or dimension s of a u thori t y with whi ch t he person must 
come to terms, i f he is to a chieve religious maturity. Heter-
onomy, the i mposition of laws or controls u pon an i nd ividual 
from outside himself, is a necessary condition during t h e 
period of prolonged and pronounced dependency , that stretches 
from infancy to adolescence. As external "power over" the 
child, heteronomy normally declines proportionately with the 
child's increasing "power to" assume responsibility for his 
decisions and a ctions. 
In its positive manifestations, heteronomy has beneficial 
a nd protective effects t hat are highl y nece s sary to the child's 
sense of se cu ri ty . His basic need s are satisfied, his lif e 
is sus tained, and he is gradually pre pared f or an effective 
role in the larger communiti es of pe r s on s be y ond t h e home. 
His a c culturation is never without frustration , demand , and 
confl ict, but even under l ess-than-opti mum conditions , h is 
g rowi ng i dent i fica tion with h is parents and his s ense of a 
meani ngf u l, widening be longingness , more t han compensate f or 
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his difficulties. 
Rebellion again st parental restrictions and injunctions 
during early childhood has reli g ious significance in the 
sense that paren tal a uthority is ultimate in the eyes of the 
child. There is add itional significance in t he psychoanalytic 
insight that c e rtain rebel l ious patterns a gainst parental 
authority in the e a rly years may eventually become general-
ized and find expression in pathological forms of rebellion 
against God and other religious authorities. Pathologi cal 
rebellion usu ally betrays a bas ic distrust and a highly 
negative image of authority. 
Autonomy repre s ents a secon d dime n sion of a u t h ority and 
a second phase in the process of religious maturation . If 
heteronomy means coming to terms with externa l authority in 
the light of one's extreme dependen cy, autonomy requires an 
acceptance of one' s own authority in the l j_ght of one 's need 
for independence, as well as dependent relatj_onshj_ps. Au-
tonomy is the capacity to trust the totality of one's exper-
ience as a reliable basis f or making free and res p ons ible 
decisions and consciously affirmi ng life - directing values. 
Irrational autonomy fails t o establish realistic limits on 
personal auth ority and freedom . Rational autonomy recognizes 
its limitati ons and is not in conflict wi t h the concept of 
realistic dependency upon sources of guidance and help outside 
of oneself. 
The psychology of Andrhs Angyal posits not only a trend 
toward autonomy or self-government but also a trend 
toward homonomy which points to the third and culminating 
stage in religious maturation, so far as this dissertation 
is concerned. Homonomy is a trend to harmonize oneself with 
a unit, cause, or force that both transcends and impinges 
upon the individual. Homonomy moves autonomy away from ego-
centrism, and autonomy moves homonomy away from authoritar-
ianism. Each trend thus serves a corrective function in 
relation to the other. 
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A fourth dimension of authority relationships--the-
onomy--is a theistic extension of the concept of homonomy. 
Theonomy postulates a basic harmony between the laws of God 
and the essential nature or innermost laws of man. It abol-
ishes any possible contradiction between autonomy and homonomy, 
and goes on to suggest that in religious surrender to God, 
one's freedom, productivity, and responsibility as an auton-
omous person find their maximum fulfillment. 
In order to have a descriptive, psychological corollary 
to the concept of theonomy, we have equated mature religious 
behavior with those actions or endeavors by which a person 
attempts to harmonize his life with the values and purposes 
of Ultimate Authority, in the belief that such conformity and 
devotion will lead to the fullest development of his poten-
tialities as an autonomous person. Stated more concisely, 
value-oriented surrender to Ultimate Authority emerges as the 
central criterion for our evaluation of rebellion against au-
thority. 
Placing mature religious behavior in an obverse rela-
tionship with rebellious behavior establishes a logical and 
psycholog ica l antithesis that would seem to predetermine the 
outcomes of any assessment of rebellion in relation to reli-
gious maturation. Dynamically speaking, ho wever, rebellion 
can never be evaluated apart from its origins within person-
ality, the environmental stimuli which evoke it, its modes, 
goals, t a rgets, its relationship to percep tual distortions 
of authority, and its ultimate effects on personality and in-
terpersonal relationships. 
The nature and degree of ambivalent feelings and atti-
tudes are additional variables that argue against a radical 
and final dichotomy between religious rebellion and religious 
surrender. 
For the sake of establishing realistic limits, we chose 
to focus primarily on the etiological factors in rebellion 
against God, as the basis for our analysis. Other factors 
and other dimensions of rebellion were introduced as they 
appeared to have relevance to the primary concern of the dis-
sertation. 
In our survey of etiological theories of rebellion, we 
considered those based on frustration, conflict, instinct, 
and threat. While none of these hypotheses are limited to 
rebellion as distinct from generalized aggression, each con-
tributes to our understanding of the causality of rebellion. 
Frustration is an important factor in the social context of 
rebellion; the conflictual and instinctual theories attempt 
to elucidate intrapsychic factors. 
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Of the four, the concept of threat appears to offer the 
most valid and workable hypothesis, partly because it compre-
hends the intrapsychic and interpersonal dimensions, and, be-
yond these, the existential realities which affect man's re-
sponse to Ultimate Authority. Although threat does not account 
for the source or sources of rebellious energy within person-
ality as instinctual theories attempt to do, it does sharpen 
both the frustration and conflictual hypotheses by suggesting 
a more fundamental, common denominator. 
With value-oriented surrender to God as the crucial 
criterion of religious maturity and threat as the central etio-
log ical factor in rebellion, the dissertation has attempted 
to evaluate three types of rebellion against authority. Build-
ing on the psychological concepts of ~proactive" or "character-
conditioned" responses or attitudes, we postulated pathological 
religious rebellion as defiant or resistive behavior which is 
directed against God and oriented primarily to the threat of 
repressed forces in personality. We anticipated that rebel-
lion, in this form, would approximate Allport's definition of 
a negative sentiment. 
Surveying the psychological literature, we found in 
Horney's triad of neurotic personality types t hree noncreatlve 
ways of handling rebellious tendencies. In addition, we noted 
Horney's tendency to trace neurosis to a basic conflict between 
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rebellion and dependency. Childhood rebellion against per-
ceived or manifest threats by parental authority is usually 
repressed in favor of or for the sake of the child 1 s extreme 
dependency upon the parents. The result is a 11 basic anxiety" 
which creates feelings of helplessness in the face of an 
environment that is potentially hostile to one 1 s most legiti-
mate wishes and strivings. Objectively, the anxiety is that 
the repressed rebellion will emerge into consciousness and 
sabotage one•s dependency relationships. 
Strictly speaking, pathological rebellion occurs where 
the conflict between the incompatible attitudes of rebellion 
and dependency is resolved through the repression of dependency 
needs. When directed against God, pathological rebellion may 
be triggered by the fear of passivity in relation to the reli-
gious demand for surrender. Or, narcissism may spark the 
defiant behavior. In any event, emotionally overdetermined 
rebellion is a defensive reaction against perceived threats 
to one•s neurotic character structure. That is to say, it is 
security-oriented, and it regards the claim for religious 
surrender as an unmanageable threat to the personality•s 
security system. The result is prolonged, and largely in-
appropriate rebellion against God. 
A second type of rebellion is represented in the struggle 
of personality to be free of restraints or encroachments that 
threaten the development or exercise of one 1 s autonomy. In 
contrasting this type with the pathological variety, we noted 
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the former's future f rame of r e f e rence, its relationsh ip to 
legitimate strivings of the r eal self, its r elative freedom 
from unconsciou s determinant s , a nd its primary orien t a tion 
to interperson a l vis a vis intrapsych ic threats. 
Among t h e non-neu rotic factors that may a ttach them-
selves to t he drive f or a u tonomy a nd rais e obs t acl es against 
religious surrender, we listed the n e e d to resist (an elus ive 
if not unexplainable source of op position), prid e or excessive 
individualism, fear of passivity , and the struggle for identity. 
This last phenomenon i nvolves a need to repudiate whi ch appears 
to be more transitional and more cl osely associated with ado-
lescence than the generalized need to resist. 
As with patholog ical rebell ion , autonomy-orien ted rebel-
lion is .only one aspect of a pronounced ambivalen ce toward au-
thority. An i mportant difference between the two types is 
the degree to which the autonomous person finds creative alter-
natives to repression, projection, a n d d isplacement . One 
alternative to au thoritarian submission is a critica l rejection 
of God, on the basis of a perceived antipathy b etwe en religious 
surrender a nd personal fre e dom, produ c t ivene ss , and re sp on si-
bility. Rationa l doubt is a synonym for t h is t y pe of rejection. 
Rational rebellion serves a number of vvorthvvhile, thera-
peutic functions , e specially where it opposes relig ious au-
thoritarianism with the de mand that valu e s b e allowed to grow 
ou t of personal e xperience and refle c tion . On t h e other hand , 
its strides toward fr e edom tend to become an escape from all 
legitimate forms of authority. As a consequence, both 
autonomy and theonomy are thwarted. 
Martin Luther's resolution of his identity crisis re-
flects a second alternative to authoritarian submission. It 
is the way of religious commitment that leads to creative 
forms of devotion and rebellion. Luther's devotion to God 
enabled him to repudiate the lesser authority of the Pope 
and thus to channelize creatively energies that otherwise 
might have turned toward self-destructive ends. In closing 
this analysis, we noted that latitude rather than strict 
patterns of conformity prevails in the practices of many re-
ligious bodies. 
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This dissertation has suggested a third category for 
analysis under the rubric of existential rebellion. Here the 
rebellious response to the demand for religious surrender is 
evoked by a sense of ultimate threat arising from the human 
situation. Urangst describes this experience of manifest 
threat. The resulting defiance may be called basic rebel-
lion, because it appears to underlie both pathological and 
autonomous forms. If it is not repressed. or displaced, ex-
istential rebellion will be directed against nature, or God 
as the Source or Ground of existence. In this sense, it 
comprises religious rebellion in its purest form. 
Because limited studies show attitudes toward death as 
one dimension of existential threat to be highly camouflaged 
and evasive, we surveyed the literature in which existential 
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rebellion i s mos t manifes t. Robert M. Lindner's psychology 
of rebelli on was found to have much i n common wi t h t he views 
of Albert Camus who offers value -oriented rebelli on against 
Go d as a crea tive a l ternative to submission and nihi lism. 
Both men believe that rebellion de f i n es the e s sen tial nature 
of ma n a nd that t h eistic r e ligion tends t o stifle man ' s 
p owers t h r ough its emphas i s on conf ormi t y . 
An y r ealistic a ppraisal o f existential , value-orien ted 
rebellion must recognize the e leme n t s o f coura ge , honesty , 
i n te gri ty , c ompas si on , and decen cy . On t h e negative s i de , 
the rebel i s found to be deficient i n wha t Fr ankl cal ls t h e 
" attitudinal values ," limited in a v:areness of hi s own gu ilt , 
a n d rigid i n h i s op p o s iti on to one of l ife's bas ic r hy t hms--
re signati on . 
In a ll of thes e c ons iderations , the d i ssertati on has 
relied on h i stori cal re s earch and on logi cal and psychologic a l 
analy s is a s methodol ogies . For the most part, the r e l evant 
literature pr oved t o b e h i ghly t heoret i cal i n nature a n d usually 
rebellion a gains t authority was a sec on dary rath er t h a n a 
primary fo cu s i n t he s e f ormulations . 
2. Conclu s i ons 
The present s t udy has alrea dy i n troduced a numbe r of 
hypotheses and c onclusi ons relat ive t o reli g i ous maturation 
a n d t h e three theoretical categories of rebelli on agains t 
authority. To re state a ll of t hes e he re woul d not be feas i ble. 
Instead, we conclude the d.Jssertation with the following 
observations : which are designed to reflect the present 
status of the psychology of rebellion, some of its impli-
cations for the psychology of religion, and, in several in-
stances, recommendations for further study. 
1) Up to the present time, many branches of psychology 
have stressed the negative aspects of authority. Numerous 
studies of authoritarianism have been launched in the last 
decade--an understandable response to the alarming inroads 
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of fascism and prejudice into the vital structures of nations 
and societies. A subtle danger in this preoccupation is that 
perverted forms of authority will be allowed to cast a length-
ening shadow over those which are genuine in character and 
benevolent in their function. Authoritarianism does not dis-
prove the validity of authority, and autonomy does not rep-
resent a contradiction of theonomy. Since pathology tends 
to be a major concern of dynamic psychology, it may be that 
the psychology of religion can play a larger role in elucidating 
what it means to come to terms with authority, thus demon-
strating the positive or creative functions of authority. 
2) Because of its concerns with the negative influence 
of authority, some branches of psychology have also been ex-
tremely critical of submission to or conformity with authority 
that transcends the self. The studies of authoritarianism by 
Adorno and his collaborators do not exalt submission, but 
neither do they find it -to be an evil per se. Rather, these 
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investigations show that the nature, motivation, and goals 
of one's submis s ion determine its psycholog ical value or dis-
value. Again, the need is for a holistic psychology tha t 
g ives fairly balanced consideration to the productive, as 
well as the disruptive, functions of authority and submission. 
J) Before the validity of personal responses to Ultimate 
Authority can be psychologically tested with any effective-
ness, it appears that much more attention will need to be 
given to the trend toward homonomy. At present, the interest 
of many psychologists stops with autonomy. There is a kind of 
indifference to the whole question of man's need for devotion 
to or association with a transcendent cause. Clinical studies 
of authoritarianism make a contribution to our understanding 
of repressive homonomy and heteronomy, but the full implica-
tions of the trend toward homonomy have not been fully elab-
orated and clinically tested. 
4) Many of the present tools of psychology fail to 
satisfy the requirements of religious experience. In assess-
ing religious authority, for example, the antinomies of au-
thoritarian-democratic, rational-irrational, and heteronomous-
a utono mous are inadequate. Ultimate Authority cannot be com-
prehended by these categories. The God-man relationship is 
hardly democratic, but neither is it authoritarian. Man's 
deepest response to God cannot be justified by reason alone, 
but this does not make the relig ious response necessarily 
irrational. "Supra-rational" deserves equal consideration 
as a diagnostic category. Fi~ally, as we have suggested 
earlier, the tension between heteronomy and autonomy does 
not comprehend the third dimension of homonomy or theonomy 
without which no psychology of authority is complete. 
5) Our study supports the psychoanalytic insight that 
all personal responses to authority are characterized by 
ambivalence, and that this ambivalence often consists of eon-
flicting attitudes of rebellion and dependency. In neurosis, 
this ambivalence is resolved by repression or the limiting 
of self-awareness. In the authoritarian personality, de-
pendency is directed toward authorities of great or unlimited 
power and rebellion is expressed openly only toward those au-
thorities in which~akness or severe limitation is evident. 
In a more general solution, the ambivalenee is split by dis-
placing or transferring at least one of the conflicting atti-
tudes away from the original object. One other pattern is 
the alternation of rebellious and dependency moods toward 
the same authority. This solution implies a constant state 
of tension which can be endured indefinitely by only a rel-
atively few persons. 
6) Rebellion against authority appears to be closely 
linked with conditions of threat, especially conditions of 
chronic threat which cannot be alleviated by individual ini-
tiative, resourcefulness, and perserverance. Sustained threat 
which nourishes feelings of impotence and helplessness appears 
to be the most common cause of rebellion. Intrapsychic, 
interpersonal, and impersonal ~hreats are three major types 
which have received primary attention in this study. All 
three have religious significance to the degree that they 
influence the individual's ability to harmonize his life 
with the claims of Ultimate Authority. 
7) Both the psychological and theological references 
undergirding this study confirm the paradoxical influence 
of authority as a potential source of both security and 
threat. This observation is consistent with the ubiquity 
of ambivalence and suggests that a partial explanation of 
this ambivalence resides in the nature of authority itself. 
A survey of the psychology of religion indicates that the 
perception of threat in Ultimate Authority is regarded al-
most exclusively as the result of repressed hostility or 
guilt, i.e. a pathological phenomenon. 
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Theoretically, this view seems too limited to do jus-
tice to the complex nature of authority and the emotional 
components that attach themselves to the concept of Ultimate 
Authority. Since Ultimate Authority has ultimate power, in-
cluding the issues of life ani death, it seems inevitable 
that all religious experience should include Urangst and that 
a courageous confrontation of this threat should be a pre-
requisite of religious maturi~. 
These are considerations that may find illumination 
in the inquiries of existential analysis into experiences of 
human crises and the underlying structures of reality. Here, 
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we only wish to note that if _some branches of psychology seem 
unduly pessimistic about the role of Ultimate Authority, the 
psychology of religion needs to beware of oversimplification 
on the side of positive interpretation. It is to be hoped 
that Feifel's investigations of the meaning of death will be 
advanced by others and that some clinical data eventually will 
emerge to test the observations of Rumke concerning the con-
flict between threat and religious surrender. 
8) Nothing has been found in the three types of rebel-
lion studies to alter the earlier conclusion that rebellion 
against authority is best thought of as a reactive rather 
than an instinctual phenomenon. As a result of this study, 
rebellion emerges as a capacity rather than a need--a ca-
pacity which becomes actualized under conditions of real or 
perceived threat and subject to dissolution upon the passing 
of threat. 
The likelihood of confirming this view seems remote 
when we consider that man lives constantly under conditions 
of intrapsychic, interpersonal, or existential threat. Under 
these conditions, rebellion may become a fundamental dimension 
of man as Camus insists it is. Nevertheless, logical argument 
and a measure of clinical substantiation join to support the 
theory that rebellion is basically a response to threat, and 
that its primary values to personality are instrumental in 
character. 
9) The dissertation has failed to establish with 
finality that certain forms of rebellion are more disruptive 
of the religious maturation processes than are other forms. 
Nevertheless, there are bases for suggesting the following 
hierarchy of rebellious types, beg inning with those which 
appear to mepit the poorest prognosis from a religious stand-
point. 
i. Displaced rebellion 
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A pathological manifestation, this category points to 
unconscious motivation and a corresponding paucity of insight 
and conscious values. There is the likelihood that such re-
bellion actually thl"larts insight by directing psychic energies 
and mental activity away from the true center of conflict 
within personality. In general, the disruptive and destruc-
tive outcomes of this kind of rebellion cannot be arrested 
without psychotherapy, in which a non-punitive, non-author-
itarian counselor helps the counselee to face and understand 
the intrapsychic causes underlying his rebellion against God. 
ii. Rebellion as a consciously-affirmed value 
Although this category might be construed to include 
the psychopathic or sociopathic personality, we have in mind 
here Albert Camus' description of the "Sons of Cain," for 
whom rebellion ultimately becomes an end in itself--indeed, 
the chief goal of man's striving. Since rebellion in this 
form is directed against God and nature in the name of values, 
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and since, conversely, ~esignation is denied any legitimate 
place in the range of man's responses to life, the opposition 
to religious surrender seems to be intransigent and final. 
iii. Transitory rebellion 
This type of rebellion appears to accompany a search 
for personal identity, a testing of authority relationships, 
and a critical approach to values and. causes that lay claim 
to one's devotion. As such, we associate it primarily with 
the adolescent years. 
There is always the possibility that transitory rebel-
lion will become an end in itself or that the testing of 
religion will result in a life-long rejection of all theistic 
claims upon one's life. However, since these outcomes may 
depend to a large extent upon the way adolescent rebellion 
is handled by parents, ministers, and other authority figures, 
there is justification in making this a separate category. 
This rubric may also be applied to other crises in life 
wherein the temporary rejection of God accompanies an exper-
ience of profound threat or loss and presages the gradual 
deepening rather than the dissolution of all positive ties 
between the individual and his God. 
iv. Rebellion against authoritarianism. 
Rebellion against an authoritarian God stands in marked 
contrast to the authoritarian submission which Fromm and other 
psychologists have attacked. such rebellion implies prerequisites 
of courage, consciously-affirmed values, and a large measure 
of autonomy. To the degree that this type of revolt marks 
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a shattering of infantile or neurotic relationships with God, 
it may be seen as a specific form of transitory rebellion. 
Regardless of its final outcome, it signifies a healthy avoid-
ance of a limitation of self-awareness through patterns of 
repression. In many instances, rebellion against an author-
itarian God represents a replacing of the authority of fiat 
with the authority of personal experience. 
On the negative side, the critical faculty in such re-
bellion may fail to perceive the crucial difference between 
the true nature of Ultimate Authority and the religious theol-
ogies, institutions, doctrines, and practices by which men 
seek to represent this Authority. Or, rebellion may attempt 
to make autonomy the ultimate solution to the problem of 
coming to terms with authority, in which case the old idolatry 
is simply replaced by another form. 
v. Rebellion as an alternating rhythm in religious life 
It is difficult to envisage a mature relationship 
with Ultimate Authority, that is altogether free of rebel-
lion. However, a reading of religious biographies and auto-
biographies suggests that a steady diminution of rebellion is 
in keeping with the growing sense of trust and confidence that 
permeates the theonomous relationship. 
For a majority of persons, rebellion against God seems 
to be an inescapable, alternating rhythm of the religious 
life, and one tha t needs to ~e faced honestly and dealt with 
creatively. We have already referred positively to Luther's 
creative handling of ambivalence toward authority and to 
Klink's analysis of permissive patterns at work in many re-
lig ious bodies. Confessional elements in public and priva te 
worship offer specific opportunity for the honest confronta-
tion of inner rebellion against God. 
The recognition that one is accep ted in spite of re-
current surges of animosity and defia nce toward God as Ulti-
mate Authority, appears to be inseparable from the experience 
of a theonomous relationship. 
10) Our inability to make unequivocal, psychological 
generalizations concerning rebellion against Ultimate Au-
t hority, may be traced partially to insufficient resea rch 
and inadequa te methodology. On the other hand, the demon-
stra ted complexity of the subject argues against monolith ic 
formulations. 
Because of the numerous variables tha t may have rele-
vance, we conclude tha t some diagnostic categories are needed 
and that the three we have suggested in Chapters IV, V, and 
VI may serve a useful, if limited, purpose in future studies. 
We also contend that isolated acts of rebellion are 
seldom as meaningful as rebellious patterns wh ich c an be re-
l a ted long itudinally to some schema of religious or personality 
growth. The heteronomy-autonomy-theonomy progression simply 
elucida tes the kinds of criteria that are needed for any valid 
measurement of the effects of rebellion upon personalj. ty 
development. 
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11) Rebellion a gainst God as a psychological phenom-
enon appears to have its most negative e f fect s upon the 
progression by which the individual moves f rom autonomy to 
theonomy. The creative function of such rebellion is 
evident where it serves to shatter infantile, authoritarian 
stereotypes, define realistically the limitat ions of pe r-
sonal authority , and explore the variou s dimensions of a 
deepening a wareness of God. Through out t he i nd ividual's 
struggle for relig ious maturity, rebellious attitudes are 
a partial corrective for authoritarian tenden cies. In the 
final analysis, however, rebellion a ppears to f urther 
more effectively the g oals of autonomy than tho se of theonomy. 
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ABSTRACT 
Sho ok, Charle s A. Rebellion against Au t ho rity in 
Rel igious Maturation. Ph.D., Bostong University , Boston, 
Ma s s., 1963. 279 pages. 
Problem: 
The problem of the dissertati on was to m~~e a preliminary , 
psychological assessment of rebellion against authority in 
relation to individual growth toward reli gious maturity. In 
approaching this problem, t he dissertation relied on h istorical 
research and log ical and psychological analysis. 
Procedure: 
To clarify the meaning of reli gious maturity in terms of 
authority relation s hips, t he study hypothesized t h ree basic 
stages of developmen t: heteronomy, autonomy , and t h eonomy . A 
creative interacti on between the s econd a n d third concepts pro-
vided the basis for a worki ng definition of mature religious be-
havior. 
A second procedural devel opment y ielde d three putative 
categories of rebellion, based on real or perceived threat as 
the central etiological factor i n rebellious patterns. The three 
types analyzed were: 1) Pathol ogical Rebellion, motivated by 
intrapsychic threat; 2) Autonomy-oriented Rebellion, motivated 
by interpersona l threat; a n d 3) Existe n tial Rebellion , growing· 
out of impersonal or existential threat. 
The remaining task of t h e dissertation was one of studying 
psychologically t h e relat i onship betwe e n t h e three t ype s of re-
bellion and the t h r ee stag es of reli g i ous development. 
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Findings and Con clusions : 
1. Mos t of t h e psychologica l literature to date stresses 
t h e ne gative aspects both of authority and of submiss ion t o 
authority. Rebellion often is a n i mplicit if not an explicit 
value in many analyse s of a u thority. The positive functi ons 
of authority and conformi ty have remained largely undefined. 
Although there are notabl e exceptions, many s tudents of person-
ality regard autonomy as t h e ultima te solution to t h e question 
of authority. Homonomy and t h eon omy are often neglected con -
cepts, or else they are surrounded with negative connotations. 
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2. Theoretically, rebellion against authority i s be s t 
thought of as a rea ctive rather than an instinctual phenomenon--
a capacity whi ch ma y become actualized under c ondit i ons of real 
or perceived threat . Alth ough not mutually ex clusive, the 
categ orie s of intrapsy c h ic, i nterpersonal, and existential 
threat offer a framework for s tudying and evaluating rebellious 
patterns of behavior. 
3. Ambivalent feelings and attitudes toward authori ty 
appea r to be the r u le, rath er than strict patterns of devotion 
or rebellion. This observation has relig ious significance in 
that, paradoxically, Ultima te Authority canno t be divorced f rom 
powers of u ltimat e s ecu rity and threat, reward and puni shment. 
Although t h ey have particular s i gnificanc e for n euros i s , re-
bellion and d ependency appear to be i mportant variables in 
normal r espons e s to t h e claims of Ultimate Authority . 
4. Of the types cons idered, pathological rebellion appears 
to exert a c ons isten tly disrup tive influen ce u p on reli g ious 
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maturation, thwarting both autonomous and theonomous strivings . 
Autonomy-oriented an d existen tial t ypes are serious deterrents 
to maturation , to the de gree tha t rebelli on ~ s e emerges as 
the pers onality's chief value , with a concomitant stifling of 
natural tendencies toward a f filiation and re s ignation. 
5. Because the element of threat is ineradicable from 
human experience, religi ous ma t ur a ti on appears to be character-
ized by the diminution of rebellion a gainst Ulti:tnate Authority , 
rather than its complete disappearance from conscious and un-
c onscious levels of pers onality. From t h is pers pective , the 
creative redirecting of rebellious i mpul s es against various 
forms of authoritarianism, emerges as a di s t i nct criterion of 
religious maturity. 
6. Rebelli on a ga i nst authority appears to have it s most 
positive effects upon the progression by whi ch t he i n dividual 
moves f r om heteron omy to autonomy. However , it s c rea tive con-
sequences for both auton omy and theonomy are evi dent where it 
serves to shatter infantile stereotypes of Ultir.1 a te Authority , 
define realistically t h e limitations a nd res ponsibilities of 
personal authority, delineate c onscious values , counteract 
authoritarian tendencies , and crystallize pers onal identity. 
7. vVhen viewed as a reactive phenomenon an d as instrumental 
behavior, rebellion a gainst Ultimate Authority a s sumes genuine 
but limited validity as an index of reli giou s maturation . In 
the final analysis , whether an individua l rebels against God 
or submits to Him is not as i mportant as the way he perceives 
God, and the conscious and unconscious meanings which underlie 
his behavior. 
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